Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the last thing I'm going to do as Secretary of Defense is to try to interpret a resolution that I've not read. I'm not a lawyer. It's a matter for the Department of State and the White House that undoubtedly drafted this. What it might or might not authorize is not for me to say.

Senator REED. Well, let me ask simply, do you have any comments on the wisdom of such a potential scenario where we would be attacking while the U.N. was in-country? Again, I raise this issue, because I don't think it's that farfetched.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator REED. It seems to me what the Iraqis are trying to do. U.N. inspectors in the country say they're getting cooperation. We all understand it would take months in simply administrative work in which the Iraqis could be quite, "cooperative." What is the wisdom of an attack in that situation?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, clearly, I can't read the Iraqis minds, I have to admit that, but their ploy consistently has been to delay, to pretend, and then to change their mind and then to alter their position.

Now, you're right, that takes time, and time is to their advantage. The longer the time is, the less likely there's something going to happen. The more inspectors that are in there, the less likely something's going to happen. The longer nothing happens, the more advanced their weapon programs go along. The longer things are delayed, the greater the likelihood that world attention will turn elsewhere, and the U.N. will once again go back into the mode that we've been in for the last 11 years of being inattentive to those violations.

So I guess I agree with you with respect to the reason for their offering the inspections, supposedly.

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, I would suggest that that might be a very likely scenario in which we would be contemplating military action. I think it bears great study by the administration.

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General Myers, let me turn to a more operational question. Throughout the afternoon, we've talked about the use of CBRchemical/biological/radiological weapons. Many times, the sponse and not just in this hearing, but others-is to point to the facility of our military units to deal with these weapons, and I acknowledge that. When we're buttoned up in tanks, when we have protective suits on, we can mitigate the threat dramatically. But it seems to me, based upon the experience in the Gulf War-and you are a more astute observer than I am-that our biggest vulnerability will be in the ports of disembarkation, where it will take up to 30 to 60 days to inflow the armor and the troops to marry up with armor to move out in a ground attack. The one lesson that is compelling from the Gulf War, at least I would suggest to the Iraqis, is, "If you let the United States build up, you'll lose every time, and you'll lose decisively." This suggests the strong possibility that they will use chemical and biological weapons against the port of disembarkation in the region before we conduct ground operations. Can you comment upon the probability of that and the likelihood of that and to the extent that would disrupt our operations? General MYERS. Well, absolutely, Senator Reed. It's very hard to calculate the probability, so we assume worst case. Without getting

into a lot of the operational details, again, the first thing you would do is try to attack whatever infrastructure associated with WMD you could. That would be the first thing you would do. We have already talked about some of the passive defenses.

You would also have active defenses, in terms of PAC-3. The PAC-3 missile was specifically designed for the slower missile-delivery systems. Any other delivery systems, aircraft, whatever, you'd work air defenses very hard to ensure they wouldn't be a factor. Then you'd try to-and, again, I don't want to tread too far into the operational details-make sure that you don't have a single point of failure. You would take steps to plan ahead so you could work around these issues.

There is no doubt-and I don't want to paint too rosy a picture here that weapons of mass destruction would be a horrible thing to have on the battlefield. They could panic a civilian population for sure, which would cause you problems alone. It would slow down the fight. It can cause us problems in logistics, as you mentioned. So, at least in this hearing, if we were asked to do that, we would plan for worst-case and then we would plan around that.

Senator REED. My time is expired, and I don't require a response, but I would assume there is significant collateral damage to the civilian populations and others if these weapons are deployed, and I assume that's correct.

General MYERS. Well, it depends on how they're employed. But, like I said, one of the things you'd worry about is panic among the civilian population and then you'd have to try to mitigate that some way, and it certainly would be a planning factor.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Roberts.

Senator ROBERTS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would ask the Chairman if it is his wish that the Intelligence Committee, which is meeting as we speak, and in the midst of the ongoing September 11 investigation and in the midst of being investigated by itself by the FBI, have a hearing on a recent magazine article about something that happened, allegedly, 20 years ago in regards to the U.S. supplying materials to Iraq in reference to their capability with weapons of mass destruction.

