a point with a neighbour dispassionately, however ardent their inclination to preserve their temper. Others, perhaps, find it as difficult to excite the needful paffions for a chiding. A friend to whom I am under obligations, may, by his obstinacy, grate my common fense, and occafion a complex paffion. This may prevail to breaking my reft in the night, however ftrong my inclination to the contrary: and when I come to talk over the point with him, may prevail to affecting even the tone of my voice, whilft I would give almoft any thing valuable to be able to speak of it calm and unruffled. In this cafe, as refpecting the perfection of wifdom, though we would give all the fubftance of our houfe, we cannot attain it.It is however worthy of notice, that when we are the fubjects of a fanguine paffion, we may concur to calming it, by turning a philosophical attention to it. Whilft we make it a subject of our reflection it fubfides or retires.-Some have thought we might act in a fimilar way, and with equal effect refpecting our bodily pains: but my experiments do not confirm the fuppofition.

Notwithstanding the paffions are frequently confequents of our voluntary actions and forbearances, and as all expected confequents of volition are willed, fo in all fuch cafes the actually exifting paffions are objects of indirect volition. Some confequents of voliiton both of action and forbearing are agreeable, and fome are dif agreeable,

agreeable. The agreeable are frequently the end of the volition of acting or refraining on which they depend but a disagreeable confequent, unless disguised, can never be the end of the volition of which it is the refult.-Thus, by voluntarily taking a wife, we indirectly will a new fource of care :-By purchasing a horse, we indirectly will poffeffion of all its faults :-By voluntarily making a mathematical inftrument, we indirectly will the existence of its imperfection :By voluntarily playing on a musical instrument, we indirectly will every defect in our performance :-And by voluntarily employing our eyes we fometimes indirectly will the fight of fome unpleafing objects. But neither a new fource of cares, the faults of a horse, or faults of a machine, defect of performance, or an unpleafing fight, could be the end of my volition.

Here permit me to remark, although the fubjeft will come before us more directly in the application, that, direct and indirect volition is rationally attributed to the Supreme Being. All good actions of a creature, whether a man, or an angel, are with propriety refolved ultimately into the agency of God. But an evil action, whether of depraved men or degenerated fpirits, cannot be traced back beyond fome finner, fince he was the first who determined on that action, he only directly willed it, God never did; The merely indirect volition of the Deity does not make it his

act, but is merely the neceffary refult of his infinite knowledge, and does not touch the moral agency of the creature, or affect his own fuafive government.

Laftly, Volitions are effective and admiffive. Where fome immediate effect or effects are neceffarily connected with my determination to act or refrain, the volition may be called effective. But when the effective determination of another agent is perceived to be neceffarily connected with my volition of forbearing or acting in a certain respect, my volition is admiffive. In other words, when our end neceffarily requires active property or ability, to be voluntarily exerted by us to effect its accomplishment, the volition is called an effective or efficacious volition or will. But when we voluntarily refrain from exercifing ability, we have to hinder by acting or forbearing the effect of what we foresee tending to its production, we are faid, not only indirectly, but admiffively or permiffively to will the existence of fuch event or effect.-Thus the volition of an architect, who builds an edifice, and of a man who lies in bed to cure a cold, is effective. But 'the volition of withdrawing the hand from the cork hole of a cafk in confequence of which the liquor runs out, as alfo, the volition of the unfaithful fervant, who refrains refiftance in confequence of which the house is plundered, is admiffive.

Thus

Thus far in this difquifition, methinks, I have gone on experiments and followed the actual nature of things confirmed by experience: for I perfuade myself, that the most unlearned husbandman, of good parts, if he reflects on what paffes. in his mind, can notice that he perceives two objects either merely in conception, or in sensible exiflence. He next views them in the respect of apprehenfion: Next under the modification of thinking we call comparing, and this in relation to good or pleasure. Here he reflects that a judgment is formed: this judgment is immediately attended with affection or paffion; and in conclufion, he finds that thinking of them in contraft is now prefering one to the other. If the ideas were of action and forbearance, or of any event, then the paffion was defire or averfion or both, that is, defire respecting the prefered object and averfion respecting the rejected, the preference was inclination of mind. If the inclination was to fome thing uncertain or impoffible, we denominate it wifh: If to fomething in future to be done or forborn, enjoyed or fuffered, it is purpose: but if the inclination was to fomething presently to be done or forborn, apprehended within the dominion of the inclined mind it is volition, and may manifeft itself to others by figns of fome fort.Though the determinate notion of power may run through the whole feries, yet the ploughman and the greatest philofopher are equally without a di

rect conception of it, or of the operation of modified thought to produce another modification of thinking. Nevertheless all the operations of the foul, depend one upon another, and a train of thinking is aptly illuftrated by a clue or chain.

SECTION VIII.

Of Choice.

CHOICE option, election, and selection, seem

nearly fynonymous words. Choice is, in my judgment a complex inclination of mind; which I know not how better to describe concisely, than by faying, choice is voluntary preference, and that chufing is voluntarily prefering. The best account I can give of this complex inclination take as follows.

The preference that we call choice effentially requires an antecedent volition, I faid effentially becaufe the end of the volition of chufing is the ftandard to which the objects are refered, in order to the minds neglecting one and embracing another, in which choice principally confists. Suit. able fubjects for choice being at hand, the question arifes fhall I chufe or fhall I forbear? Perhaps I am indifpofed to lay myself under obligation to a donor, and so voluntarily forbear to chuse. Perhaps I am difpofed to fufpend my chufing to fome future opportunity, and fo voluntarily forbear chufing at

prefent