ter.

of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: "Is all the pious just?" "Yes." "Is all the just pious? "No." "Then what part of justice is piety?" Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which "attends" to the gods, as there is another part of justice which "attends" to men. But what is the meaning of "attending" to the gods? The word "attending," when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made betBut how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we minister to the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that there is not time for all these difficult questions to be resolved; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is "a science of asking and giving "asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? Nay, but we give them honor." Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is what has been already disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But although the popular conceptions are overthrown, Plato does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he exhibits the subject of the Dialogue in several different lights, but fails to answer explicitly his main question.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose "prancing steeds" Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away (p. 396). He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in pros ecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, and perhaps like most educated men of his age, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Soc rates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he thinks, is availing himself of the

popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armory which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavors to elicit from him. "Piety is doing as I do" is the first idea of religion which is suggested to his mind, and may be regarded as the definition of popular religion in all ages. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of which, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, “Why Socrates was put to death," suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, “The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:" which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only.

The next definition, "Piety is that which is loved of the gods," is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (píλov) and the participle (povμevov), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (pidovμevov and pileirai). The words "loved of the gods" express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety. Then follows the third and last definition, "Piety is a part of justice." Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. To which the soothsayer adds, " Attending upon the gods." When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this "attention to the gods," he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the latent anthropomorphism of these notions. D; Rep. ii. 365 E; Sym. 202 E.)

(Cp. Politicus, 290 C, But when we expect him to go

on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit, and the coöperation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety;

(2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defense of Socrates.

The subtle connection of this Dialogue with the Apology and the Crito, the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Laches, Lysis, and other Dialogues; the insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that it is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II. The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV. The figure Daedalus has occurred in the Meno (97 D); that of Proteus (15 D), in the Euthydemus (288 E), and Io (541 E). But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial, or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

EUTHYPHRO.

Euth.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

SCENE:- The Porch of the King Archon.

HY have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? Steph.

WHY

Wand what are you doing in the porch of the 2

King Archon? Surely you cannot be engaged in an action before the king, as I am.

Socrates. Not in an action, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another. Soc. Certainly not.

Futh. Then some one else has been prosecuting you.

Soc. Yes.

Euth. And who is he?

Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.

Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. And what is the charge which he brings against you?

Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corrupters. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am anything but a wise man, he has found me out, and is going