foundation of his rights over us; and the virtuousness or sinfulness of our acts consists primarily in their being a recognition and treatment of him, that accords with, or is in contradiction to, those perfections and rights. There are other considerations, however, that may enhance those obligations, and contribute to affect the character of our actions; such as the revealed will of God; the consequences to ourselves they are to draw after them; and their influence on the well-being of others. All these are seen and felt by us to be sources of obligation; are employed as excitements to obedience; and are recognised accordingly, as contributing to constitute or enhance the morality of acts. This great fact, however, the writers on the foundation of morals have wholly overlooked, and proceeded in their theories, on the assumption that some one of these characteristics is the sole element of virtue. Of these, Edwards regarded it as love to being in general, or benevolence; Hume and Paley, as utility to the agent; Dwight rather, as utility to the beings at large who are affected by the actions of which it is predicated; Archbishop King, as conformity to the will of God; Clarke, as accordance with the fitnesses of things; and Wollaston, as conformity to truth: all of which, as well as several others, are obviously traits of all virtuous acts, and cannot be excluded from a full delineation of their character.

A LETTER TO

REV. NOAH PORTER, D.D.

ON THE STATEMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR IN REFERENCE TO DR. BELLAMY'S DOCTRINES.

. SIR,

REPORT, authorized, if I am not misinformed, by the Editor of the Christian Spectator, represents you to be the author of the article in the October number of that work, on "the Life and Character of Rev. Luther Hart," in which the following passages occur.

"For the June number of 1830, he prepared the review on the early history of the Congregational churches of New England""The review of Bellamy appeared in the succeeding number." p. 488.

"As to the origin of evil, Mr. Hart fully concedes that Bellamy and Strong reason chiefly and avowedly on the theory, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; or that the moral system includes more good than it could have done, had there been no sin and punishment, and was therefore preferred by the Creator to any other system possible or conceivable. This of course must be admitted to be the doctrine which these great men held. Yet this subject does not appear to have come before them in the form in which it is now presented, as a distinct subject of contemplation and argument. They assumed the common theory of the day, as it had come down to them, without distinctly inquiring, whether there was any alternative consistent with the Calvinistic faith, or following this out in its bearings on other known and admitted truths. Hence it is not wonderful, if when they met with difficulties of which this theory

did not afford a satisfactory solution, they unconsciously gave their arguments a shape which involved the assumption of the other. This is the less surprising, when it is considered that both theories occupy so much common ground-the doctrines of God's eternal purpose of his permission of sin, in order to the greatest good-of his universal providence overruling it for good-and in short, all the essential attributes of his nature, and all the revealed principles of his government. This Mr. Hart thought was the fact, and referred to the passages in their writings which induced this belief. This was not claiming them as having adopted the theory attributed to the New Haven theology. It was claiming only, that this theory, to which those powerful minds, contrary to the tradition received from the fathers,' unconsciously resorted, in explaining and vindicating certain revealed truths; and the only inference is, that it is a theory which commends itself to the mind, in view of the revealed character and government of God." Christian Spectator for 1834. p. 491.

It is a satisfaction sir, when one meets with serious difficulties in the perusal of a work, to be able to resort immediately to the author, and solicit from him such reconciliations or corrections, as his inconsistencies and errors may require. I notice that in a late letter given to the public, you made professions of strong attachment to truth, and expressed ardent wishes for the prevalence of just views respecting the New Haven theologians and their theology. It is reasonable to expect that one who is so ready, without solicitation, to step forth for the maintenance of right in the cause of others, will exhibit at least an equal promptness in furnishing such light as may be necessary for the vindication of his own representations and doctrines. I take leave therefore, to invite your notice to several statements and implications in the above cited passages, which I find myself unable to reconcile with truth.

I. The first topic to which I solicit your attention is, the view which you give of the representation put forth in that "review of Bellamy," of his theory respecting "the origin of evil."

Your statement is, that "as to the origin of evil, Mr. Hart fully concedes that Bellamy and Strong reason chiefly and avowedly on the theory, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good; or that the moral system includes more good than it could have done, had there been no sin and punishment, and was therefore preferred by the Creator to any other system possible or conceivable;" and that he only represented that "they unconsciously gave their arguments a shape which involved the assumption of the other" "theory attributed to the New Haven theology ;"-not that he claimed that they "avowedly" adopted that theory.

This statement, I regret, sir, to be obliged to say—so far as the review of Bellamy, to which I shall confine my remarks, is concerned-is directly the reverse of fact. The open, the bold, the unqualified representation of that review is, that the theory on which Dr. Bellamy constructed his main reasonings, and chiefly proceeded throughout his discussion, is the theory which Dr. Taylor has advanced; and that it was only by "inadvertence," and from "the pressure of difficulties of which this theory did not afford a satisfactory solution," that he was driven to adopt the hypothesis that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

He begins his remarks on the subject with the following declaration.

"Dr. Bellamy, in accounting for God's permission of sin, has not adhered throughout to any one hypothesis. On the contrary, he has at different times, reasoned on at least two different hypotheses, according to the nature of the difficulties, which were presented to his view. These are:

1. That sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

2. That the system or plan which God adopted, (not the sin which was incidental to it, as a certain consequence) is the necessary means of the greatest good.

"This latter hypothesis, we need hardly say, is the one of which we have affirmed, in common with Dr. Taylor in his sermon on the

nature of sin-not that it is true, or can be supported by absolutely decisive evidence-but that it may be true, and that it has never yet been proved to be false."—Christian Spectator for 1830, pp. 529–530.

He here simply affirms that Dr. Bellamy "reasoned on at least two different hypotheses, according to the nature of the difficulties which were presented to his view;" without stating which it is that he professedly maintained. After endeavouring to account for Dr. Bellamy's reasoning "in different parts of his treatise on different and inconsistent hypotheses❞—an endeavour that for injustice and absurdity has scarce a parallel, except on Dr. Taylor's pages-he presents, in the following language, his concession that Dr. Bellamy reasoned at times on the theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

"In ascribing to Dr. Bellamy the theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, it is but just to remark, that he proposes it often in the form of a mere hypothesis, or as what may be true." "In other instances, however, he adopts the form of positive assertion. He states too, that if God had pleased, he could have hindered the existence of sin.' And this he supposes might have been done in perfect consistency with free agency. It is obvious, therefore, that Dr. Bellamy in a part of his reasoning proceeds on the supposition that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. And we are perfectly willing that such statements, on his part, should have all the weight to which they are entitled on a full view of the facts." p. 531.

Such is the obscure and stifled concession, which he makes, that Bellamy sometimes reasoned on the hypothesis that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good--not as truth required, that that was the theory which he openly and formally advanced and maintained, to the utter rejection and condemnation, not only of that which Dr. Taylor holds, but of every other. To this reluctant and smothered admission, he adds: