gressional intent behind the Bail Reform Act to place the burden of proof upon the government to demonstrate that release should not be granted.

176. U.S. Const., amend. VIII, states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments imposed."

177. Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 12 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1961); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 645 (Harlan, Circuit Justice 1961); Hirt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981); Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 962 (3d Cir. 1981). See also Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) ("[B]ail . . is basic to our system of law"); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (the "traditional right" to bail "serves to prevent infliction of punishment prior to

conviction").

178. This conclusion is warranted in spite of the fact that the House Judiciary Committee ostensibly rejected the per se incorporation of the Bail Reform Act, see House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note 23, at 5. First, in spite of the House bill's statement that 18 U.S.C. SS 3141, 3144, 3146 (a), 3146 (b), 3148 and 3150 (i.e., provisions of the Bail Reform Act) do not per se apply although all other sections of Chapter 207 do per se apply (including other sections of the Bail Reform Act), see H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199 (c) (1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3199 (c) (1), the bill nevertheless goes on to provide that "the release of a person under this subsection shall be deemed a release under section 3146 (a).

See H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3199 (c) (1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, S 3199 (c) (1). 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (a) is a major provision of the Bail Reform Act, setting forth conditions of release which the court may impose. Second, the language of this section of the Bail Reform Act and 18 U.S.C. S 3146 (b), also from the Bail Reform Act which sets forth criteria the court is to use in setting conditions of release, are virtually identical to the corollary provisions of the House bill.

In further support of the conclusion that the House version intends the applicability of the jurisprudential interpretations of the Bail Reform Act in spite of the bill's ostensible rejection of certain provisions of the Act per se, the reader should also bear in mind the following:

1. there was no need to incorporate the applicability of 18 U.S.C. S 3141 into extradition proceedings, since this section establishes the general power of courts and magistrates to release persons on bail and such authority in extradition proceedings is explicitly stated in the House bill at S 3199 (c) (1);

2. there was no need to incorporate the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3144 into extradition proceedings, since this section establishes the power of courts and magistrates to impose additional bail if it appears that bail is insufficient to prevent the person from fleeing the jurisdiction, and such authority in extradition proceedings is provided for in the House bill in § 3199 (c) (7);

3. there was no need to incorporate the applicability of 18 U.S.C. $ 3148 regarding release in capital cases or after conviction into extradition proceedings, since neither of these kinds of situations arises in an extradition proceeding;

4. there was no need to incorporate the applicability of $ 3150 regarding penalties for failure to appear into extradition proceedings, since this provision allocates the penalties according to distinctions as to charge, conviction, etc., that are not readily applicable to extradition proceedings.

179. See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note

23, at 11.

180. H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195 (a) (3); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, S 3195 (a) (3).

181. H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3195 (a) (3) (A) (III); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, & 3195 (a) (3) (A) (III).

182. Such a challenge would, first, require a reconsideration of the rationale of Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903). Given the increased general availability of international travel created by jet airplanes, it no longer seems reasonable to assume that persons suspected of having committed crimes in foreign countries are more likely to flee the United States than persons suspected of having committed crimes within the United States. A challenge to bail procedure on appeal would entail a challenge to the domestic procedure as well. Although Fed. R. App. P. 9 (c) has been rather ably criticized by one commentator, see Note, "Bail Pending Appeal in Federal Court: The Need for a Two-Tiered Approach,"

57 Tex. L. Rev. 275 (1979), it has been accepted by the courts. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 95 n.

50 (3d Cir. 1979).

183. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3192 (d) (1); S. 1940, supra note 5, $ 3192 (d) (1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3192 (d) (1). 184. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903).

185. See S. 220, supra note 7, S 3195 (b) (1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3195 (b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1,

S 3195 (b) (1).

186. See 2 Bassiouni, U.S. International Extradition,

supra note 12, at Chap. IX, S 4.

187.

23, at 12.

See House Judiciary Report on H.R. 6046, supra note
The rule of specialty

stands for the proposition that the re-
questing state which secures the surrender
of a person can prosecute that person only
for the offense for which he or she was
surrendered by the requested state or else
allow that person an opportunity to leave
the prosecuting state to which he or she
had been surrendered.

Bassiouni, U.S. International Extradition, supra note 12, at

Chap. VII, S 6, p. 1.

188. S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 state that

S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193 (b) (2) (B); S. 1940, supra note 5,

S 3193 (b) (2) (B); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193 (b) (2) (B).

189. H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193 (a); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3193 (a); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193 (a). 190. See House Judiciary Report on H. R. 6046, supra note 23, at 13.

191. S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193(b)(1); S. 1940, supra note 5, § 3193(b)(1); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193 (b) (1); H.R. 2643, supra note 8, § 3193 (b)(1); H.R. 6046, supra note 5, § 3193(b) (1); H.R. 5227, supra note 2, § 3193 (b) (1). 192. S. 220, S. 1940, and S. 1639 require that

[t]he court, upon being informed of the
person's consent to removal, shall--

(1) inform the person that he has a
right to consult with counsel and that, if
he is financially unable to obtain coun-
sel, counsel may be appointed to represent
him pursuant to section 3006A; and

(2) address the person to determine
whether his consent is--

(A) voluntary, and not the result of
a threat or other improper inducement; and
(B) given with full knowledge of its
consequences, including the fact that it
may not be revoked after the court has
I accepted it.

S. 220, supra note 7, § 3193 (b); S. 1940, supra note 5,

§ 3193(b); S. 1639, supra note 1, § 3193(b).

H.R. 2643, H.R. 6046, and H.R. 5227 contain a similar

requirement, by providing that

[t]he court shall-

(1) inform a person making a waiver under this section of such person's right to representation by counsel, including counsel appointed without cost to such person if such person is financially unable to obtain counsel; and

(2) inquire of such person and determine whether such waiver is-

(A) voluntary and not the result of threat or other improper inducement; and