IMPORTANCE OF DAM CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING ΤΟ PLANNED Colonel PARKER. In appraising the work on the T. V. A. project primarily as an engineer, I would like to make one point a little clearer. A great measure of the efficiency and economy that I believe it has been possible to achieve on this construction job has been due to the observance of a policy of authorizing construction according to a planned schedule that made possible a continuous and relatively uninterrupted use of the personnel and equipment. In this connection, it is important to remember that the engineering staff of the Authority, together with its data, analyses, equipment, experience, and cohesion as a working unit, accumulated in the last 5 years, has a "going concern" value which is a tremendous asset to the Government. It is no easy matter of a week to assemble, train, and coordinate an engineering staff capable of coping effectively with the vast and complex problems that this T. V. A. project has presented. It must necessarily take years and involve great effort and expense to build an organization of these proportions, an organization that is, in many respects, as highly specialized as the working force of a great automobile plant or shipbuilding concern. I don't want to go on elaborating that unnecessarily, but I would like to emphasize again the fact that we have a going concern, and that I think that the quality and economy of our work is constantly improving. Representative JENKINS. Could I ask you a question? Do you think that the Army engineers could have done all of this work much more economically for all concerned? Colonel PARKER. It would have required a very considerable expansion of the corps, I think. You see, they do not do work in this way; they do work mainly by contract. Representative JENKINS. Shouldn't their system of contractorsaren't these jobs too big for the contractors? Colonel PARKER. There are a great many advantages of doing this sort of work by force account. I would be very glad to-perhaps I can cover that point a little more thoroughly as I go along, when I get into some of the detailed methods employed in this construction. Representative JENKINS. Can you tell me offhand what was the reason the Government built the Boulder Dam by contract, and not by this method that we are talking about? Colonel PARKER. Of course, Boulder Dam is a single project. Personally, I am not convinced that it is always an advantage to build such single projects by contract. A hydroelectric project or any dam contains a great many items of uncertainty, particularly as regards handling the river and foundation costs. The bids of contractors on jobs of this kind, and particularly on those of great magnitude, must necessarily include a very considerable contingency item, and on such jobs, in a great many cases, difficulties are encountered from running into unexpected conditions which may lead either to the contractor's getting into financial difficulties or pressing claims of various kinds on the contracting party, or perhaps shutting down the work, and all sorts of difficulties arise which add to the cost of the work and extend the time of completion. Another difficulty is that these very large jobs cannot be handled by the ordinary contractor; on jobs such as Boulder and Grand Coulee and Bonneville, there were a very limited number of bidders, and the bids of two or three bidders in such cases frequently differ by very large amounts, indicating a considerable uncertainty, and I think that it is by no means certain that you necessarily acquire additional economy by contract work. Representative JENKINS. Yes; but the Government, the engineering forces of the Government, decided that that was the best way to build Boulder Dam. Colonel PARKER. I don't wish to criticize them. Representative JENKINS. That is the biggest undertaking of its kind in the country. Mr. BIDDLE. Do you know anything about the accident record at Boulder Dam? Colonel PARKER. Nothing exactly; no. I would like to emphasize that our work differs from Boulder and Grand Coulee also in the great number of projects. Representative BARDEN. When was Boulder Dam built? Colonel PARKER. Well, I have forgotten the exact date of completion; about 1935, I believe. Representative BARDEN. When was the contract let? Colonel PARKER. I can't give you the date. The late twenties, I think it was; I don't know anything about that. Representative JENKINS. Pursuing my interpolation a little further, do you know how Roosevelt Dam was built? Colonel PARKER. By contract, I believe. Representative JENKINS. And Grand Coulee is being built that Representative JENKINS. Panama Canal was built that way largely, wasn't it? Colonel PARKER. Let me outline to you for a moment what would have happened if we had let our jobs by contract: In the first place, Norris Dam wouldn't have been started for a considerably longer period than it was; it would have been necessary to have prepared complete plans and specifications before the work could have been let. That would have been true of each job. Neither Norris nor Wheeler could probably be started well within, certainly 6 months, and possibly more. Representative JENKINS. Isn't it true in that connection that it would have been better, with reference to the Norris Dam and Chickamauga Dam, if you had taken more time in preparing the plans and specifications? They found a good many mistakes, didn't they? Colonel PARKER. May I