Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971), and of other cases collected in the Reporters Note to the cited section 88 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. There being no circumstances justifying affording the Tribe an opportunity to relitigate the issue, and the Tribe having had a full and fair opportunity to do so in Jessie Short, it is now bound by the former judgment. Count II is for the same reasons as Count I barred by the doctrine of res judicata as seeking to relitigate a claim formerly determined.

Jurisdiction-in District Court or Court of Claims-of

Counts I and II

Both counts I and II are demands for the payment of money. In count I the Tribe "requests the court to declare" that the sequestered proceeds be "distributed to plaintiff forthwith" and that future proceeds be "distributed solely" to plaintiff. Count II asks for a "judgment mandating defendants to restore the assets of plaintiff's trust which have been taken." The complained-of takings and diversions were done by officers of the United States, acting as such, in their official capacities, with respect to money held in the Treasury of the United States. A claim that such defendants pay out such money from the Treasury is obviously not a claim against the officers personally but a claim against the United States for the sums involved. Exclusive jurisdiction of such claims in excess of $10,000 is lodged in the Court of Claims, under sections 1491 and 1346(a)(2) of Title 28 U.S.C.

It is true, as plaintiff Tribe often repeats, that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of suits for injunctions or declaratory judgments. United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969). But a suit for money of the United States, over which the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction, cannot be converted into a suit for injunctive relief, over which the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction, merely by naming a Government officer as defendant and praying for an injunction that the money of the United States, in its Treasury, be paid by the

named defendant. A Congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction cannot be so easily circumvented.

The complaint in plaintiff's case is surely one against the United States, for money, by the test laid down in Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947): that the suit is against the sovereign (and not its officers) if "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain

*". 330 U.S. at 738, quoted with approval in Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). Since the Treasury would be the source of the money which would pass, were plaintiff to have the injunctive relief it seeks, the action is thus one for money against the United States.

Plaintiff would have it that the money here involved is not Government money but Indian money, held by the United States for Indians. In fact, legal title to the funds rests with the United States, which holds the money for the beneficial owners, determined to be such in the decision in Jessie Short, the "Indians of the Hoopa Valley Reservation."

The legal posture of Indian trust funds held in the federal Treasury was discussed by the Court of Claims in Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 451, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966). There the plaintiff Indian tribes had argued that the Government's use of their trust funds necessarily amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of their property. The Court rejected this contention in the following passage (175 Ct. Cl. at 455): Even on the technical level, the flaw in this argument is that legal title to the funds on deposit in the Treasury lay in the United States. * * * The Indians' interest was, at most, that of a beneficiary, and a trustee's failure to live up to the standards imposed upon him is not a taking of title from the cestui but a breach of obligation. The jurisdiction of this court over actions for money encompasses actions for money held by the Government for Indians, whether the relationship is called a trust, as in Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra, or a holding pursuant to an implied contract, as in Fields v. United States. 191 Ct. Cl. 191, 423 F.2d 380 (1970). Jessie Short was such a case and jurisdiction was assumed. See

also Coast Indian Community v. United States. 213 Ct. Cl. 129, 550 F.2d 639 (1977); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States. 206 Ct. Cl. 340, 512 F.2d 1390 (1975). Accordingly, the suit is against the United States for money in its Treasury, in the amount of $10 million and more. The United States is suable for such amounts of money only in the Court of Claims, and not in the district court in the form of a suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as officers subject to suit in district court.

The Land v. Dollar test appears in the context of a decision on sovereign immunity, but the principle is directly applicable here, because a recent limited congressional waiver of sovereign immunity for suits against officers has explicitly preserved sovereign immunity to suits against officers for money damages, and thus underscored the limitations of Tucker Act jurisdiction, by which suits for sums in excess of $10,000 are committed exclusively to the Court of Claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1346(a) (2) 1976). The reference is to a 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, Act of October 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-574. § 1, 90 Stat. 2721, which added to section 10 of that Act. 5 U.S.C. $702(1976), this sentence:

An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.

This enactment, coupled with the simultaneous removal of any requirement of jurisdictional amount for district. court jurisdiction of federal question suits against Government officers, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) as amended by Pub. L. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721, reinforces the division of jurisdiction between district court and Court of Claims in which the latter is given exclusive jurisdiction over money claims against the United States in excess of $10,000. The effect of Pub. L. 94-574, for present purposes, is twofold. Sovereign immunity is waived, consent to sue is

given, and jurisdiction is granted, for suits in the district courts against Government officers and agencies raising federal questions, excepting suits for money damages. Cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-07 (1977) (opinion by Brennan, J.); Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Service Commission. 554 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.1977). See also Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 29 AD. LAW REV. 265 (1977). Suits against officers for money damages in the district court are not consented to; for such suits sovereign immunity still prevails. Only in the Court of Claims. in an action against the United States under the Tucker Act, is there consent to suits seeking trust monies or money held pursuant to contract, in excess of $10,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491. 1346(a)(2)(1976).

The net of Pub. L. 94-574 and the Tucker Act establishes a dichotomy not unlike that in the courts of equity and law in olden days. Suits against Government officers for specific relief may now be brought in the district court, and suits for money are to be brought in the Court of Claims. This is not to say that the newly authorized suit will be successful. The amendment by Pub. L. 94-574 to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act concludes with the proviso that:

Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.

Pub. L. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721.

The inhibitions on the review of Government agency action are well-known-ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies and the like-and the framers of Pub. L. 94-574 disclaimed all intention except to lift the bar of sovereign immunity to suits in district court against Government officers for other than money damages. H.R. REP. No. 941656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5, 11-15; reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6122-26, 6131-36; Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REV. 383,

403-05 (1970); Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 29 AD. LAW REV. 265, 270-71 (1977). But what is important in the present case is that for injunctions and declaratory relief, the claimant against the Government must go to the district court and there sue officers: for money damages (always referring to damages ir. excess of $10,000), the plaintiff must go to the Court of Claims. Congress has thus reaffirmed that there is no consent to suits in district court for money damages in excess of $10,000.2

The division of jurisdiction between the two courts requires that the courts be careful to reject Tucker Act ciaims masquerading as suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1974) was such a suit. There a contractor brought suit against the Secretary of the Navy seeking a reversal of an administrative determination requiring the plaintiff to repay the Navy some $55 million paid by the Navy under a contract. The district court found for the plaintiff and entered an injunction restraining the Secretary from recouping the $55 million by refusing to make further payments on the contract. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the claim to be a suit against the United States within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491.

Applying the test of Land v. Dollar, the court held that the judgment against the Secretary would expend "itself with sensible impact) on the public treasury and [would compel the government to pay money in advance of the time specified in its contract, money which it conceivably might never otherwise have to pay at all." 487 F.2d at 1303. In concluding that the then text of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970) could not be invoked as a grant of jurisdiction for such a suit (a forecast of the decision in Califano v. Sanders, supra), the Court pointed out the necessity of guarding against allowing claims for money redressable in the Court of Claims to be

- For the sake of simplicity, no mention is made of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC 1346 b (1976), or other waivers of sovereign immunity in areas such as admiralty