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surrendering its "veto power." [4] . . . If the General Assembly is to assume greater responsibilities, then should there not be some form of weighted voting, so that nations which are themselves unable to assume serious military or financial responsibilities cannot put those responsibilities on other nations? Should there be, in some matters, a combination vote... [requiring] a majority of all the members... and also a majority vote, on a weighted basis...? [5] Perhaps consideration should now be given to the creation of a special organ of the United Nations . . . to deal permanently with the problem of armament [particularly in terms of atomic energy and nuclear weapons]. ... [6] are the charter provisions adequate [to allow the General Assembly] to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progress and development of international law and its codification. . . . The defects of the charter can to a considerable extent be corrected by practices which are permissible under the charter. . . . much can be done within the framework of the charter, but without actual dependence upon the procedures of the United Nations itself. . . . The United Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all. Madame Pandit sought, as delegate from India rather than as president of the Assembly, to have the Assembly reconvene early in February to settle the Korean question. But on January 30th only 28 of the needed 31 votes were recorded in favor of her proposal. The Security Council, however, continued its work through the winter months and the Soviet Union exercised its 58th and 59th vetoes before the end of March.42 During April the Security Council studied the Middle East tensions, but no decisions were reached on the various disputes between Israel on one side and one or more of the Arab League states on the other. Finally on May 8, 1954 the Council voted 8 to 2 to permit general debate on the Israeli-Jordan border incidents.

Middle East problems before the Security Council

In late May the Council had before it the request of Thailand to consider sending a peace

observation commission to SouthSoviet vetoes east Asia to study the threat of war sending peace in that troubled area. On June 1st, commission to Mr. Lodge, as presiding officer of Indochina the Council for the month of June, honored the request of Thailand

42 Veto No. 58 (Jan. 22, 1954) killed a plan proposed by the United States, France and Great Britain for settling the SyrianIsraeli dispute over the diversion of the Jordan River waters. Veto No. 59 (March 29, 1954) defeated a New Zealand resolution calling on Egypt to stop interfering with Israeli-bound shipping in the Suez Canal.

and on June 3rd the matter was taken under study by the Security Council. The 60th Soviet veto, on June 18th, blocked a move by the Council to send such a team to Southeast Asia.

Soviet vetoes reference of Guatemala question to OAS

On the same day Guatemala asked the Council to condemn the United States, Honduras, and Nicaragua for alleged support of the rebel forces seeking to oust the Arbenz government of Guatemala. The United States proposed that the matter be referred to the Organization of American States (the OAS), but Russia protested and used its 61st veto to prevent such a referral. Thereupon, the Council called for a cease fire in Guatemala and urged all UN members to do nothing to aggravate the situation in the Central American republic where the revolt was in

progress.

United States policy strongly supports the purposes and concept of the UN

44

On top of the events in the Middle East, in Central America, in Korea, and in Indochina43 which occupied the UN during the first six months of 1954 came the crisis at Geneva when the Soviet bloc sought to gain membership in the UN for Red China as part of the price for peace in Indochina. That story belongs in a later section of this study. Suffice it to say, then, that, in spite of all the talk of "quitting the UN," "by-passing the UN," "going it alone," and so forth, the prevailing opinion seems to be that every effort must be made to make the UN work and that the United States has a duty as well as a privilege surrounding its membership in the UN. The policy of the United States respecting the UN is based on the hardheaded belief that until a better world organization is erected, we must do all we can to see that the UN operates with its best possible effectiveness. President. Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have been firm in advocating this policy, in frequent opposition to statements from powerful individuals among the leaders of the Republican party. The continuity of administration and, through administrative

43 These events are discussed more fully in the sections dealing with more specific geographical regions. They are mentioned here to show the multiplicity of problems confronting the American State Department-not only on a bilateral basis restricted to the particular region, but also in the international forum of the UN.

** See pp. 222-29 below.

leadership, of State Department policy on this question has been marked during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Support of the United Nations and of the purposes of collective security have been basic to the development of postwar American foreign policy.

If anything, administration support of the United Nations has grown stronger rather than lessened during the presidency of Mr. Eisenhower. Time and again President Eisenhower has answered critics of the UN by affirming his belief in the purposes of the international organization. That does not mean that his administration has been content to leave the determination of American policy to the international membership of the UN. In no instance has the United States surrendered

to the UN the right to carry on its foreign policy as the State Department and the President see fit. But the United States has given the UN strong support where it believed the UN to be right. And in many unpublicized efforts of the UN to alleviate the lot of mankind in underdeveloped areas the United States has been in the forefront of those nations lending material financial and individual aid in the form of funds, goods, and services.

Thus, to paraphrase a historic phrase, if no United Nations organization existed it would be necessary to create one. The question now is not, "Why have a UN?" It is rather, "Since we have a UN, how can the United States help to make it stronger and more useful?”

The United States Strives For European Unity

1. American Policy toward Europe: 1945 Once victory in Europe had been achieved the problems of peace and rehabilitation in that continent became the joint responsibility of the United States, Great Britain, and Postwar the Soviet Union, with France takreadjustments ing her place as a member of the begin in Big Four at the close of the war. Europe Before formal peace treaties could be drawn and adopted, many interim measures were required. The occupation of Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Austria, as well as the restoration of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other areas liberated from the Germans were immediate matters demanding attention. Actions in the first months after VE-Day were commonly accomplished by implementing on-the-spot decisions. Or, in more orderly fashion, agreements were approached at regular meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The United States was an active participant in each of these meetings, represented usually by the incumbent Secretary of State.

