is indubitably a subject of high importance. The views which are formed of it, necessarily modify essentially our whole theological system, and extend their influence to our apprehensions of duty and sense of obligation. It merits therefore, from all, a patient consideration, and impartial judgment.

Whatever conclusions may be entertained respecting the truth or error of either of the doctrines on the subject, no doubt can be felt that they are inseparably involved in the systems to which they respectively belong, and that whichever of them is sustained or overthrown, must carry along with it the support or subversion of the scheme of which it forms a part. That such is the fact with the system which the Calvinistic churches, generally, have heretofore entertained, no question can exist. That doctrine, on the one hand, not only specifically denies that the instrumentality of moral means is ever employed by the Spirit of God in the work of renovation, but represents the mind as totally incapable of being regenerated, even by his influences, through their instrumentality; and, affirms on the other, that it is changed by an agency that is wholly independent and exclusive of their aid; and on the ground that the object of regeneration itself is, to remove a depraved taste or disposition, which, by the necessity of its nature, makes all the moral influence that reaches the mind, -no matter what its nature may be, nor by what agency it may be brought to act on it,-inevitably the mere instrument of excitement to sin. The doctrine is thus a necessary inference from the theory of a constitutional aversion to holiness, and relish for transgression, on which it is founded, and must stand or fall, as that scheme is maintained or overthrown. The intimacy with which they are

connected, and the distinctness with which they are taught, may be seen from the following specimens.

"It has been extensively supposed that the Spirit of Grace regenerates mankind, by communicating to them new, clearer and juster views of spiritual objects." "Yet it appears to me clear that this account is not scriptural nor just. Without a relish for spiritual objects, I cannot see that any discoveries concerning them, however clear and bright, can render them pleasing to the soul. If they are unple sing in their very nature, they cannot be made agreeable by having that nature unfolded more clearly. He who disrelishes the taste of wine, will not relish it the more, the more distinctly and perfectly he perceives that taste. To enable him to relish it, it seems indispensable that his own taste should be changed, aud in this manner filled to realize the pleasantness of wine."

"But the great difficulty in the present case is this: the nature of the object perceived is disrelished. The more then it is perceived, the more it must be disrelished, of course, so long as the present taste continues. It seems therefore indispensable, in order to the usefulness of such superior light to the mind, that its relish with respect to spiritual objects, should first be changed. In this case the clearer and brighter the views of such objects are, the more pleasing they may be expected to become to the mind."-Dwight's Theology, Vol.

II. P. 422.

"It is impossible that a new disposition should be produced in a natural (I may add, or even in a supernatural,) way, by the influence of motives. Motives, as objects of love or aversion, occasion the heart to act according to its existing disposition; and there their power ends." "The power which changes the heart, is immediate, acting through no second cause, producing its effect by no instrument."Park-street Lectures, p. 154, I59.

"If man is dead in the moral sense, that is, has lost all principles of true virtue entirely, he is as absolutely beyond the reach of all means as to their bringing him to life again, as one that is dead in the natural sense. Moral means can only work upon such moral principles as they find to work upon. They cannot produce a new nature, new principles of action, any more than natural means can make new life for themselves to work upon, in a dead carcass."-Smalley's Sermon on Natural Ability.

The representations respecting the agency by which regeneration is accomplished, with which we are presented in these passages, and which are in accordance with the statements that have been generally made in the Calvinistic churches of this country-thus obviously have their whole foundation in that theory of depravity, with which they are connected. The reason alleged by their authors, for regarding the doctrine of renovation through the instrumentality of truth, as thus radically erroneous and absurd, is, that from the mind's depraved taste, all motives to holiness, even if presented and urged by a “supernatural" power, must, from the necessity of their nature, prompt to sin, instead of holiness; that they can only "occasion the heart to act according to its existing disposition." They accordingly formally propound the doctrine, as a dictate alike of reason and scripture, that the Spirit renews the mind by an agency wholly exclusive of the instrumentality of moral means, and against their influence; and the propriety of their inference clearly depends wholly on the truth of the theory from which it is deduced. If no such constitutional taste, as their scheme represents, pertains to the unrenewed mind, and consequently the regenerating agency is not employed in its removal, then no such ground exists as they allege, for the denial of the possible and actual instrumentality of moral means, in achieving that change; and, accordingly, the abandonment of their theory of depravity, should carry along with it the relinquishment also of their inference respecting the nature of the regenerating influences. To continue to adhere to the inference, after the premises are discarded, is to attempt to sustain a superstructure without a foundation.

There is, in like manner, as I shall have occasion hereafter to show, an equally indissoluble connexion between

the views, which I have advanced respecting the nature of the mind, and the conclusion, that regeneration is wrought through the instrumentality of a moral influence: and the adoption of the one, must, in all logical propriety, involve the inference and approval of the other.

What now, it becomes the friends of these systems, impartially to inquire, are their respective merits? Which of the decisions respecting them, rests on grounds that are clearly vindicable, and entitled to assent? To me the reasons on which the first rests, seem utterly inadequate to the support of so momentous a superstructure, and the difficulties with which it is beset, to be insurmountable obstacles to its rational adoption.

I. The first objection to the doctrine, that regeneration is wrought by an influence wholly exclusive of moral means, is, that it is predicated on the theory of a specific constitutional taste for sin and aversion to holiness, that necessarily renders every moral influence that reaches it, no matter of what perceptions it may be made up, a mere temptation to sin;-a theory which has hitherto been "assumed," as one of its advocates significantly admitted, never proved; and assumed against the most incontrovertible and essential facts. Before this stupendous system, however, of inference and assertion, respecting the total inadequacy and inappropriateness of truth, as an instrument of renewing the mind, and the necessity of a physical agency, wholly exclusive of means, to accomplish that change, can offer the slightest claim to our assent, it must be demonstrated on clear and indisputable ground, that a taste like that on which it is predicated, actually exists, and is armed with the terrific power and fraught with the fatal influence which are ascribed to it. But no such demonstration, as I have shown in a former

number, can be made out, without placing that taste among the essential attributes of our nature, and involving the system accordingly, in all the odious and insuperable difficulties which perplex the scheme of physical depravity. The friends of this doctrine, therefore, if they adhere to its inculcation, must consent to encounter those difficulties, likewise, in all their magnitude, and struggle against their pressure, or sink beneath their weight.

II. The next difficulty with which this doctrine is pressed, is, as might be expected of a mere inference from such a theory, that it does not enjoy the countenance of any specific statement, or obvious intimation, on the page of revelation. No passage can be adduced from the volume of inspiration, presenting the faintest indication that the renewal of the mind, is, and must be, accomplished by an agency that wholly supersedes and excludes the influence of perceptions and emotions! The passages which have hitherto been alleged for the purpose, have only served to show how unauthorized and hopeless a task they undertake, who attempt to sustain the doctrine, by authority from the word of God. Of the glaring misapplication of the scriptures, and inconclusive reasoning into which they have fallen, several examples were noticed in the first number of the second volume of this work; and it were easy to add a multitude of others. They all mistake a simple ascription to the Holy Spirit, of the renovation of the mind, or statement that his agency is necessary to the accomplishment of that change, for a formal assertion that his agency is, and must be, of that particular species and that only, which their scheme represents him as exerting; and are, accordingly, mere assumptions of the point which it is their business to demonstrate.