Congressional Abdication on War and SpendingTexas A&M University Press, 2000 - Всего страниц: 220 The balance of powers among the branches of government is the defining structure of American democracy. The Founders assumed each branch would jealously guard its own prerogatives to prevent tyrannical power. Were they wrong? In recent years Congress has progressively abdicated its role in two crucial areas: war powers and the budget process. The result is a chief executive with too few constraints and too little restraint, to the detriment of national policy and democratic processes. How has this come about, and what are the implications of this changing balance of powers? Louis Fisher addresses these pressing questions in a carefully argued study of congressional power. He examines how attempts by Congress to reassert its will in the wake of Watergate ultimately resulted in further surrender of legislative power to the presidency. This book will engage students of the governmental process and help them to understand not only the issues at stake in balanceofpower questions, but also how to conduct civic discussion and reasoned argument. In the end, Fisher advocates a return to constitutional principle on the part of lawmakers and the education of citizens who will insist that Congress protect those principles. |
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Louis Fisher. Copyright © 2000 by Louis Fisher Manufactured in the United States of America All rights reserved First edition The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of ...
Louis Fisher. Copyright © 2000 by Louis Fisher Manufactured in the United States of America All rights reserved First edition The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of ...
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... American framers did not borrow the separation doctrine from Mont- esquieu , who presented a tidy , uncomplicated ... America accumulated their own insights into the prob- lem of checks and balances . During this period , complaints ...
... American framers did not borrow the separation doctrine from Mont- esquieu , who presented a tidy , uncomplicated ... America accumulated their own insights into the prob- lem of checks and balances . During this period , complaints ...
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... American troops abroad . This discretionary authority did not extend to taking the country into full - scale war or to mount an offensive attack against other nations . As John Bassett Moore , a noted scholar of international law ...
... American troops abroad . This discretionary authority did not extend to taking the country into full - scale war or to mount an offensive attack against other nations . As John Bassett Moore , a noted scholar of international law ...
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... American citizens whose actions might have embroiled the United States in the war between France and England . Al ... Americans " originally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate , and probably the dominant , role in ...
... American citizens whose actions might have embroiled the United States in the war between France and England . Al ... Americans " originally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate , and probably the dominant , role in ...
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... American War of 1898 , World War I , and World War II . On other occasions Congress used the statutory process to authorize war , as with the " Quasi War " with France from 1798 to 1800 and the Barbary wars during the Jefferson and ...
... American War of 1898 , World War I , and World War II . On other occasions Congress used the statutory process to authorize war , as with the " Quasi War " with France from 1798 to 1800 and the Barbary wars during the Jefferson and ...
Содержание
LVI | 122 |
LVII | 125 |
LVIII | 127 |
LIX | 130 |
LX | 132 |
LXI | 134 |
LXII | 137 |
LXIII | 140 |
LXIV | 142 |
LXV | 143 |
LXVI | 146 |
LXVII | 147 |
LXVIII | 149 |
LXIX | 151 |
LXX | 153 |
LXXI | 155 |
LXXII | 158 |
LXXIII | 162 |
LXXIV | 163 |
LXXV | 165 |
LXXVI | 166 |
LXXIX | 167 |
LXXX | 168 |
LXXXII | 169 |
LXXXV | 170 |
LXXXVI | 171 |
LXXXVII | 173 |
XC | 175 |
XCI | 176 |
XCII | 179 |
XCIII | 182 |
XCIV | 185 |
XCV | 209 |
XCVI | 213 |
XCVII | 215 |
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action administration agreed amendment American appropriations appropriations bill approval argued Armed Forces asked attack authority balanced bill billion Bosnia branch budget Bush called citizens claimed Clinton commit Committee Cong Congress congressional constitutional continued court debate decided decision defense deficit delegated Department effect emergency enacted executive federal force foreign framers funds give gress ground Haiti hearings House Ibid impoundment increase initiatives institutional interests Iraq issue item veto John Justice language later leaders legislative limited majority means members of Congress military military force necessary never objected operations Panama passed political prerogatives president presidential procedure proposed protect Reagan Relations representative resolution responsibility Security Council Senate separate sess Source spending statute statutory tion treaty troops Truman United unless veto vote wanted Washington World
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Стр. 5 - ... that the legislative, executive and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of each other as the nature of a free government will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of unity and amity.
Стр. 3 - The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Стр. 8 - Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.
Стр. 6 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Стр. 37 - X., or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty...
Стр. 59 - Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.
Стр. 6 - The powers delegated by this constitution are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial, nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.
Стр. 39 - Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
Стр. 141 - ... competence of the speaker to suppress as if it were against order. For were he permitted to draw questions of consistence within the vortex of order, he might usurp a negative on important modifications, and suppress, instead of subserving, the legislative will.
Стр. 17 - Congress ex majore cautela and in anticipation of such astute objections, passing an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President, etc., as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.
Ссылки на эту книгу
While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers William G. Howell,Jon C. Pevehouse Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced Matthew A. Crenson,Benjamin Ginsberg Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |