The question came up then, is flood control so important as to take its place among the critical national undertakings or shall we postpone it until after the end of the World War? We took that up with the War Department, with the Cabinet officers here in Washington, and the advice we got was this:

That a recurrence of a flood disaster in wartime would be so serious that that region would be justified in the midst of a war spending that money for flood control. That is not only operating it for flood control, but putting in the initial cost of building it; so that that construction of that great project which we got during the wartime was begun because the Nation could not afford to risk the danger of a great flood during wartime.

Now, if you build these dams for multipurpose projects, including flood control, and then should have a national policy infringing upon that flood control for power, and then should have a disaster, I think that the cost to the national security might be very great, and I want to emphasize that because unless that national policy can be defined, unless there can be clear-cut policy, deeply entrenched policy to safeguard flood-control storage space only for flood control, then I can no longer say to the country that these purposes ought to be combined.

Such projects as the seven T. V. A.'s all rest in their feasibility upon the clean-cut recognition of that policy, and it is because in the T. V. A. administration that policy has been ignored, it has been denied, and it has been brushed aside, and there has been an abuse of this that has been one of the principal reasons that I have taken issue with my associates on the T. V. A. Board.

Representative JENKINS. May I ask a question? Dr. Morgan, I assume that you are going further into the detail to show how they have failed to follow a fixed policy. Do you intend to do that?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I can't do that this morning very well, because those papers were in the typist's hands when I took the train last night, and if I had another day I could get them. I can do that by Monday.

Representative JENKINS. Let me ask you a question. Take for instance Norris Dam-that is the best example of where the program can be abused or where it can be carried out, and I think that it would be the best illustration of any of the dams.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Hiwassee is equally so, and the Fontana would be another.

Representative JENKINS. Let me just ask you about Norris, because we have all seen that and we know about that. As I remember it,

they figure 135 feet there for that dam, for what they call minimum head, and then the next 65 feet is what they call the storage head, and the next 15 feet-it is 215 feet high-the next 15 feet would be for flood control. Now, then

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. And also the space still above that for flood control, of a certain quality.

Representative JENKINS. What I think you are trying to impress upon us is this: If those handling or manipulating the machinery at Norris Dam, if they will always keep that 14 feet for flood control, and never invade upon it, and never infringe upon it, then they will be carrying out a strict policy.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. No; I would have to go further than that, because for about 100 feet below that we have a combined use of flood control and power and navigation, where if we close our gates after the flood season is over, we are certain that after the 1st of May, say, there will never be a maximum flood; there would be considerable floods, but never a maximum flood, and after the middle of April or the 1st of May it is feasible then to begin to store in the lower part of the flood storage area. So it is not simply the 15 feet at the top that must be properly managed, but it is below that, down to the minimum storage.

Representative JENKINS. Can you illustrate how in, taking Norris Dam as an illustration-can you illustrate how they have failed to do what you think should have been done?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I can illustrate it generally now but I would have my specific papers with me on Monday. I will say this: That, for instance, during the time of the construction of Chickamauga Dam and the Pickwick Dam we had our men working in cofferdams, down below the level of the river, and at that time we had not only the general value of flood control but we had our own particular need of flood control; we need to hold down the stage of that river so that it would not break over our cofferdams and flood them out. The possible loss would be $100,000 in each of those dams, and therefore the recommendations of our water control committee were given to the power unit for the regulation of Norris Reservoir-how much water to store and how much to leave out. Those directions were ignored, and the management of the Norris Dam was treated entirely differently than the findings of the Water Control Department would require, and when our assistant chief engineer took issue with the Power Division for abusing the operation of the dam, he was told that they were going to work out a new rule curve and they did; they denied the recommendations of the water control organization and ran it for power.

Representative JENKINS. Did this defiance have any disastrous result on your cofferdam?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. It didn't. We had to adjust ourselves to it, but, fortunately, the flood didn't get high enough, but it might have cost us a couple of hundred thousand dollars.

Mr. BIDDLE. Dr. Morgan, you used the words "ignored" and "defied" and "abuse"-do I take it that your criticism does not go to the design or construction of any dam, but to your theory of the operation of the dams?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. It goes not to the design or construction, but not only to my theory, but to the actual administrative set-up that the Board of the T. V. A. established against my vigorous protest, and against such a statement as I have here, as to its importance.

Mr. BIDDLE. What I wanted to get at, Dr. Morgan, was that with respect to the multiple use-and bearing in mind that flood control and navigation were the most important features, your opinion is not that the dams were put at the wrong places, or constructed in the wrong way.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Not at all.

Mr. BIDDLE. It is purely and solely with administration and operation. I just want to emphasize that.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. It is purely that there has been a lack of sense of responsibility for the obligations of our Board, and in protecting the interests for which those dams were built.

Mr. BIDDLE. These dams, then, according to your belief, are constructed with a view of giving navigation and flood control precedence, and constructed for that, with that purpose steadily in mind?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I didn't say that.

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, is that your view?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I say my view is this—

Mr. BIDDLE. I am speaking of construction, now.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. My view is this: That these dams were built to secure the largest possible values of control of that river, in flood control, navigation, and power, and such other incidental values as might accrue.

Mr. BIDDLE. But you know the act requires that flood control and navigation be given preference, so that I assume that they were designed and constructed with that thought in mind, were they not? Dr. A. E. MORGAN. They were designed and constructed with the idea of getting the greatest total value of them, and that does not necessarily mean that there was any conflict between that position and the position that you take.

Mr. BIDDLE. I didn't think that there was any conflict-that is why I wanted to bring that out.

