6-13, 1922. An invitation to Genoa, April 10-May 19, 1922, was declined since the conclusion was reached that it would be "a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate" (ibid., 1922, 1, 393). However, the Ambassador in Italy was sent to Genoa for the duration of the conference.

The function of an observer was described in the instruction of April 20, 1920 to the Ambassador in Italy for attendance at the San Remo conference (ibid., 1920, 1, 2): "You are not to participate but will act solely as an observer. You are to express no opinion and take no action on any subjects [considered] by the Supreme Council but you are to report the proceedings to the Department and await instructions on any question on which an expression of the views of this Government is desired." The policy of the representative of the United States admitted to the Conference of Ambassadors to be an observer, as described by the first Ambassador in France to fill the position, was that "in every case where it seems that United States in the event of ratifying treaties concerned might even possibly desire to adopt different attitude from that decided upon by Conference a reservation has been made" (ibid., p. 3).

The Acting Secretary of State reported in a circular telegram of January 18, 1921 that it had been decided to discontinue representa tion on the Conference of Ambassadors "since this country has not accepted the Treaty of Versailles and as the most important questions raised by the armistice have been disposed of". By January 28 the Ambassador in France was asked to get copies of the minutes of meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors "informally"; they "would be of great value to the Department".

The Secretary of State of the new administration was equally cautious when he took office in March 1921, while the Principal Allied Powers were sitting in London to decide on the reparation program. From their president on May 6 came this request (ibid., 1921, 1, 12):

"As President of the Allied Conference which is just completing its sittings in London, I am authorised with the unanimous concurrence of all the Powers here represented to express to the United States Government our feeling that the settlement of the international difficulties in which the world is still involved would be materially assisted by the co-operation of the United States; and I am therefore to enquire whether that Government is disposed to be represented in the future, as it was at an earlier date, at Allied Confer

ences, wherever they may meet, at the Ambassadors' Conference, which sits at Paris, and on the Reparations Commission.

"We are united in feeling that American cognizance of our proceedings and, where possible, American participation in them, will be best facilitated by this."

The Government of the United States accepted this invitation the same day, saying that, "while maintaining the traditional policy of abstention from participation in matters of distinctly European concern", it was "deeply interested in the proper economic adjustments and in the just settlement of the matters of world-wide importance which are under discussion in these conferences, and desires helpfully to cooperate in the deliberations upon these questions."

After the Schedule of Payments for reparation was accepted, the Ambassador in London was designated to participate in the Supreme Council without committing his Government "to any action on its part". Nonparticipation was to resolve any difficulty in separating "matters of 'distinctly European concern' from matters of 'worldwide importance'" (ibid., p. 14). The American Ambassador in Paris resumed as "unofficial American observer on the Conference of Ambassadors". His function was "to make reservations for reference to the Department on decisions affecting the interests of the United States", refraining from opinion or comment on other questions and making any commitments only on instructions.

The pattern of participation as it stood in May 1921 remained substantially unchanged so long as questions originating from the Paris Peace Conference were uppermost. The general lines of the policy described were given more rigidity when the Senate's condition to the treaties restoring friendly relations with Germany, Austria, and Hungary became applicable. Attendance of the "observer" at meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors was seldom more than formal. The staff attached to the office of the unofficial American observer on the Reparation Commission rendered many services. Some of the personnel were taken over by the Commission, while the unofficial observer himself was not infrequently called upon to give awards, to umpire questions, or to make disinterested reports upon such matters as the evaluation of shipping tonnage.

Peace Between the United States and Germany

The treaty of peace was laid before the Senate by the President of the United States with a message, with a view to its advice and consent to ratification, on July 10, 1919. The substance, form, and the

order of negotiation of its various parts had, however, been under debate in the Senate since the previous December. Since the convening of the first session of the 66th Congress on May 19, the presumed contents of the treaty had been daily under critical discussion on the floor.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty to the Senate on September 10, 1919, after 45 days devoted to reading its text and to hearings. Two minority reports were also submitted (S. Rept. 176, 66th Cong., 1st sess., serial 7590).

The majority of the committee proposed 46 amendments, of which 40 were designed to remove the United States from participation in all commissions or bodies for which continuing action was provided under the treaty. These amendments called for striking out the words "and Associated" from the term "Allied and Associated Powers" wherever it appeared. All amendments were defeated in Committee of the Whole by November 6.

Four reservations were originally proposed by the committee. Following the extensive debate on the amendments ranging over the entire treaty, those reservations were superseded by 16 reservations reported by the committee on October 23 (S. Doc. 143, 66th Cong., 1st sess.. serial 7610). The resolution of ratification embodying 14 reservations was prepared in the Committee of the Whole. The resolution failed in the Senate on November 19 to receive the required two-thirds vote by a vote of 39 to 55. Of the 14 reservations, all except four related to the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, which are physically Parts I and XIII of the treaty.

