in December 1981 to define the requirements for the next generation engine and to identify program options and technology gaps which satisfy both Service's needs. As detailed requirements for both the next generation fighter and its engine evolve, program funding will be identified and requested. We currently anticipate a late fiscal year 1983 or early fiscal year 1984 start of the next generation fighter engine program. The projected IOC for both the advanced tactical fighter and the new engine is 1993 or 1994.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to be recorded as voting in favor of going into closed session or authorization for closed session today and one other additional time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman will be so recorded.

Mr. EMERY. Mr. Chairman, I make that same request.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the request is granted.

Any other questions?

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, I have a question on another section, not on this one, but I want to mention that I am interested in the B-1 bomber. But that's at a subsequent time, I understand.

General BURKE. We have a separate small briefing on that subject that will come along later, sir, if you like.

Mr. WHITE. Mr. Chairman, what is the will of the chair? Do you want me to ask that question now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. General, I'm very curious about the follow-on bomber, B-1. As I understand it, we have expended something like $100 million for an alternate engine for the F-111. Am I correct on that? It was $82 million. What is it now, about $35 million more at the present time?

General BURKE. Yes, sir. I wouldn't think it's up to a hundred at this point though. I think it's less than that.

[The following information was received for the record:]

ESTIMATED PRICE FOR ALTERNATE ENGINE FOR THE F-111

The F-111 is a fighter aircraft which uses the TF30 engine. The Air Force has not spent development money on an alternate engine for the F-111 aircraft. The Navy and Air Force combined have spent $113M through fiscal year 1981 on the F101DFE (derivative fighter engine with potential application in the F-16 and F-14 aircraft) but this engine is not a candidate for the F-111 aircraft.

As for the follow-on bomber (which would be the FB-111B/C or a variant of B-1), we have initiated efforts under the LRCA program to productionize a specific configuration of the GE F101 engine. This engine, termed the F101-102, is common to either aircraft candidate. The dash 102 configuration incorporates changes to the original B-1 engine (the F101-100) identified primarily during the B-1 flight test program. While both the F101DFE (fighter engine) and the F101-102 (bomber engine) are derived from the original B1 engine, mission usage and airframe/engine interface requirements make these engines distinctly different in size, weight, maximum air flow, thrust and SFC.

Mr. WHITE. I understand that the B-1 bomber is anticipated to be, or a variant thereof, the bomber for the 1990's until we go into the next century. I was wondering if you had an alternate engine by way of insurance that you're trying to develop for the B-1 bomber similar and parallel to your action in relation to the F100 engine.

General BURKE. No, sir, we don't. We are at this stage, I think, firmly committed to buying 1,388 F-16 fighters, a large number of them already bought, and at least 765 F-15 fighters, all of which are powered by the F100 engine. We are not at any similar point with regard to the bomber. The recommendation of the Secretary

of Defense as to which bomber to buy is due to the committee shortly, and the B-1 is a candidate, but it's not the only candidate.

Mr. WHITE. You said you had an engine that had something like 700,000 hours of test on it for the F-16 and for the F-15, the F100 engine. I just felt that perhaps you should be looking at an alternate engine for the B-1 as you make those decisions going parallel to your decision. You say you haven't arrived at that decision as yet, but I presume that you are talking in terms of the B-1 or a variant thereof as a delivery system that has already been developed and the prototype has been made.

General BURKE. The congressional mandate to the Secretary of Defense is to do an assessment and make a recommendation, choosing between either the existing B-1, a variant of the B-1, the stretched FB-111, or an advanced technology bomber.

Mr. WHITE. Isn't the B-1 bomber engine itself older technology and not an advanced technology?

General BURKE. It's the newest bomber engine technology in the world. It's not all that new. It went into development around 1970. Mr. WHITE. Has any thought been given to a parallel or an insurance engine before making a decision, if you make a decision on the B-1? You're surely going to make a decision on the B-1 or a variant thereof, I'm sure.

General BURKE. There has not been any formal consideration of that, but I will so do.

[The following information was received for the record:]

ALTERNATE ENGINES FOR B-1 VARIANT

While there is no formal consideration being given to an alternate engine for the B-1 Variant during the current source selecton process, alternate engine options have been studied in detail during the planning stages of the bomber program. A study was conducted during the fall of 1980 to evaluate options for the new bomber program (including engines) by the Air Force. This study concluded that no alternative for the F101-102 engine exists for the B-1, the B-1 Variant and the FB-111B/C that can support the schedule for early introduction into the fleet. Viable options do exist for the advanced technology bomber and formal consideration will be given to these alternatives if the advanced technology bomber option is selected. An uprated F101-102 engine is also being considered for a possible new start in the fiscal year 1983 Engine Model Derivative Program which could be retrofitted into a B-1 Variant F101-102 engine within three to four years from program go-ahead without impact on the IOC.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McDonald.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Burke, has there been a declassification of the Federal support program?

General BURKE. No, sir.

Mr. McDONALD. So we can't really go into that, at least not at this time?

General BURKE. No, sir.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, I do on the shuttle, but do you want to get into it first?

General BURKE. No, sir, I haven't addressed it yet.

General BURKE. This is our space section, a little better than half a billion dollars, most of which goes for the Air Force portion of the Space Shuttle system, and that is not the Shuttle itself, which is, of course, a NASA responsibility, but for the development of the upper stage associated with the Shuttle, which we call the inertial upper stage, for taking payloads from low orbits to the high orbits, and for the development of all of the attendant facilities at the launch and recovery site at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

There are some difficulties with the inertial upper stage program, and the Air Force Systems Command is even at this moment looking into that and negotiating with the manufacturer. That is unresolved at this point.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask a follow-up question to that?