We might also ask them to have additional questions in regards to the Oil for Food Program, which Saddam has used billions, I think, to build up his weapons of mass destruction, sanctions violations on the part of the French and the Russians and, for that matter, China, which has also aided and abetted that ability. I would hope that that hearing would include that as well as speculation on something that happened 20 years ago.

I have a real quick question for General Myers. On page 8 of your testimony, you indicated we have made similar improvements virtually to all aspects of our joint team. I think we all know that this will be a an improved joint war fighting team. The Secretary has also indicated that, as well. I don't remember what page it was on, but he certainly made reference to that.

During the recent challenge that we called the Millennium Challenge 2002-I'm summing up here—there has been some speculation that the Red Team effectively used what we call asymmetric

warfare to seriously impede the ability of the Blue forces, which were our forces, to put forces ashore or to get to the fight-i.e., the sunken fleet was resurrected and the experiment simply continued. My concern is that the techniques used by the Red force under the command of Lieutenant General Van Ryper, a former marine, might represent similar tactics used by Iraq in the war against our forces. My question is, how prepared are we for an enemy using techniques to defeat and circumvent our technology, which we have, and all of the advantages that you have cited, General, which I believe we have, and also the will of the American fighting force, which I believe that we have, against classic asymmetical warfare? Let me just say the reason I'm asking this is that on the authorizing committee here, and we're the appropriators, we pushed awfully hard for the money for this exercise. A lot of the services didn't want to do this. But General Van Ryper succeeded in using cruise missiles in unique ways to overwhelm the Navy's Aegis radar and sink the entire simulated Blue armada of 16 ships. The Red team simply stood them up again. Basically, despite a disparity in the technology sophistication between the two sides, the U.S. forces proved susceptible to the Somalis basic warfighting tools, which included the use of smoke pots to disorient the American troops and the communication via word of mouth and drum beating. That sort of harkens back to Somalia.

Basically, the general said, "I am warning against mirror imaging the thinking of Iraqi leaders, Saddam Hussein, and his lieutenants." Somehow you've got to get out of the Western mind-set and, as much as you can, recognize you're dealing with different cultures, different ways of thinking, different warfare, i.e., asymmetrical warfare.

The Joint Forces Command has done no analysis on why the Red Team has had such a great success. I know they will. I know they'll report it to the Secretary, but I'm concerned about this in regards to the American war fighter. Where are we in this?

General MYERS. Well, Senator Roberts, I have a great deal of respect for General Van Ryper. I happened to go to a joint war fighting course with him, matter of fact, a few years back.

Senator ROBERTS. Yeah, he spoke very highly of you when he came into my office.

General MYERS. So I hold him in high respect. Not to dwell on the Millennium Challenge piece of this, but it was an experiment where sometimes things had to be reset to try to figure out and achieve the objectives we wanted to do.

Senator ROBERTS. But the war in Iraq, General, is not going to be an experiment, and it's not going to be an exercise.

General MYERS. I understand. I'm going to get to that. Senator, I think the worst thing we can do is think we're better than we are, and that's a big danger. I know that, in this case, the Middle East, is clearly in General Frank's mind all the time. We try to get Red Teams, people like General Van Ryper, that look at various scenarios and try to think differently than we think. We know it's a different culture. We understand those sorts of things.

But I would say this, that I visited every location except Camp Lejeune on Millennium Challenge, and I spent time at Coronado,

Nellis Air Force Base, and Norfolk, and I suspect you probably did, too. I don't know for sure.

The thing that makes the difference and that is not at the tactical level but at the strategic level of what we were trying to look at was our decision cycle, not the specific weapons. This was a scenario, of course, that was in the future, so there were a lot of hypothetical weapons introduced. But the thing we were really trying to investigate is, can we make our decision cycle, our ability to think inside the enemy, faster than any potential adversary? I think that was one of the greatest outcomes, that we think we have ways to do that and to be even better.

