In 1965-70 this was our only accomplishment. We fielded the Vulcan, which was an interim system in response to Vietnam, and the Chaparral, which again was an interim system. Basically, it was a converted Sidewinder missile.

In that same period of time the Soviets-and this doesn't tell the whole story-I'll update this for you now-have developed and deployed the SA-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and now, [deleted] and that's in the same period of time.

80-743 0-81-2

I showed you the Kirov. Here is our 963. This is about a 7,800-ton displacement ship, if I remember correctly. You will find that the only ordnance on the 963 is the 5-inch gun, forward and aft, and the Sea Sparrow, which is about an [deleted] missile. That is in 7,800 tons of displacement.

The CG-36 has the Tartar missile and the 5-inch gun. But relatively speaking, it looks like a Saturday night prom ship. Consider the growth potential for ordnance that you have on here. We are fielding ships today that just don't stack up against the Soviet threat. A Soviet Kashin is a 4,500-ton displacement ship, and without going into the details of it, it has the GOA-the AS-3-surface-to-air missle launchers forward and aft, guns all around the ship. You have surface-to-surface long-range capable missiles on that ship, and that's a 4,500-ton displacement ship. Everything they field is loaded with ordnance, a fighting capability right now.

So while we're emphasizing design to cost, they're emphasizing design to capability.

Mr. DICKINSON. What is the difference in ranges of our antiship missiles compared to theirs? How close do we have to get to hit one of them compared to ours?

Mr. BATTISTA. That's interesting. The longest range surface to surface missile we have today is the Harpoon, and that's [deleted]. If you improve it, it will go [deleted] miles. He outranges you by at least a factor of [deleted]. He can also outrun you.

So I get rather confused when Navy representatives come up here and tell you that the way we're going to cope with the Soviets is to take the battle to them, and then you ask, "What are you going to do about the Kirov?" and they say, "Stay outside of his envelope." How do you take the battle to the enemy and at the same time stay outside of his envelope? So undoubtedly we have to have to do something, and do it quickly.

I guess the good news is that you have a big increase in the defense budget for fiscal year 1982. You can turn that good news into bad news by not spending the $42 billion increase properly, and there are some examples. We've been through a very cursory review of the budget, but there is every indication that we can do better in this 1982 budget, and we'll identify those issues that you might want to develop during the coming month with the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OSD witnesses.

We are fortunate insofar as we have growth potential in our ships. We must go forward and deploy the vertical launch system; basically, this is just an array of holes, so to speak, in the deck of the ship where you would put Tomahawks, Harpoons, and Standard missiles. If we get on with that program, then I think we will come up with the equalizer to the Soviet threat that we have to face up to right now. But, as I say, when you go to the fleet—and Mr. Dickinson and I with Tom went out to pay a brief visit to the U.S.S. Merrill-we found out that they're short of Harpoons, that they don't have the capability they need, and when one ship comes in they off load the ordnance and put it on the other ship. Basically, as Admiral Carter told us, if the war started today we would have [deleted] of sustainability, [deleted] before we would run out of ammunition, and that's the profile we're up against today. Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Mollohan.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. To follow up on Mr. Dickinson's question, how do the missile ranges of our ships compare with the Soviets?

Mr. BATTISTA. Ours right now with the Harpoon is [deleted] miles. Theirs is approximately, the best information we have is 200 miles. Everyone will accept 150 at the very least.

Dr. COOPER. You may be thinking also about the Tomahawk, which is yet to enter the inventory, which would have a range of over [deleted]. But we haven't fielded it yet.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Do we still have it in production?

Dr. COOPER. It's into production, but it hasn't entered the inventory yet.

They are producing three missiles a month at the General Dynamics facility in San Diego. In contrast, we have the capability to produce 15 F-16's a month, but we're producing three Tomahawk cruise missiles a month in San Diego. It looks like a ghost town out there right now.

Mr. DICKINSON. What is their capacity for production?

Mr. BATTISTA. Right now it's 20, the minimum efficient rate, and as a result of our building 3 as opposed to 20 we are paying $1.5 million a copy for that missile when in fact if we built them properly we would be paying $750,000 a copy for that missile. So you're paying nearly 100 percent to buy no defense capability whatsoever, to maintain an inefficient production line, and that's

what's killing our industry. As you all well know, Tom did the staff work on the Industrial Base Panel, and the conclusion there is our industrial base, our supplies, our vendors, are in a state of atrophy right now because the Department of Defense is a fickle customer. We're up again, down again. You facilitize to build 180 F-16's a year, and you're building, what, 96 for this year?

