the direction of autonomy and of fiscal concessions. 'Dominion Home Rule' is an unhappy phrase, and should not be used. For powers-in regard to military and naval forces, for example-may be entrusted to a Parliament sitting two or three thousand miles away, which cannot safely be entrusted to a Parliament sitting in Dublin or Belfast. A new offer of the kind which we have indicated might or might not be accepted by the Sinn Fein party, represented by Mr de Valera; it would probably be rejected with scorn by the dangerous men who form the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and whom Sinn Fein is now unable, even it were willing, to check or control. But we should occupy a much better position in the face of America and of our Colonies, if we were able to demonstrate that Ireland had been offered everything that she can reasonably ask, while remaining within the Empire, than we are now when we can only say that we have offered a measure of Home Rule which, by all parties, loyalist or Republican, in the South of Ireland, has been declared to be unworkable. It is not worth while for Britain to haggle over the amount of the Imperial contribution which Ireland should pay. Ireland will be mean indeed if she refuses to pay her fair share; but it would be better for Britain to secure peace, even at a price, than to continue the policy of the past year which has signally failed to accomplish the end for which it was designed.

The newspapers of June 13 forecast fresh military activities in Ireland, and upon this some comment may be useful. We repudiate altogether the foolish saying, 'Force is no remedy.' Force is often the only remedy, when you are dealing with men of violence. But if force is to be used, you must be prepared to use it to the full. And the military authorities at Dublin Castle have never been given freedom of action. They are like a man fighting with one hand tied behind his back. The Government are afraid of admitting publicly what every one knows, viz. that their half-hearted policy has failed. It is a policy of declaring martial law here and there, while centres of sedition and murderous plotting like Dublin are not subject to it; of arresting the subordinates, while the leaders, de Valera and the rest, are allowed their freedom; of declaring Sinn Fein an illegal

organisation, while no attempt is made to punish any one merely for being a Sinn Feiner. This policy has failed. Life and property are more insecure in Ireland than they have been for a hundred years at least; and our brave soldiers and the equally brave Irish Constabulary are being murdered, three or four daily, not to speak of innocent and loyal civilians. The loyalist minority who gave all they could to the Empire during the war, who gave as many recruits in proportion to their numbers as any district in England, are living in intolerable fear.

Sir Hamar Greenwood has failed to redeem his promises that he would soon have murder by the throat. He has failed; and his policy should be changed. His policy is that of trying to compel the Southern Irish Nationalist to accept an Act of Parliament which no one in Ireland approves; and to do this, while it is matter of common knowledge that the Government which he represents is willing to amend it. Such a policy can only succeed if it has the sanction of overwhelming military force behind it, and this the British Parliament is unable or unwilling to provide.

Would it not be the wiser course, even now, to make a public offer to Ireland, and particularly to Southern Ireland, of as generous a nature as is possible without danger to Britain? If that fails, it may be a miserable necessity to pour more troops into Ireland and reconquer the country. But, at any rate, such drastic measures would then be understood to be inevitable. There must, in any case, be a further period of unrest in Ireland, during which the criminals who form the Irish Republican Brotherhood are gradually suppressed. To remove the soldiers or the auxiliary police now, as some politicians have suggested, would be a great wrong to the loyal population, who would then be left at the mercy of unscrupulous criminals. But it would be a great gain if the majority of Irish Nationalists, who are not all criminals, could be enlisted on the side of order; and this may perhaps yet be done if Britain can persuade them of her bona fides and her genuine goodwill.

Art. 11.-THE WAR OF THE MINES.

IN the voluminous annals of industrial strife, whereby the present stage of civilisation is distinguished from all others, the year 1921 will surpass all previous records -has already done so though it is but half run-not in the number of disputes, but in their magnitude and duration and in the consequent loss involved. For this invidious prominence the coal-mining industry is chiefly responsible. It does not stand alone, but it supplies by far the largest item in the account. Both in itself and by reason of its effects on industry in general the coal dispute of this year stands out as the greatest effort yet made by the forces engaged in the production of wealth to destroy their own function by turning what should be co-operation into conflict. It is the highest peak yet climbed in that particular mountain range of human folly. Other people, who have other ideals and regard the production of wealth rather as a necessary evil than as a good in itself, are free to excuse or justify and even applaud these interruptions of the process, as men find virtue in armed warfare; and those who hold that adversity is good for the soul may view national impoverishment with equanimity. But it is not open to men whose object in life is the production of wealth to defend their own failure by any such argument. Folly has many forms, as we have learnt from the witty satire of Erasmus, and for some of them much may be said; but action which defeats its own object is folly absolute. A man making for some destination who takes a road that leads elsewhere is held to be unwise or ignorant; but one who deliberately proceeds in the opposite direction is justly thought insane.