At the first of these meetings, in London on September 11, 1945, Secretary James F. Byrnes was the principal American delegate.1 He had succeeded Mr. Stettinius on July 3rd as head of the State Department and had accompanied President Truman to the Potsdam conference. Mr. Byrnes was one of the most experienced American statesmen of that day. He had been for many years a Representative and Senator from South Carolina and then had been appointed by Presi

First meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, 1945

1 His topmost advisor was John Foster Dulles, then a leading New York Republican and authority on international law.

dent Franklin Roosevelt to the Supreme Court. During the war he had resigned from the Court to become Director Secretary Byrnes' of the Office of War Mobilization. background In this post he was popularly called Assistant President." of experience "the Mr. in government Byrnes was one of President Roosevelt's first-line assistants at the

Control of foreign policies shifts to new teams in

team

Yalta conference and when ill health dictated the retirement of Mr. Stettinius the choice of Mr. Byrnes to head the State Department was generally regarded as a strong move on President Truman's part.2 Since Mr. Truman's experience with foreign affairs was considerably limited, it was judged that the State Department would exercise a more active role in the determination of policy than it had under Mr. Roosevelt. (53) Thus it happened that at the outset of the postwar period the United States moved into the diplomatic field with a new in control-Truman and Byrnes. Great Britain likewise was represented by a new pair at the helm-Clement Attlee as Prime Minister and Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary. The Soviet Union retained its wartime leaders-Marshal Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov. The other member of the Big Four, France, presented an undetermined and unstable factor with a number of different governments appearing during the months of the postwar political uncertainties.

the

United States and Britain while Soviets keep same men in high posts

The London meeting of the foreign ministers was convened primarily to lay plans for a peace

For note of a later position held by Mr. Byrnes under the Eisenhower administration see pp. 122-23 above.

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Secretary Byrnes reports on London meeting

SECRETARY BYRNES' REPORT ON THE FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 5, 1945: The . . . session . . . closed in a stalemate. But that need not . . . deprive us of a second and better chance to get on with the peace. . . . When any one member can prevent agreement, compromise is a necessity. . . . Compromise... does not mean surrender [it] requires the assent of more than one party. . . . We do not seek to dictate the internal affairs of any people. We only reserve for ourselves the right to refuse to recognize governments if after investigation we conclude they have not given to the people the rights pledged to them in the Yalta agreement and in the Atlantic Charter. . . . The American Government shares the desire of the Soviet Union to have governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe. But lasting peace depends not only upon friendship between governments but upon friendship between peoples. . . . It certainly never occurred to President Truman or myself [at Potsdam] that any of the five members of the Council who are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council . . . would not be invited to be present during the discussion of the treaties. . . . The Soviet Delegation's position [at London] was not simply that they wished to withdraw the invitation to China and France to participate without right to vote. Their position was that it was beyond the authority of states signatory to the surrender terms to extend the invitation. . . . the Soviet Delegation insisted that they could no longer discuss treaty matters in the presence of members who were not parties to the surrender terms. . . . I therefore proposed, with considerable reluctance, that we ask our French and Chinese colleagues to accept the position of the Soviet Delegation that the preparatory and exploratory work of the Council for the peace settlements be confined to the signatories of the surrender terms. proIvided that at the same time it should be agreed that a truly representative peace conference should be convoked before the end of the year. . . . The American Delegation took the position that

peace cannot be the exclusive concern of a few presently powerful states. . . . We urged that those states, both large and small, which had fought and suffered in the war must make the peace. This has been a peoples' war and it must be a peoples' peace. . . . The United States is willing to dictate terms of peace to an enemy but is not willing to dictate terms of peace to its allies. . . . As the record stands the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union has not rejected our proposal for a peace conference. During the discussions he admitted it was correct in principle. . . . The matter that caused the suspension of our work .. presented an issue that had to be met. . . . in the Council of Foreign Ministers one nation can veto all action. . . . The power of veto in procedural matters should not be used by the United States or any other nation to coerce the judgment and conscience of fellow nations. . . .

...

President Truman, while depending in great measure upon his official advisors for assistance in the foreign policy field, early demonstrated his interest in international matters. Shortly after the failure of the London sessions, he enunciated his concept of American foreign policy in an address in October 1945.

President

Truman outlines America's foreign policies

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 27, 1945: . . . 1. We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage. We have no plans for aggression against any other state. . . . We have no objective which need clash with the peaceful aims of any other nation. 2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force. 3. We shall approve no territorial changes in any part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. 4. We believe that all peoples who are prepared for selfgovernment should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. 5. By the combined and cooperative action of our war Allies, we shall help the defeated enemy states establish peaceful, democratic governments of their own free choice. . . . 6. We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by force of any foreign power. . . . 7. We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and of rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country. 8. We believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world. 9. We believe that the sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere, without interference from outside the Western Hemi

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