On the same day in the Senate, a resolution to advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty without reservations failed by a vote of 38 to 53.

An effort to agree on compromise reservations was made in the next session. A resolution somewhat revised and embodying 15 reservations failed of the two-thirds requirement in the Senate on March 19, 1920, by a vote of 49 to 35.

The chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who was the leader of the Republican majority, thereupon submitted a resolution "to return to the President the Treaty of Peace with Germany". It was adopted by a vote of 43 to 37.

On December 20, 1919 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had before it S.J. Res. 136 (66th Cong., 2d sess.), by Mr. Knox, which consisted of the single sentence: "That peace exists between the United States and Germany." Also before the committee was S.

Con. Res. 17, by Mr. Lodge, to the same effect, but with a preamble, the form of this proposal enabling it to take effect without approval by the President. After discussion the committee adopted a substitute joint resolution by a vote of 7 to 3 which would repeal the joint resolution of April 6, 1917 declaring a state of war, assert rights under the treaty of peace with Germany, and reaffirm the policy expressed in the act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 556, 618) by requesting the President to "invite all the great governments of the world" to formulate in conference plans for an international court and for disarmament. This was submitted to the Senate as S.J. Res. 139 (66th Cong., 2d sess.) from the committee. It was put on the calendar and reposed there (Congressional Record, Dec. 20, 1919, p. 960).

This approach to the problem was sidetracked after the Christmas holidays for the second attempt of the Senate to reach agreement on a resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the treaty of peace. The Senate vote of March 19 closed that line of action.

The Senate having failed, the House of Representatives took over, and on April 9 the chairman of its Committee on Foreign Affairs introduced H.J. Res. 327 (66th Cong., 2d sess.), "terminating the state of war declared to exist April 6, 1917, between the Imperial German Government and the United States, permitting on conditions the resumption of reciprocal trade, and for other purposes". This came from the committee without amendment on April 6 but with both majority and minority reports (H. Rept. 801, serial 7653). The debate on April 8 and 9 was limited in time by a rule adopted 214 to 155. An effort to recommit the proposal with an amendment was defeated 177 to 222, and the adoption of the joint resolution as it stood was by a vote of 242 to 150.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussed it at length without action on April 15. On the 16th Senator McCumber proposed a substitute providing for the resumption of commercial relations with Germany and the repeal of laws prohibiting trade and commerce enacted since April 6, 1917 to establish conditions "as though no war had existed". Senator Knox suggested reverting to S.J. Res. 139. Not until April 29 did the committee resolve its quandary, and then it reported out a substitute for the House proposal by a vote of 9 to 6 (U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Proceedings .. 63d-67th Cong. (1913-23), pp. 232-35).

On April 30, 1920 the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported out an amended form of this joint resolution, which was passed by the House on May 9, 1920 by a vote of 250 to 242. It was again amended in the Senate, to include ending of the state of

war with the Austro-Hungarian Government and was there passed on May 15 by a vote of 43 to 38. The House concurred in the Senate amendments on May 21 by a vote of 226 to 139. The President vetoed the joint resolution on May 27, and the House on May 28 failed to pass the measure over the veto, two thirds being required, by a vote of 220 to 152 (H. Rept. 801, 66th Cong., 2d sess., pts. 1 and 2, serial 7653; S. Rept. 568, serial 7649; President's veto message, H. Doc. 799, 66th Cong., 2d sess., serial 7768).

In a conversation with René Viviani, former premier of France on a mission to the United States, the Secretary of State on March 30, 1921 told him that "he felt that there was today in the United States greater opposition to the Treaty of Versailles than at the time of the last election even", antl that "the idea of separate peace with Germany gained ground". However, the memorandum of the conversation ended (Foreign Relations, 1921, 1, 967): “Mr. Jusserand [the French Ambassador] then stated that the President had informed him that he was not in favor of a separate peace. Secretary Hughes replied that while the President felt so with respect to a separate peace at this time, yet in view of the strong public opinion in this country with reference to the Treaty and League, unless an alternative were suggested which would have the general support of public opinion here, a separate peace might be the only course left open to us."

For the consideration of the 67th Congress, the new President (Harding) submitted a message on April 12, 1921 (ibid., p. xviii) in which, adverting to the pledge "to seek an early establishment of peace", he said:

"The United States alone among the allied and the associated powers continues in a technical state of war against the Central Powers of Europe. This anomalous condition ought not to be permitted to continue. To establish the state of technical peace without further delay, I should approve a declaratory resolution by Congress to that effect, with the qualifications essential to protect all our rights. Such action would be the simplest keeping of faith with ourselves, and could in no sense be construed as a desertion of those with whom we shared our sacrifices in war, for these powers are already at peace.

"Such a resolution should undertake to do no more than thus to declare the state of peace, which all America craves. It must add no difficulty in effecting, with just reparations, the restoration for which all Europe yearns, and upon which the world's recovery must be founded. Neither former enemy nor ally can mistake America's