If it is argued that the object is eventually served and production advanced by these conflicts the answer is a flat denial of the fact. A school-boy tussle, a fisticuff encounter, a duel on a question of honour, may allay ill-feeling and lead to friendship, though it often does not; but in such cases the cause of quarrel is subjective, and the only method of allaying passion is an appeal to force. The object is, in fact, secured by the vindication of self-respect; nor is any material loss incurred. But

industrial differences are objective and can be settled by other means than a trial of strength, which causes material loss to both sides and almost always leaves a legacy of bitterness on one side or on both, which keeps open a running sore to the detriment of the common interest. The object is not attained but made less attainable. In some important industries and localities there is a standing feud reaching back to old conflicts, and many disputes of to-day have their roots in former ones. A 'victory' for either side leaves the other silently determined to get its own back and watching for a favourable opportunity. The best result follows when no decisive advantage is obtained by either and the conflict ends in a standing arrangement for settling future differences. In that case the trial of strength may be said to clear the air,' but at a heavy cost, which might have been avoided, for it is obvious that the same arrangement might have been reached without any cessation of the work by which both parties live.

But there is no need to labour the point. The principle of conciliation, on which so much pains are spent to-day, and all the machinery of joint boards, councils, arbitration courts, public inquiries, and so forth, are a recognition of the folly of industrial strife. So, in another form, are the various theories of an ideal state from which it would be banished by removing the

causes.

Yet we are witnessing to-day an unprecedented outbreak of this very folly, at a time when the nation can less afford to indulge in it than at any previous period in its history. It has crushing debts to liquidate and current expenditure to meet; it is in deeper financial waters than ever before. There is only one way out-the way of work. Other nations in a similar position have taken it; they are at work and working hard. Here less work is being done than ever before. Employment had been falling rapidly for six months prior to the coal stoppage; and by March the trade union returns, which have for many years furnished the basis of the official statistics of unemployment, reached 10 per cent., which has never been equalled in the past, since the record began, except during the coal strike of 1912. It was plain enough that Vol. 236.-No. 468.

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we were sinking deeper into the hole, not rising out of it. Expenditure was increasing while the only source from which it can be met was drying up. And this was the time chosen to cease coal-getting, which could have no other effect than greatly to aggravate all the conditions of economic decline and to accelerate the process. All the parties concerned-including the Government, whose responsibility for precipitating the crisis cannot be evaded-plunged into it without any regard to the national situation or appreciation of the inevitable consequences of their action. That is clear from the subsequent change of attitude forced upon each of them by the actual circumstances which have compelled recognition.

Nor is that all. Right up to the decision of the Miners' Federation on June 10 to take a ballot, partisan spectators who had nothing to do with the quarrel stood round the ring urging on their own side with loud shouts of encouragement to keep up the fight and in no wise to give way an inch. Further, a desperate attempt was made to bring all economic activity to a standstill by a sympathetic strike of railwaymen and other transport workers, and it failed only by a hair's breadth at the last moment. The object was to compel submission to the miners' will or rather to the will of the strategists directing their policy-for they had not been consulted-by causing a complete economic collapse and making life impossible all round. The effect would have been quite different. A general strike of the 'Triple Alliance' would have bound the rest of the community together in active self-defence to resist with the utmost determination the domination of the irresponsible clique controlling the action of these large organised bodies. It was the climax of pugnacity and would have led to a sort of civil war.

The failure of the proposed Triple Alliance strike is an extremely significant fact; it set a limit to the extension of industrial strife. It was due to no action by the mine-owners or the Government, who simply made preparations to fight, but to the refusal of the other bodies to be dragged into a quarrel not their own and one entered into without consulting them. The official apologia presented to the Transport Workers'