For example, during the period 1971-75 the annual Soviet tank production at their three plants was 3,030 tanks per year, and we have means of ascertaining those numbers. Ours was 413.

Just to give you a feel for the problem I'll pass this photo up to you. This is one of their three tank plants at Nizhniy Tagil in the Soviet Union. You will see I have outlined the area of that plant superimposed over a map of the District, and it goes from one border to the other and covers everything from the Lincoln Memorial to Union Station. I'll pass this up to you. This is an example. This is only one of their three tank plants.

Dr. COOPER. While you're doing that, Tony, I might also mention that 2 years ago this information was classified. General Stafford, the former astronaut, presented it to the subcommittee and Mr. Dickinson asked if he could do what he could to get it declassified, which he did, and several of the members have been using this type of data. If anybody would like to, we can get graphs of this for you.

Mr. BATTISTA. The following viewgraph shows if the $104 billion was available to the United States, that is just the difference between what they spent and what we spent in 1978 dollars, that is what we could have funded here in the United States.

It would have paid for the entire fleet of 244 B-1 bombers, the entire MX program, all of the subs, and you can read the rest. But basically the message is if we just had the difference between what the Soviets spent and what we spent we could have modernized all of our strategic forces and most of our ground forces, and greatly enhanced our tactical air forces. That's just with the difference. Now, that's only part of the story. The rest of the story amounts to what the Soviets are accomplishing at their universities, in filling their pipelines, and this is a chart that I used in the 1977 presentation to the subcommittee.

You can see the counts here, and if we go any later than this then the information becomes classified.

Here again, if you want copies of this, we have them down at the office.

But in terms of air defense systems, in terms of antitank weapons, artillery systems, it's just no contest, what's been coming out of their line and what's been coming out of ours.

Attack submarines, they not only outnumber us 3 to 1; they outproduce us 3 to 1.

Major surface combatants, right now we have one new one on the drawing board, coming into the fleet. That's the CG-47 Aegis cruiser. The Soviets have four brandnew ones.

Another part of the problem has been our lack of commitment. We'll start a program and then wind up canceling it midway through, or going through an exercise where there is a lot of system analysis done and we never seem to get on with it. The case in point I'll use here is our Strike cruiser. We never did build the Strike cruiser. The Soviets thought it was a pretty good idea. They now have their Kirov, and I'll pass this photo around, which is the most heavily armed cruiser in the world today. There is nothing we can do, based on the [deleted] to cope with this threat, and there are more coming out of their shipyards, and we expect about seven or eight of these in the next 5- to 7-year period.

Long range surface-to-air missiles [deleted] surface-to-surface missiles, guns, antisubmarine rockets, rapid blooming overboard chaff to counter what we have. There is nothing we have in our inventory that matches what the Soviets have done.

I'll give you an example in terms of artillery. In 1960 we had the 8-inch and the 155 Howitzer in the inventory. They were selfpropelled. The Soviets literally had nothing more than towed artillery, the old V-1-M30.

Look at what our history has been between 1960 and 1975, and look at where the Soviets have come. The Army will contend that their 152 and 122 is comparable to our M-109 and 110. I contend that that's a very conservative estimate because if you take a look at the capabilities that they've built into this piece of machinery, we don't have any comparable capability. For example, the CBR protection. They have chemical, biological, radiation protection. While we have improved our ammunition, so have they, and we're at the point now where they [deleted].

The next one, I believe, shows the surface-to-air missile systems.