We're pretty good today. We found out we were pretty good in Afghanistan. We still need improvement. We still need to improve our joint war fighting. I'm not here to say that it's perfect by any stretch of the imagination. But that was one of the big outcomes of the Millennium Challenge that I think we can all be very proud of that would probably translate very well into future conflict.

Now, as you get down to specific weapons systems and tactics and techniques, there are different issues there, but it's the decision making, it's the planning ability, and the ability to take information, and turn it very quickly and use it again. These are things that we looked at very hard in Millennium Challenge. Again, one of the things we have to guard against is thinking we're better than we are, and I can guarantee you General Tommy Franks doesn't think that, and I certainly don't.

Senator ROBERTS. But if we think faster and we disrupt his command and control, then that certainly would disrupt Saddam's ability to launch the weapons of mass destruction, to draw Israel into the race, or going to the scorched-earth policy, et cetera, et cetera. If we think faster and disrupt his command and control, then that is-in part-the answer, if not the answer.

General MYERS. Yes, sir. Yes, Senator, that's absolutely right.
Senator ROBERTS. Okay, thank you.

My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Roberts.

I would say to you and all the members of the committee that if there are additional subjects that you would like to be briefed on by the intelligence community-I use the word "brief," not a “hearing" when I made reference to Senator Byrd

Senator ROBERTS. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. —that if there are subjects that are relevant to your consideration of this issue, to you and all members of the committee, please give me those subjects. I will make the same request on your behalf as I did on Senator Byrd's.

Senator ROBERTS. Yes, I had understood that you said a "hearing," and that's why I said what I said. I'm sure every member can go to the Intel Committee and get briefed on precisely the question that the Senator brought up. I appreciate the Chairman's answer. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if our objective is regime change in Iraq, and if, as Senator Reed just read the resolution that was just sent up here today, that it is also to promote the peace and stability in the re

gion, could you share with the committee what is the plan that, once you've taken out Saddam, we will have a military presence there for quite awhile in order to make sure that there is peace and stability in the region and that there's not another Saddam that rises up that gives us the same problem in the first place that we have?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Nelson, I think what I would say is that the immediate objective is disarmament. I think a case can be made that the policy of the United States Government, including Congress, is regime change. But I think the reason Congress came to that conclusion and the President talks of regime change as a policy of the United States is because it's, at this stage, so difficult to imagine disarmament without regime change.

With respect to what might follow, the Department of State has given thought to that. It's hard to know precisely. The things that I sense broad agreement on in the international community is that it would be enormously unhelpful if Iraq would split up into multiple states, that it should be a single country, that that's best for the region, that it be a government that does not have weapons of mass destruction, does not threaten its neighbors, and provides through some mechanisms of elections and representation to assures that the ethnic minorities in that country are treated properly and that they're not repressed or disadvantaged.

Again, the President has not made a decision, but if one assumes, as your hypothetical question does, that force is used, disarmament takes some period of time. One would think there would have to be a military presence, undoubtedly a coalition presence or a U.N. presence for a period of time, and it will take some time to find all of these locations because there are so many and they're so well hidden.

Iraq's economic circumstance is quite different from Afghanistan's in the sense that they do have substantial oil revenues. Therefore, from a reconstruction standpoint and from a recovery standpoint, one would think that during that period where the disarming is taking place and by, presumably, an international or coalition force of some sort, and, presumably, Iraqis from inside the country and from outside the country would have some sort of a mechanism whereby they would decide what kind of a government or template would make sense. It was the Afghan people that decided that, and I would think it would be the same to Iraqi people. They will be liberated people and they will have choices they haven't had for many, many years.

I would think that during that period, the economic circumstance of not just that country but the neighboring countries would be enormously benefitted. It has not been a happy part of the world under his leadership.

Beyond that, I think part of it would be left to the Department of State, part of it would be left to the Iraqi people, and part of it would be left to some sort of an international coalition that would be participating.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you really have stirred up MacDill and the Tampa area. I'm quoting from the Tampa Tribune of a couple of days ago.