complete the orderly way I was going to describe it? I say that neither Norris nor Wheeler could have been started as soon. There would have been claims in both cases for extras unless we had explored the foundations to a considerably greater extent than we did. In each of the dams, in each of the seven dams, which we have already worked on, there would have doubtless been a separate contractor, or perhaps one might have gotten two at most. Each contractor would have had to acquire a separate plant; he would have employed his men separately. Those operations would not have been coordinated at all; each would bid against the other for both plant and equipment. We are able, in our force account operations, to maintain an orderly procedure, whereby the personnel, the employment situation is handled on a flat load factor basis, and we try to arrange our jobs so that where one stops another begins, and we try to arrange our jobs so that we can pass the equipment and construction equipment from one to another, and getting back to Chickamauga for a moment: Chickamauga was built on what may well be said to be a very difficult foundation. It was located there from considerations of navigation; it had to be a place somewhere near the head of the Hale's Bar pool so that there wouldn't be too much dredging to get navigation up to it. That involved putting it in the neighborhood of a major fault between two geological formations; that is, between the so-called Knox dolomite and the Chickamauga limestone, on the limestone. This limestone is very full of caves and holes of all kinds, and it is very difficult to build on. We had to expose that limestone throughout the whole length of the earth dike across both flood plains and get down into that limestone a depth of 40, 50, and 60 feet, and construct a tight concrete cut-off. The nature of that operation couldn't be foreseen until we got down in there and found out what we had to do. If we had let that particular job to contract, if we had let it on the lump-sum basis, a lump sum for the whole job, the first thing that would have happened when the contractor got down in that bottom and found out what we were going to make him do, he would have immediately claimed, with considerable justice, that he hadn't been assured or hadn't been informed what was there, and he would put in a tremendous claim for extra payment which would involve the Government in litigation for years, probably, and he would have been entirely justified in doing so, because we didn't know what was there, and couldn't find out until we opened it up. If, on the other hand, we had let the contract on a unit-price basis, so much per yard of earth and concrete, we would have been unable to describe that work in the bottom of that trench, and in the first place, because we didn't know what we were going to do when we started, and in the second place, because the material handled down there would be almost impossible to classify. I am most firmly convinced that a job of that kind can be handled to advantage only by force account. Chairman DONAHEY. If this is a proper point, I would like to suggest that we adjourn until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 9:30 a. m., tomorrow, Friday, December 2, 1938.) INVESTIGATION OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY FRIDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1938 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. The committee met pursuant to adjournment in Room 357, Senate Office Building, at 9:30 a. m. Present: Senator Vic Donahey, chairman; Senators Schwartz, Davis, and Frazier; Representatives Thomason, Jenkins, and Wolverton. Chairman DONAHEY. You may proceed. TESTIMONY OF COL. THEODORE B. PARKER—Resumed Mr. BIDDLE. Colonel Parker, I think when we adjourned yesterday you had begun to discuss some of the physical problems and characteristics of the valley with respect to the building of the dams. Would you like to discuss those questions now further? Colonel PARKER. I think that would be an appropriate place to start. Mr. BIDDLE. Yes. OBJECTIVES OF ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENTS Colonel PARKER. I should like to first state what we consider to be the objectives of our engineering and construction departments. These departments have as their common objective the most efficient development of the Tennessee Valley in the public interest for the development of navigation, flood control, and power. This program is being carried out by the construction of dams and reservoirs on the Tennessee River and its tributaries in order to provide a 9-foot navigation channel from the mouth of the river up to Knoxville, a distance of 650 miles, in order to provide for the control. of destructive floods on the Tennessee and the lower Mississippi River, and to provide for the maximum development of power consistent with the prior and adequate provisions for navigation and flood control. Now, this river which we have been instructed to develop has its source in the vicinity of Knoxville, where it is formed by the confluence of the French Broad River and the Holston River. It has from that point a length of about 650 miles to its mouth at Paducah, Ky., which is on the Ohio River, about 50 miles from the mouth of the Ohio. This river drains a total area of about 40,000 square miles over a considerable part of which there is very heavy rainfall. The country at the headwaters of this river is very steep, sheds the water 4709 |