defense system. An additional part of this effort is to develop potential future roles for defense, and define future system concepts for those roles. PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS The major achievements in systems applications during the past year included: [Deleted]. [Deleted]; (2) completion of the HOE Critical Design Review; (3) completion of [deleted]; (4) completion of fabrication of the [deleted]; and (5) completion of major studies analyzing BMD growth options and identifying requirements for [deleted]. FISCAL YEAR 1982 STP BUDGET REQUEST The funding requirements in fiscal year 1982 for the Systems Technology Program described previously are presented below. The major effort is directed toward the LOAD system. The $211 million for LOAD, with appropriate funding in the outyears, will support an [deleted]. The Homing Overlay Experiment requires $57.9 million. With current funding, the HOE homing and kill demonstration will be completed in [deleted]. The remainder of expenditures includes continuing definition of new defense systems against projected threat developments, broad-based systems technology support, and program management and administration costs. The BMD Program Manager is also responsible for the management of Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR). KMŘ is not solely for the support of BMD. It is also the major test range for our strategic offensive missile force and, in addition, makes a significant contribution to our collection of intelligence on objects in space, particularly on the initial orbit of new foreign space vehicles. KMR is unique in two major respects: first, the unique quality of the data collected by its highly accurate sensors is essential to the successful development of the new generations of strategic offensive missiles; and second, it provides unique opportunities for coordination and cooperation between the strategic offensive and defensive technical communities. The US possesses no comparable capability to collect exoatmospheric signature data, record missile reentry phenomena, provide terminal trajectory and impact data, recover reentry vehicles when required, and transmit near real-time data to the mission sponsors. Major fiscal year 1982 test programs at KMR include: The Strategic Air Command (SAC) operational tests (OT) of Minuteman II and III missiles provide training for SAC crews and evaluation of system performance. Selected tests have [deleted]. The BMD Advanced Technology Center's [deleted] utilizes the Kiernan Reentry Measurement Site radars [deleted]. The Systems Technology Test Program on Meck Island supports the development of BMD components, particularly the [deleted]. Fiscal year 1982 technical Improvement and Modernization plans include: Upgrade of telemetry ground stations. Replacement of Meteorological Sounding Systems. Upgrade of Splash Detection Radars for reentry vehicle scoring and recovery. Initiation of the C-7 Sonobuoy Missile Impact Location System (SMILS). These technical improvements are required to satisfy stated user test program requirements, reduce system downtimes, and reduce operating and maintenance costs. Interim land use agreements have been negotiated with the Government of the Marshall Islands for fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981, respectively. The trusteeship is scheduled to be terminated by 31 December 1981. However, the full impact of the end of the trusteeship on the KMR budget cannot be assessed until the Compact of Free Association is consummated and implemented. FISCAL YEAR 1982 KMR BUDGET REQUEST The fiscal year 1982 budget request for KMR is $143.8 million as shown below. The fiscal year 1982 level allows continued operation of the facility, restoration of the techinical improvement and modernization program to an acceptable level, reduction in the backlog of major facility maintenance and repair projects, and provision for payments to the Government of the Marshall Islands for continued land use. Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question? Gentlemen, you talked about antidotes and the inadequacies, or the fact that they were ineffective in large part. Is there any concept that has to do with a vaccine, where it would make a person immune to any of these? General FULWYLER. Yes, sir, indeed there is. And I feel that the proper way to go, and that's where we hope to put some of this research money, is finding some type of a prophylaxis, either vaccine or pills or something you take. For instance, there is indication some of the [deleted] are working on some of this type too. That's the answer. That's the only feasible thing as an answer Mr. MOLLOHAN. Are we doing anything in research? Mr. MOLLOHAN. One further question. I've heard so much of agent orange. Will you tell me what agent orange is? General FULWYLER. Agent orange is a defoliant, a chemical compound developed to cause a tree to lose its leaves, which in Vietnam permitted us to view and prevented hiding places in the jungle for the Viet Cong. Mr. MOLLOHAN. Has it ever been determined to be a health hazard? General FULWYLER. I can't answer that officially. All I can say, for instance, I think there was a court case just recently, where it was found that there was no connection between-at least, the certain ailment this particular claimant had, and agent orange. But I don't know. Mr. MOLLOHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY General KENYON. Mr. Chairman, I would now like to give you an overview of our needs in the air defense area. Ground air defense involves those efforts directly related to the development of air defense of all ground forces, including airbases, depots, lines of communications, key command and control facilities, and other vital installations and critical assets. Air defense is integral to the combined arms team to provide protection from enemy air attack-the third dimension of today's battlefield. Air defense relates to the detection and engagement of the air threat with ground fire systems. MISSION The primary mission of Army air defense artillery is to provide air defense protection of U.S. Forces in the field. Our mission is accomplished in close coordination with the Air Force, for neither service, alone, can provide this necessary air defense protection. The air defense mission is directed