R.D.T. & E. OVERVIEW BRIEFING BY STAFF

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 11, 1981.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Melvin Price (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

As I indicated to you in my letter of March 2, 1981, the subcommittee will begin its review of the fiscal year 1982 Department of Defense budget request for research, development, test and evaluation tomorrow.

Mr. Dickinson and I thought it would be a good idea prior to our formal hearings to get together with the staff to review the R. & D. process and to highlight some of the issues that will come before the R. & D. Subcommittee this year. I believe this will be especially helpful since we have 10 new members on the subcommittee. Almost every new member on the committee went on our subcommittee.

I stated in my letter of February 18, 1981 that the review of the R.D.T. & E. budget request is extremely complex since it is made up of nearly 3,200 projects and programs representing a very broad spectrum of technology. The R. & D. budget request is perhaps one of the most challenging tasks in our long list of congressional duties. For someone with a background in engineering or science, the task is at the very least difficult-difficult because the R. & D. program includes such complicated areas as computer sciences, medical research, and radiation technology, to name just a few. For those of us without academic training or experience in the sciences, the difficulty is compounded; yet, through our combined efforts and good judgment, this subcommittee has over the years approved what most defense experts have considered to be effective and efficient R.D.T. & E. programs.

I know that the subcommittee enjoys the reputation of being one of the hardest working and competent subcommittees on Capitol Hill. With your assistance, I am confident that we can maintain our high standard and reputation.

Research and development is paramount to a strong defense posture. The R. & D. that we approve today will determine which weapon systems will be deployed throughout the remainder of this century, and, in fact, during the first quarter of the next century. Important as it is, R. & D. must be accompanied by a sound acquisition strategy that will allow us to translate technology into operationally effective hardware in a timely way.

Yesterday, Secretary Weinberger advised us of his serious concern over our poor defense acquisition strategy and related that he has assigned Deputy Secretary Carlucci to head a panel to improve defense procurement.

When we look at the Soviet inventory of military equipment and their enormous expenditures for defense, we find that we can no longer tolerate the "start, delay, stop, start again" process that Mr. Ichord so appropriately described last year.

So we have a challenging and complicated task before us this year, and I am confident that our combined efforts will get our defense program back in the right direction.

I have asked the staff this morning to address the R. & D. process, to highlight potential issues for fiscal year 1982, and to offer their perspective on ways to improve the acquisition strategy. This morning we will proceed in an informal manner, and I encourage the members to ask questions and develop issues in our preparation for the formal hearings. I want to emphasize that this is a briefing that I hope will develop into an exchange of ideas. Before proceeding with the staff, I would like to recognize Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

As you have stated, we have discussed this, and we have done this in the past, in order for the newer members on the committee to have a full appreciation of the scope of the job ahead of us and some of the problems we have had our staff brief us as to anticipated problems, the weapon systems that we are to deal with, give a little history also of some of the acronyms that are bandied about so easily. I would hope that, if they haven't already done it, the staff would make hard copies available of some of those common acronyms so that we can have a handy reference.

I take pride on being on this committee because I know in conferences with the Senate we are effective because we know the facts and we can justify our position more often than does the Senate, and when we go to conference our success has really been due in large part to the staff and to the members doing hard work in subcommittee.

So, as the chairman has pointed out, the important weapon systems of the future are born here; some are killed here. The services have a very high regard for this subcommittee, and this is a prestigious subcommittee that I take pride in serving on.

I can't commend too highly the staff, who are dedicated, and who are nonpartisan. They are very responsive when anybody has a problem.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for setting this meeting up. I think it's very beneficial.

Without anything further, I would like to get on with it.

Let me just say, by way of background, this committee has grown. In the past we have tried to adhere to the 5-minute rule without a timer and everybody has been cooperative. Due to the number that we have now and the size of the subcommittee having grown, perhaps we'll have to get strict. But I would hope that the members would just be considerate and that the Chair won't have to invoke the 5-minute rule which is in effect, but to give some flexibility and latitude to the members as we have in the past, and

as long as the members are cooperative I don't think we need to have a timer, if somebody is interested in a subject and is developing a point that they will be allowed to proceed. Mr. Chairman, I know we have discussed it, I would hope that we will attempt to deal in that way with some flexibility and latitude. If it doesn't work and if there are any complaints from the members, then we'll just decide whether or not to go to the inflexible 5-minute rule. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else have any ideas on the subject? [No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. If the staff will then proceed.

