1. THE Nature and Properties of a Lot, SERM. with the different Sorts of them.

II. AFTER what Manner God is faid

to dispose of them.

I. AND, First, I fhall endeavour to explain what is here meant by a Lot, which Foundation being laid, the rest of my Difcourfe will be rendered more plain, eafy, and intelligible.

on;

A Lot, then, is, by the best Writers defined to be a cafual Event, purposely ap plied to the deciding fomething in Quefti fo that the Nature of a Lot lies in this, viz. in the Determination of our Choice, in fome Matter we are unrefolved of, by the Intervention of some casual and accidental Effect.

Now, amongst the various Diftinctions of Lots, the most useful I look upon to be into Extraordinary and Ordinary Lots. Extraordinary Lots were thofe Divine Lots which were formerly made Use of in Sacred Matters, as an immediate Appeal to God himself, for the deciding fomething which could not be determined any other Way. Ordinary Lots were either Civil, fuch as were made Use of in Civil Matters; fuch as the Choice of Magiftrates, where it was requifite that there fhould be fome

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VIII.

SERM. fome Contingency: Or Luforious Lots, VIII. i. e. fuch Lots as were made Ufe of for Sport and Diverfion; thefe being the different Sorts of Lots I come,

II. Secondly, To fhew how God doth dijpose of them.

i. It is plain, that, as for Divine Lots, God did difpose of them in an extraordinary Manner, and, as it were, point out, with his own Finger, what he would have performed and done; they were appointed by him, to decide fome Differences, and to reveal his Mind and Will in feveral Exigences; and were properly made Ufe of under a Theocracy, where God, by this Means, did fhew himself to be their fupreme Legislator and Governor. He did not, indeed, appear to them in a vifible Shape, and fway his Scepter amongst them; but he decided their Differences after fuch a Manner, and made Use of such Means to discover his Will to them, as made it evident to the World, that an invisible Being ordered all their Affairs and Counfels, and stood at the Helm, and directed all their Motions, to what Point or Coast he thought most convenient. It is true, thefe Divine Lots were aped and imitated by the Heathens; but then 'tis plain, that their Answers were difpofed by Trick and

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Artifice, and that their Gods were as SE RM. dumb as their Oracles were observed to VIII. be, at the Appearance of the Meffiab.

CIVIL Lots were Things wholly contingent, and defigned to be fo; and therefore God did no otherwise dispose of them, than by concurring to the Action of the Creature ; the turning this Action of a Creature into a Lot, i. e. making this contingent Act to answer fome Doubt, was wholly owing to those Perfons who appealed to it.

AND after the fame Manner did God difpofe of Luforious Lots; he was no farther interested in them, than by the general Course of his Providence, ordering and difpofing the Actions of his Creatures, to produce thefe neceffary Effects, which the Preservation of their Beings neceffarily required of them; the Contingency of these Effects, in order to the deciding several Doubts, is wholly owing to the Compact and Agreement of thofe Perfons who did commit the Decifion of the Question to them; and, being generally Things of the leaft Moment, there is little Prudence or Forefight, or Confultation, required to the deciding of them.

THE Words, being thus canvaffed and confidered, denote thus much to us: That, though

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SERM, though there is nothing in the World more VIII. cafual than a Lot, yet there is a Providence

of God which extends itself even to the Difpofition of them, and orders them as feems beft to his Divine Will and Pleafure.

Secondly, THE Words, fo understood, afford us these following Confiderations :

I. THAT there is a Providence of God,
which orders and difpofes of all fublu-
nary Affairs, and concurs towards the
Production of the most trivial Events.
II. THAT fome Events are under the
more particular Direction of Divine
Providence.

III. THAT this Management doth by no
Means interfere with the Liberty of
Man's Will.

IV. THAT fuch Games, as depend wholly
upon Chance and Fortune, are not ab-
folutely unlawful: And yet it is evi-
dent,

V. THAT every good Chriftian ought to very circumfpect in the Use of them.

be

I. THAT there is a Providence which orders and disposes of all fublunary Affairs, and concurs towards the Production of the moft trivial Events. This feems to be the

main Design and Intendment of the Words SE RM. of my Text; which give us to under- VIII, stand, that even these Things, which depend upon Chance for their Effence and Being, yet are, in fome Measure, under the Guidance and Influence of the great Creator and Governor of the World ; nothing can be more cafual than a ludicrous Lot; the Nature of fuch Lots depending on this infeparable Property, that they are cafual Events; for if there was any Certainty in them, or if they admitted any Forefight, there could be no Lottery in them; and yet God, by his general Providence, doth in fome Measure dispose of these, i. e. he upholds and maintains them; he gives Men the Power to make Ufe of this Casualty to very good Purposes, to decide fuch Matters as could not fo well be decided without them, and to conduce to their harmless Mirth and Diverfion. And if the Providence of God in fome Measure difpofes of fuch casual Events, which are of fo little Use to the good Government of the World, much more of those which have a certain Caufe, and produce determinate Events, and are of greater Weight and Confequence, and conduce more to the Good of Mankind. For,