Dr. COOPER. The Carter budget had eight a month, which is 96 a year. I think the new budget raises it to 10 a month or 120 a year. The optimum rate is 180, but they've been building them at 3 a month. So it's just the old start, stop, slowdown syndrome.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me say for the interest of the members here and I know the chairman agrees with me-whatever in this briefing is of interest to you, if you want to go personally and visit it, tour the plant, and give it a hands-on inspection on the west coast, the east coast, or wherever the production is, if any member of the committee, if they desire to do so, will just make their desires known, the chairman will at least try to put a trip together to go see it.

I was on the Oriskany and the New Jersey, and visited the GD plant 2 weeks ago, and there wasn't any sweat. If you want to go, let your desires be known because it's most important that you go and see and learn these things. You can't do it by briefing.

I think that's right, isn't it, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, one other fast question.

You say the Tomahawk has a range of [deleted] miles and we're producing 3 and we should be producing 20.

Mr. BATTISTA. That is correct.

Dr. COOPER. Or more.

Mr. BATTISTA. Or more, in fact.
Mr. MOLLOHAN. But 20 is your-

Mr. BATTISTA. Minimum efficient rate.

And this is across the entire spectrum, Mr. Mollohan. In fact, up until the new budget came over I could have stated categorically that there was not one major weapon system that we were producing at even the minimum economic rate, and this is costing us money and causing our industry to dry up. In fact, in the case of the Navy we are going to produce fewer aircraft this year than we attrited last year.

Now, how you can embark upon a get-well program for defense with that kind of an approach is well beyond me. But that's true for the entire spectrum of major procurements.

Tom, do you know of any?

Dr. COOPER. The only one we were told about were two radars, the TPQ-36 and the TPQ-37, which were being bought in small

amounts.

Mr. BATTISTA. Yes. I think we're only buying a dozen or so of those anyway.

But I think you can say that that's the highlight of the problem, the fact that we are spending a lot of money on defense and not getting the proper return on that defense investment simply because we have poor management, our approach to the problem. Dr. COOPER. Tony, I agree with what you said about the Navy. I'm a little shaky on the numbers, but last year, ball park, the Navy requested 110 aircraft in their budget. They attrited in excess

of 250. That's one of the reasons we were bringing on the F-18 program, to try to modernize the Navy's tactical airpower. But we're buying less than half than what we're attriting each year right now in the Navy.

Mr. BATTISTA. You can say a lot of the problems that we've had is because of the massive Soviet buildup, unprecedented in terms of ground forces. But a lot of it, I think, reflects on our own inability to get things from the drawing board into the field, and I think a lot of it has been due to the fact that we haven't had a consistent set of either foreign or defense policy objectives. If you have a weak foundation then the 3,200 projects that you have aren't going to stack up very well. As a consequence, let me give you some horror tales.

We started the B-70 program back in the early sixties as a replacement for the B-52, and we spent almost $2 billion, and it was canceled. For the return on the investment you have one museum piece, a B-70, out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Then you went into the AMSA program, the advanced manned strategic aircraft, you spent another $300 million, and then that led to the B-1. Then on the B-1 we expended a shade over $4 billion, $4.1 billion, and you have four R. & D. aircraft to show for that.

So for an investment of nearly $7 billion back in those year dollars you have one museum piece and four R. & D. aircraft, and when you contrast that with the Soviets in 1968 our best intelligence estimate was that they had no interest in developing a manned penetrating bomber. In 1970 we saw the first flight of the Backfire. Now not only do they have the Backfire, they are improving the Backfire, and they have a follow-on to the Backfire coming off the drawing boards right now.

So while we've been thinking about a new bomber and canceling one program after another they have been building them. As a consequence, you have about 150 Backfires in the inventory today with a Soviet capacity to produce as many as five a month.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, another question.

How does the Backfire compare to the B-1?

Mr. BATTISTA. The Backfire is somewhere in physical size between the 111 and the B-1. It's smaller than the B-1. In terms of its capability, I do not frankly believe the CIA estimate that it cannot reach most of the United States unrefuelled. In fact, some of my friends in the Air Force had the opportunity to take pictures of a Backfire, and I showed these pictures to the [deleted], and they acknowledged the fact that it is not structurally a [deleted] airplane. It has less structure in it than we had anticipated; it's more like a [deleted] airplane. Mr. McDonald, I showed you those photos, and you can tell that by looking at the wing cant you can tell a lot about the structure of the aircraft, and my own personal assessment is that it has intercontinenal range and it can reach [deleted] unrefuelled.

Mr. DICKINSON. There's no doubt about it that they have air refuelling capability, is there?

Mr. BATTISTA. No doubt whatsoever. But it is a long range strategic bomber, contrary to what some of the Intelligence folks say, and just to have the Soviets say "We're not going to use it in a