BRIEFING BY ANTHONY R. BATTISTA AND DR. THOMAS E. COOPER, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. BATTISTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you stated, the R. & D. program is rather complicated insofar as there are slightly under 3,200 projects and it covers everything from computer sciences to antisubmarine warfare to space research, including high-energy lasers, directed energy weapons, and when you begin review of this budget you will find that there probably are 10 times the numbers of terms, phrases, acronyms, and special brands of Pentagonese jargon that's associated with these projects and programs. After a while, for the benefit of the new members, it becomes rather clear as to what we are talking about. For example, you're going to hear about DSARC and mission element need statements, MENS statements, and, for example, you might have a defense witness telling you that the MENS was approved; the program is now in advanced development, or AD, and the DSARC is going to meet, and they will decide whether or not they're going to FSED, and that's rather confusing at first. But all that means is we have a requirement for a new weapon systems. We built an experimental model, and now the board of directors, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, is going to meet to decide whether or not the program should continue into engineering development, that is, to convert the experimental model to the actual piece of hardware that's going to be in the aircraft, or the ship, or whatever.

You will hear terms like EMP, electromagnetic pulse, and that's rather confusing at first. But basically all that means is you've shot a heavy dosage of voltage at an aircraft or a system and it didn't die; it lived.

So after a while I think you kind of get a feel for the terms and the jargon that's used.

I'll start by saying that in 1977, when Mr. Ichord took the R. & D. subcommittee and Mr. Price had gone over to the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee, he asked that the staff get together and give the subcommittee our assessment of where we stood vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in terms of our defense capability, and he said, "I want a no holds barred presentation. Tell it the way you see it," and getting that license, we gave a presentation, which some of you may recall, that in effect said at the rate we are going the Soviets will achieve total military dominance over the United States by about the mid-1980's.

If you use a bad news-good news kind of approach, that was the bad news, and the continued bad news is that they are probably 4 years closer to that objective today, one of the reasons being the massive Soviet defense program that they have embarked upon, with no letup in sight.

Mr. DICKINSON. To interrupt, Tony, there is no classification on this. Is that right?

Mr. BATTISTA. At this point there is no classification.

Mr. DICKINSON. I wanted the members to know whether they can quote this, whether this is in the public domain or is not.

Mr. BATTISTA. This is very much unclassified, Mr. Dickinson. Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. McDonald.

Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Battista, the Delta segment of 323 which the Soviets outspent the United States seems to me gets constantly bigger. I can remember not too long ago when we were looking at $104 billion plus $40 billion, and I know that was from 1968 to 1978. But when we were looking at the decade of the seventies there was $240 billion, and now we've gone up almost another $100 billion.

Mr. BATTISTA. You're right. It depends on what you include in the category. I'll address your $104 billion.

The $323 billion Delta refers to military expenditures, including research, development, test and evaluation. It includes equipment, procurement and personnel. The $104 billion you're talking about related to just R.D.T. & E., procurement and military construction, as I understand it. Is that right, Tom?

Dr. COOPER. That's right. But the $240 billion is in fiscal year 1981 dollars, and we are talking about that in fiscal year 1979 dollars. This is all-inclusive. If you escalated that to fiscal year 1981 dollars you would probably have to add 20 percent to those numbers, or so. But this is all-inclusive, whereas the $240 billion that you alluded to includes only R.D.T. & E., facilities and procurement.

Mr. McDONALD. Thank you.

Mr. BATTISTA. This slide will show you the percentage changes in terms of expenditures.

Mr. BATTISTA. This is the R.D.T. & E. program here, and you will notice that in that period there was about a $40 billion Delta between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. program over that period of time.

Now, if you throw in the procurement and R.D.T. & E. expenditures you see on the next viewgraph-

Mr. McDONALD. Tony, before you leave that, could you leave that just a minute?

Mr. BATTISTA. Mr. McDonald, to bring this up-to-date, though, to relate that to the $240 billion that you mentioned, if you add fiscal years 1979 and 1980 to bring it up through the decade, that $40 billion becomes $70 billion, and that is a number you're familiar with.

Mr. DICKINSON. Tell him where the figures come from too, please. Mr. BATTISTA. OK. The figures for the Soviet Union are the best intelligence estimates we have.

Now, if you want my personal judgment on this, I think the situation is far more catastrophic than just the numbers indicate. These are the conservative estimates. When you consider, Mr. Dickinson, that the Soviets don't have to go through all the procurement widgets that we do-and I can prove this to you later on by examining what comes out of their pipeline-I think the situation is a lot worse.

For example, consider the M-1 tank and the way we're procuring it. The fact that we're not buying it at the minimum economic rate, means it is costing us $2.5 million a copy. I think the Soviets, in contrast, do produce at effective economic rates, and consequently they pay significantly less for their T-72 than we're paying for our M-1.