CONTENTS Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Fred C. Iklé, Ph.D., Distinguished Scholar, The Center for Strategic and George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for Inter Alan Zelicoff, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Center for National Security and Arms Control, Sandia National Laboratories The Honorable John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Inter- national Security, U.S. Department of State LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable John R. Bolton by the Honorable Betty McCollum, a Representative in Congress from the U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AFTER IRAQ WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 2003 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] The Committee will come to order. The subject of today's hearing, U.S. nonproliferation policy after Iraq, is one of transcendent importance. It demands our attention. The prospect of rogue states or terrorists in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a terrifying one. There can be no acceptable margin of error in our effort to protect ourselves from this mortal threat, for the measure of our inadequacy will be unprecedented devastation. I will not attempt to list the many problems and tasks we face as even a lengthy treatment would not begin to exhaust the subject. However, let me offer a few important questions. How could we combat the fact that many of these weapons are extraordinarily easy to make and to transport? How does one persuade or compel a country to cease its activities, especially if it already possesses the means to proceed on its own? How can one prevent the further spread of the knowledge and technical capacity to produce WMD when this information seems to be so readily available? Must the United States take up this challenge alone? Can we do it alone? I am hopeful that this hearing will shed some light on these important issues. The unbounded nature of the threat evokes Churchill's words on his assumption of office at Britain's darkest moment. He said, "You asked what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory, victory at all cost, victory in spite of all terrorists. Victory however long and hard the road may be for without victory there is no survival." For us, however, there can be no final victory. We must divest ourselves of all illusions. We cannot uninvent these weapons nor erase the knowledge that makes the impossible. Therefore, we must accept the fact that the WMD threat will probably be us forever. Our vigilance and our commitment must also therefore be enduring. Today we are fortunate in having the opportunity to hear from an impressive array of witnesses with relevant expertise. As per the Committee's standard practice, I would ask the panelists to limit their opening statements to 6 minutes if they can. Their written statements will also be a part of the record of the hearing. I believe it would be more efficient if the panelists were allowed to give their opening statements in succession, after which the Members can pose questions to any or all of the witnesses. We can then begin a more productive discussion. Although questions may be directed to individual panelists, I would encourage each of the witnesses to add any comments that they believe to be appropriate to the person asked to respond. We will hear from Under Secretary Bolton following the initial panel, and I will introduce these panelists here shortly, but first of all, I would like to turn to the Ranking Minority Member, the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos, for such opening statement as he may have. Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We meet today on the heels of our spectacular victory in the war against Iraq. The impact of this victory will be felt for generations. Among other important effects, it represents a major event in the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whatever WMD may or may not be found. By destroying Saddam's vicious regime, we sent a clear signal to would be proliferators that we are prepared to use force whenever necessary. There is absolutely no doubt that the Iraqi dictator was hell bent on developing chemical, biological and nuclear arms. But regardless of the evidence we find, and we have already found some, no one should question the real threat Saddam posed to our national security and to the civilized world. As the historic record clearly show, Saddam had the intention and the capability to wield weapons of mass destruction, and he used them against Iran and he used them against his own people. And as far as the U.N. inspection process is concerned, he lied repeatedly and never accounted for known stocks of WMD. Had we not acted, sooner or later he would have deployed them. On those grounds alone our actions are not only justified, they were mandatory. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them are indeed a clear and present danger to our national security. Rogue states, including many state sponsors of terrorism, are swapping technology and materials to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. North Korea is the world's premier proliferator, exporting missiles to fellow rogue states, such as Iran, which is now under the cusp of joining the nuclear club. Globalization has accelerated this trend as sophisticated dual-use research, technology and manufacturing knowledge leaks to rogue states, assisting them in developing weapons of mass destructions and the means of delivering them. Foreign supply dual-use equipment was critical to Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological programs prior to the 1991 Gulf War, and I have no doubt that dual-use equipment bought on the international black market was critical to Saddam's subsequent WMD rearmament efforts. In countering this growing threat, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid we are woefully unprepared. Although we have the military means of disarming potential proliferating states, as our victory in Iraq clearly shows, we cannot rely on armed force alone. A stronger international legal framework for preventing and punishing proliferation is urgently needed. Our current legal framework is riddled with gaps and lacks enforcement mechanism. Its shortcomings became abundantly and embarrassingly clear last December during an absurd incident involving a North Korean shipment of scud missile parts to Yeman. As you will recall, at the Administration's urging our Spanish allies courageously stormed the North Korean vessel on the high seas, and seized its deadly cargo, only to release it and the scuds to Yemen a day later, again at our request. Why one must ask. The North Koreans, according to the White House, were doing nothing illegal. This is an outrage, Mr. Chairman, but one this Committee has begun to address. In the wake of that December debacle, I introduced the Missile Threats Reduction Act, which you co-sponsored, and I agreed to include it in the State Department authorization bill approved by this Committee last month. Our legislation declares, it declares it to be the policy of the United States to seek multilateral authority to stop the trade in destabilizing offensive ballistic missiles. Our legislation urges the President to seek a U.N. Security Council resolution prohibiting any missile trade with North Korea in particular, and authorizing the interdiction of North Korean vessels carrying such cargo. These measures would go a long way toward filling the gap. The United States currently imposes stringent export controls, but few other nations have control systems of similar scope. To this day, some of our so-called allies even refuse to see that Iran is becoming a nuclear threat, and they continue to export dual-use equipment to Iran, aiding and abetting the ayatollahs' WMD and missile programs. I am pleased to learn that the Administration shares our concerns, and has followed our lead in calling for change. Earlier this week the President announced a new proliferation security initiative which apparently seeks the same multilateral authority to stop proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction as we propose for the illicit missile trade. The Administration has yet to share the details of this initiative with Congress, and I hope that Under Secretary Bolton will do so today. I invite the Administration to work with us in ensuring the State Department authorization_bill due to be debated on the House Floor later this month reflects our shared nonproliferation priorities. Mr. Chairman, we achieved a major victory for the cause of nonproliferation in defeating the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Let us now secure this victory by strengthening the international legal |