Now, let me come back to this question of national policy. I think it is an extremely important one. Is it your belief that Congress should not in the case of a national emergency change in any respect its policy with reference to the administration and operation of the dams which gives flood control a precedence over the use of power or do you think that Congress should determine, when a crisis arises, which choice they want to make?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I think this: That we have here a situation where the tendency to encroach upon flood-control storage for the purpose of power is a very strong tendency. Power brings in its money every year; there is an immediate need for it; whereas for floods, you may wait for several years, and then only need it once in several years, and therefore taking into account human nature. as it is, there is a constant tendency to take the immediate benefit. to give way to the immediate pressure, and that being the case, I think that there needs to be firmly and deeply entrenched in national policy the idea that the flood-control storage capacity must be held inviolate for floods, and that deep-seated policy ought not to give way to the impulse of the moment, to get a little more money.

Mr. BIDDLE. That was not the question that I asked you. I am speaking of whether or not Congress ought to leave open to determine in case of national emergency arising, whether the policy should be in any way altered. You wouldn't want to close the determination under circumstances which have not yet arisen, would you? Aren't you speaking of the present general policy of the operation of the dams?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. What I think is this: That I might illustrate it by having a Constitution. We have a Constitution that is a longrange view that prevents even Congress suddenly, in an emergency, doing something that is in violation of a long-range policy. Now, I think in this case that Congress ought to set up the inviolability of

flood-control storage for flood control as against any emergency action, and that the only time that that policy should be waived would be when other provisions have been made for flood control so that the people and the property no longer are resting upon that security which might be taken away in time of emergency.

Mr. BIDDLE. Your illustration is an excellent one because in time of war constitutional matters are very differently determined from in time of peace, but what I want to get perfectly clear is, even in the national emergency of war, you think that any policy, any fixed policy with reference to priority of flood control, should not be changed in any way.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I think that to set up such a hope, such an expectation, which was set up here yesterday, is dangerous.

Mr. BIDDLE. I didn't ask you for hope or expectation. I simply asked you whether you would now say that even in time of war the policy with respect to flood control should remain unalterable. I thought that you went as far as that, and I wanted to be sure.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I say that to hold out any expectation of using this for power in time of war is a dangerous expectation to hold out, and it ought not to be done.

Mr. BIDDLE. Would you prefer not to answer the question?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I prefer not to answer the question further than

that.

Mr. BIDDLE. Do you think, Dr. Morgan, that the present act-I am speaking solely of the Tennessee Valley Authority statute-states the policy of operation and administration of the T. V. A.? I am speaking of the operation with respect to the priority of flood control and

power.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Whether it states it adequately?

Mr. BIDDLE. Yes.

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I have never read the wording of the act with the purpose of answering that particular question. I do say this, however, that the people who have the responsibility for that have facing them the necessity, and if it had not been clearly stated in the act, then it is all the more our responsibility to give every emphasis we can to that necessity.

Mr. BIDDLE. I understand that. I understand you are critical of the administration, but the committee would, of course, be interested to know whether you suggest specific changes in the act, and if so, what? Is it fair to say that you have not considered that at this point, and do not wish to make such suggestions?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I would like to make suggestions later on that, but not at this point.

Mr. BIDDLE. All right; very good.

ALLOCATION METHOD ADOPTED BY AUTHORITY

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Then, in the matter of another point that was discussed today and yesterday, the matter of allocation of costs, I would like to get out of order a bit to bring that up while the T. V. A. engineers are here.

There are two points among others in which I think that that allocation is not wholly sound. Mr. Parker stated here a few minutes. ago, that the method for finding the cost of power was this: That

certain power developments were planned, were assumed, and they produced more power than was necessary, and then they cut that down pro rata and assumed that you could get a smaller amount of power at the same unit cost.

That is not a sound assumption because within certain limits a big power development is cheaper than a small one, and if you get a large power development with relatively small unit costs and then cut it down to a smaller scale and use the same unit cost, you unduly favor power, so that I say in that respect the allocation unduly favors power.

Mr. BIDDLE. Have you been able to figure the unit cost per kilowatt of power of the three-dam system or of a larger system?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Both.

Mr. BIDDLE. Could you give us the figures?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. I will have that.

Mr. BIDDLE. In your study?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. In my study, yes.

Now, there is one other point in which the estimate is, I thinkwhere it specifically is wrong, this allocation estimate, and that is for Norris Dam only; $5,000,000 was allocated to power alone, as being peculiarly a power investment. Now, as a matter of fact, in building that dam, the penstocks through which the water could go to the powerhouse, and the openings for the sluice gates

Mr. BIDDLE. Would you get that $5,000,000 figure in the allocation report, so that we can have that?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. On page 23 of the printed allocation reportthat is House Document 709 of the Seventy-fifth Congress-the direct allocation to power at Norris Dam is $4,542,000.

Mr. BIDDLE. Do you know what that covered?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. That covered powerhouses, and control buildings, including the intake section of the dams, intake gates, water wheels, turbines and generators-accessory electrical equipment and miscellaneous power-plant equipment.

Now, at Norris Dam, the penstocks are set up-I think it is at an elevation, I haven't the elevation in figures in mind, and the intakes of the sluice gates are set up, so that there is there a half a million acre-feet of water down in that, what you call dead storage-it can't be, and it is not useful for flood control; it is not useful for navigation, except for the rowboats in the reservoir; its use is for power, to lift this water up high enough so that there is head for power. Now, that half million acre-feet of storage is a power investment, and should be allocated directly to power. According to the allocation report, that storage cost $10 an acre-foot, and a half million acre-feet would be $5,000,000.

Representative JENKINS. May I ask a question there? It is true, is it not, that the intake of the Norris Dam is higher than in the other dams?

Dr. A. E. MORGAN. Yes.

Representative JENKINS. And what you are telling us now in a practical way is that all of that dead storage back there is purely an incident to power?