You have a need for an intertial upper stage and NASA does too. Is that right?

General BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKINSON. How is their requirement different from the Air Force requirement so that you have to go down a dual track? General BURKE. Ralph Jacobson served in NASA, working directly in the Space Shuttle program, before he came to work with us, and he can, I think, make a more articulate recount of that than could I.

General JACOBSON. Mr. Dickinson, our inertial upper stage is a two-stage device designed to get payloads to synchronous orbit. NASA has those same requirements for the tracking and data

relay satellite system, and they will use a two-stage rocket to do that. They have reached a decision in the past few weeks that the three-stage inertial upper stage which was to be developed for their planetary program will no longer be satisfactory for their requirements, and have therefore decided that a liquid upper stage would be better for that set of requirements.

Mr. DICKINSON. How does that impact your joint program then? General JACOBSON. It impacts our joint program in that fewer inertial upper stages will be procured in the first 3 years of the program than we had originally anticipated, and the three-stage development program will not take place.

Mr. DICKINSON. It will not take place?

General JACOBSON. It will not take place if NASA's decision is upheld by the Congress.

Mr. DICKINSON. If I could just review this, this part of it?

Last year there was a cost growth of $144 million in this program, and the program slipped 12 months, and the program was supposed to have been, it is my recollection, capped at that level. Now there's $110 million in here and it's slipped another 6 to 9 months, another $10 million growth.

Looking to the future, what might we expect? Do you think this is going to cap at this amount of growth? There has to be an end to this somewhere. Do you have all the shingles nailed back on that thing?

General JACOBSON. Mr. Dickinson, as General Burke said, the Systems Command is investigating this latest requested cost growth with the contractor at this time. I don't believe that it is clear which part we, as an institution, have agreed to and which part we have not at this point.

Mr. DICKINSON. That puts us in a bad position. We're asked to approve the funding before you even get the information as to whether it really is going to be required and what you're going to ultimately do.

General JACOBSON. It's my understanding, Mr. Dickinson, that our request for 1982 is along the lines of the presentations to this committee last year, that there are no further cost growths above the cap represented in our 1982 submission. We are threatened by further cost growths at this time, which the Systems Command has under investigation.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me yield to the staff here, Dr. Cooper.

Dr. COOPER. General, in fact, NASA's pulling out of the program has kind of left you holding the bag, hasn't it?

General JACOBSON. NASA's pulling out of the program will result in increased costs over and above the development difficulties we've been having, and those had to do with spreading what engineering work there is in the development over a smaller base, plus buying fewer rockets, which will result in a higher per unit cost.

Dr. COOPER. In fact, wasn't it NASA that early on specified that because of man rating problems the IUS should be solid, as opposed to liquid and designed to that specification?

General JACOBSON. It's my understanding with regard to that in the early days of the program that NASA had not yet satisfied themselves that a liquid upper stage would be safe. In the intervening years they have expended considerable effort on that question

and about 6 months ago, if my memory serves me correctly, satisfied themselves that a derivative of the Centaur upper stage would, indeed, be a safe upper stage to proceed with in the planetary programs.

Dr. COOPER. But the Centaur upper stage will not be available in time for you to use it in order to put some of your very critical payloads in space. You are more or less committed now to stick with the IUS, aren't you? You have no choice.

General JACOBSON. Yes; indeed we are, Dr. Cooper, and so is the NASA. The NASA is committed

Dr. COOPER. For the 22,000-mile orbits?

General JACOBSON. To use the two-stage IUS for their Tracking and Data Relay Satellite.

Dr. COOPER. But you're footing the bill for the development of that entirely now?

General JACOBSON. Yes, sir.

Dr. COOPER. In fact, the program is over half a billion dollars in cost.

General JACOBSON. Yes, sir. And the NASA is footing the bill for the development of the Shuttle, the orbiter itself and related facilities at Kennedy.

Mr. DICKINSON. Is the launch date still April 7, the original launch date, or has that slipped?

General JACOBSON. I think, Mr. Dickinson, the best way I can put it is the launch date will be no earlier than April 7.

This is a very complicated engineering development, one of the most complex ones I believe man has ever undertaken, including, in my view, our trip to the Moon. It is finally coming together, I believe. All signs point that way. But it is a complex machine. It is the first time we've launched it. I believe the launch will be soon this spring, but I wouldn't want to commit to April 7.

Mr. DICKINSON. If you would recommend it, I'll make reservations now for April 7.

General JACOBSON. No, sir. I believe I would have more flexibility than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hutto.

Mr. HUTTO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you've covered a wide variety of Air Force programs, some of them of particular interest to me, including the AMRAAM, the WAAM, and the LLLGB.

One thing I would like to ask you, how do you feel about our standing ammunitions inventory in our arsenal now?

General BURKE. As of right now I think it's unhealthily low. When we realize the results of the increased buys that are in both the 1981 and the 1982 budgets that will be approaching a more reasonable level, and we have reasonably ambitious plans throughout the 5-year planning period to get them up to the level that we would want.

We have ample stocks of munitions. What we don't have is nearly enough of the preferred munitions, munitions that let you get in there and get the job done without losing a lot of airplanes. Mr. HUTTO. Do you feel that we should be devoting more resources in money and manpower to the ongoing programs, such as