U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:44 a.m. in room SH216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Cleland, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.

Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff director. Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.

Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, Republican staff director; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority counsel; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Daniel K. Goldsmith, and Andrew Kent.

Committee members' assistants present: Brady King, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Marshall A. Hevron, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos and Eric Pierce, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. Senator Warner is a few minutes away, but his staff says that he has no objection to our beginning.

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The Armed Services Committee meets this morning for the fourth of our series of hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. We welcome back to the committee Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central Intelligence; and Samuel Berger, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In their previous positions, our witnesses provided advice to the presidents that they served regarding the use of military force to further U.S. national security interests. They helped shape a national security strategy based on these interests and advised the presidents on its implementation. Over the years, Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Berger have also provided advice to this committee on Iraq and on many other issues.

Two days ago, three of the four former senior military commanders who testified before the committee offered a strong endorsement of the need for a multilateral approach to dealing with Iraq. They stressed that working with the U.N. to achieve a resolution regarding inspections and disarmament backed up by the threat of the use of force by member states to compel compliance would bring great political and military advantages.

General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the committee that, "a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force would," in his words, "be a very powerful tool." He went on to say that, "we need to impress upon Saddam Hussein that he's not just facing the United States, but that he's facing the will of the majority of the world. We must also ensure that we have made it possible for as many of our friends and allies to join us, some of whom believe very deeply that you should go to war only unless you are directly attacked or with the sanction of the United Nations." He added, "every time we undermine the credibility of the United Nations we are probably hurting ourselves more than anybody else."

The general told us that, "we must, under no circumstances, ever create the impression that the United States is not free to go to war, but that is very different than not trying to achieve the kind of resolution that, in this case, we want. It would make our job easier, it would help us in the future, and it would surely have an impact on how Saddam Hussein reacts to the current resolutions." General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, commented that the President had made the right move by going to the U.N., stating that, "the President's strong statement provides leverage to build a new coalition for proceeding on a path of diplomacy backed by force. I think it's the appropriate path." Then he added, "we need to be certain that we are really working through the United Nations in an effort to strengthen the institution in this process, and not simply 'check a block."" He advocated taking the necessary time to build the strongest coalition possible to plan for a post-conflict Iraq, and then, if necessary, taking military actions with our allies and with the blessing of the United Nations.

General Joseph Hoar, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, testified that we should, "take the time to do the tough diplomatic work to gain support in the Security Council for disarmament, and, failing disarmament, then military action."

General Hoar cautioned us to get the timing and the means of going to war right, to consider the military risks, and to plan for what comes next in Iraq after war.

I, too, believe that we should focus on mobilizing the world community to give Saddam Hussein a clear ultimatum to disarm and comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions or face military action by a multinational U.N.-authorized coalition of member states to compel compliance.

I also believe that we should not announce to the world at this time that we will follow a unilateral go-it-alone policy if the U.N. does not act. Telling friends and potential allies at the time that we're seeking their support, but that it's "our way or the highway," will divide the world, not unite it. This doesn't mean giving the U.N. a veto over our actions. No one I know of is willing to do that. But what the multilateral approach does is keep the pressure on the U.N. to act and not let them off the hook by signaling that we want to be the world's police force.

We look to our witnesses today to share with us their views on the administration's policy and to offer their advice on what would be the best possible strategy for dealing with the threat posed by Iraq.

Senator Warner, I know, is going to be here at any minute. I think what I'll do, however, is call on the witnesses at this point because we're going to have some votes in 45 minutes. Then when Senator Warner comes, I would offer him the opportunity of making his opening statement at some point where it's not disruptive of the witnesses' presentation.

After the opening remarks by our witnesses and by Senator Warner, we would then have a 6-minute round of questions following the normal early bird procedure.

Mr. Berger.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. BERGER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the critical issues of Iraq faced by the United States and the international community. I believe the Iraqi regime does pose a serious potential threat to the stability of a combustible and vital region of the world, and, therefore, to the United States. Doing nothing, in my judgement, is not an acceptable option. The challenge is to do the right thing in the right way, enhancing, not undermining, the stability of the region and the overall security of the United States.

It is important for us to be as sharply focused as we can in an uncertain world about the nature of the threat. We have focused a great deal on Saddam Hussein's capabilities, and properly so, but capability is not the same as threat. That also involves questions of intention and urgency. It is not just the "what," but also the "why" and the "when." Threat is only half the equation for war. It must be balanced against the "how," the cost and risks of proceeding.

First, a few words about the "what" and the "why." We know Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons. He has for nearly 20 years, as we know only so well from his use of them against his

own people and the Iranians. He has deadly stockpiles of biological weapons. The possibility that Saddam Hussein will use his biological and chemical weapons to attack us directly or in concert with terrorists cannot be dismissed. We must continually evaluate it in light of available intelligence. However, it would be uncharacteristic for a man who has placed the highest premium on self-preservation. There would be a significant chance of detection followed, quite simply, by his annihilation. It is certainly possible, but perhaps no more so than the possibility that he will use these weapons against our troops or our allies if we attack him.

It is his nuclear weapons capability that concerns me the most. I believe Saddam Hussein's strategic objective was and remains to assert dominance over the Gulf region. We stopped him in 1991. Amazingly, he tested our will again in 1994, moving troops in that direction. We deployed 30,000 U.S. forces to the region, and he pulled back. This region is critical for the United States and the world strategically and economically. I believe that a nuclear Iraq can change its fundamental dynamic, affecting how others behave toward us and toward allies such as Israel and emboldening Saddam Hussein to believe, rightly or wrongly, that he can attack his neighbors and, because of his nuclear capability, we will hesitate. Hussein maintains an active and aggressive nuclear weapons program. Most analysts believe that for him to develop his own capacity to produce fissile material, nuclear fuel, it will require several years. Acquiring that nuclear fuel abroad could enable him to produce a nuclear weapon in 1 or 2 years, according to Prime Minister Blair's statement on Monday.

He has been seeking such material for many years. So far as we know, there has not yet been any case where significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material have been diverted. Experts such as the highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies have concluded that obtaining this material remains a formidable challenge-not impossible, but unlikely.

I emphasize this point not to suggest that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is not unacceptably dangerous to the United States-indeed, I believe it is-but the trajectory of his nuclear program affects the "when" of the threat equation, whether we have time to proceed in a way that isolates Saddam, builds a broader international coalition, and minimizes, to the extent possible, the risks.

We most likely have the military power to do this virtually alone, but shifting the world's focus back to Saddam's intransigence will give us not only the power to act, but far greater legitimacy if we do so. The extent to which the legitimacy of our actions is recognized and accepted internationally, that we act collectively and not largely alone, is not an abstraction. It greatly reduces the risks of any future military action. Those risks are just as real and serious as the threat. They include inflaming an already volatile region in a way that undermines governments such as Jordan or Musharraf in Pakistan, and, worst case, leaves us with a radical regime in Pakistan with a ready-made nuclear arsenal. This increases the likelihood that a conflict breaks along a dangerous Israeli-Arab fault line, diverting us from the war against a terrorist threat that remains real and virulent at a time when cooperation—military, in