against a substantial air threat. The first attack of the first battle will consist of sophisticated aircraft with electronic countermeasures (ECM) in massive air attack against the forward forces. This will be closely followed by the ground attack which will be supported by attack helicopters. AIR THREAT Let's briefly review the air threat. This shows, on a time-related axis, the growth in Soviet fixed-wing capability to carry increasing ordnance, or payloads to increasing ranges. Fitter-D, Flogger-D, and Fencer-A have appeared in the past 10 years. These fixed-wing ground attack aircraft, if unopposed, have the ability to reach our main operating bases in West Germany. The U.S. bases are, for example, at Bittburg, near the Luxembourg border, and Zweibruecker, near the French border. In addition to higher payloads and longer ranges, the Warsaw Pact has the increasing ability to attack our bases in zero/zero weather if unopposed. That ability is slightly over [deleted] percent now. They are expected to achieve more than [deleted] percent all-weather capability by 1990. [Deleted.] One of the most striking developments, however, is the increase of attack helicopters. This portrays the attack helicopter threat to Central Europe. Hip and Hind are combined. Today's threat is over [deleted] that is expected to approach [deleted] by [deleted]. The electronic countermeasures, or jamming threat that is forecast, is substantial. There is expected to be a [deleted] rise in the power of these jammers, which are used in three different and complementary ways. The standoff jammer, as the name implies, stays well behind his battle lines. It flies high, and directs its transmitters against our air defense radars and our communications. The escort jammer flies with the attacking force, and the self-screening jammer is a self-protection measure on the attacking aircraft. That then is the emerging threat that our air defense forces must deal with. Numbers are growing, but more importantly, their system sophistication-quality-is increasing. The bottom line: Increasing ability to project air power. This total threat is what drives the requirements for the development of Army air defense hardware. Before looking at the hardware, however, an understanding of how we will organize our air defense to fight is important. FAMILY OF WEAPONS To counter this threat, the Army, in conjunction with the Air Force, employs a family of air defense weapons which eliminates the attractiveness of air attack options. Although the systems are funded separately, they have been developed and fielded as a family to provide a complementary mix of weapons. Thus, the limitations of one weapon system can be offset by the capabilities of another, and through proper tactical employment of the family, it is possible to counter the entire spectrum of threat capabilities. In general, Air Force interceptors complemented by the high- and medium-altitude air defense missile systems conduct an area defense, while the guns and short-range missiles are concentrated on defending selected high-value assets and maneuver units. Most of the short-range and manportable systems are deployed forward for defense against very-low-altitude attack. Shown here is a simplified schematic for employing the Army air defense family in support of U.S. Forces. We complicate the enemy's attack problem by leaving him no easy choices. This is accomplished by deploying a mix of systems with different but complementary characteristics. Mass is the allocation of a sufficient amount of air defense resources to adequately defend the force's priority assets. The systems must be provided mobility to survive and to accompany fast-moving forces. The manportable element of the Army air defense family-currently Redeye-is generally dispersed throughout the forward maneuver area to provide local defense against very-low-altitude air attack. These weapons can also be used to defend key forward area assets such as brigade command posts, bridges, and supply points. Short-range air defense weapons include a mix of guns and missile systems. The current Vulcan gun is employed in defense of high-priority mobile maneuver forces. Chaparral defends critical assets in the brigade and division rear, as well as in the rear area for such tasks as air base defense. Immediately in back of the short-range weapons is the next member of the family-the improved version of the battle tested Hawk missile system. Some Hawk units are in support of the committed divisions to provide complete division area coverage and an all-weather capability. The remaining Hawk units are in defense of corps and theater critical assets located in the rear areas. Behind the division we find Nike-Hercules. Nike-Hercules provides medium-to-high-altitude coverage of the entire corps area. This slide shows the complementary capability of our weapon systems in range and altitude. The Vulcan, Chaparral, and Redeye take care of the low and very low threat, while Hawk watches over the low to medium altitude, and Hercules the medium to high. The Air Force, of course, has the capability to cover from the ground up and fill gaps where they may develop. The airspace forward of our Army coverage, and also certain airspace to the rear, belongs to the Air Force. Our friendly aircraft will have to fly through Army air defense coverage-thus necessitating the absolute need for good identification procedures, as well as positive command and control. Now let's review the hardware and identify the general capability of each system and its limitations. REDEYE Redeye is a first-generation infrared seeking missile, operational since the midsixties. Each two-man Redeye team has a basic load of six missiles, and there are six additional missiles per team in command stocks. Each division has approximately 70 teams. We have about 13,000 missiles in our inventory. Redeye is a good weapon, but it has several drawbacks. The most important are its lack of ability to engage aircraft flying at speeds greater than [delete] knots and its lack of a forward engagement capability. VULCAN Vulcan is a 20-millimeter Gatling gun mounted on a modified armored personnel carrier on a towed carriage. Vulcan was fielded very quickly when we began to perceive, in the midsixties, that the Warsaw Pact was developing a close air support capability. The |