tion is a novelty, and the unknown always carries a certain amount of fear. The talks which we had with political leaders of the countries we visited went far .. to dispel these fears. . . . However, the public and the opposition parties seize upon incidents and statements made here which seem to them to be reckless.... in order to win and hold the confidence of those whom we need as friends and allies, we must at all times play the part of a nation which is fully aware of the grave responsibilities which it carries. . .

The importance with which the Eisenhower administration regarded the German question is indicated by the choice of James B. Conant,

President of Harvard University, as President United States High Commissioner Conant, for Germany. (61) Dr. Conant deof Harvard, parted for Bonn on February 9, named High 1953 with the announced purpose of Commissioner furthering the peaceful reunification for Germany of Germany and the incorporation of a democratic Germany into the European Community.26 These purposes were reiterated by Dr. Conant in his first major radio broadcast, in German, over the RIAS station in Berlin on February 18, in which he announced that "the new administration in Washington will not abandon Berlin," and that an important objective of American policy was the reunion of East and West Germany "under conditions which [will] insure a democratic free government of . . . [the East German's] own choosing."27 It was with considerable pleasure that the Eisenhower administration hailed the vote in the West German Bundestag on March 19, 1953, ratifying the EDC treaty by a margin of 224 to West German 165, and the adoption of the peace "Bundestag" contract by a vote of 226 to 164. ratifies EDC The Bundestag's acceptance of the EDC treaty marked the first parliamentary vote by a prospective member-nation in its favor. The two instruments still had to pass the upper house, the Bundesrat, before final German ratification was achieved.28 But the first hurdle had been cleared.

26 U.S. Dept of State Bulletin, XXVIII: 301-302, Feb. 23, 1953.

27 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII: 327-28, Mar. 2, 1953. 28 The West German constitution provided, also, that parliamentary acceptance of treaties might have to pass a court test if the issue was posed by a vote of either house.

FrancoAmerican talks in Washington, March, 1953

The early spring of 1953 saw a number of European statesmen journeying to Washington to confer with the new President and his foreign policy advisors.29 Premier René Mayer and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, of France, were in Washington March 26-28; Paul von Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister, preceded the Frenchmen (March 14-18); and German Chancellor Adenauer, accompanied by Dr. Conant, visited Washington April 7-9. While many subjects were discussed at these meetings, and opportunities were presented for personal acquaintanceships to ripen, the most important of the spring meetings was the one with the French.

The Franco-American talks in Washington covered a worldwide range of topics, with particular emphasis on the situation in Indochina. In regard to problems peculiar to Europe, the joint communiqué issued at the close of the meetings had this to say:

...

FRANCO · AMERICAN COMMUNIQUÉ, WASHINGTON, MARCH 28, 1953: . . . the two Governments recognized the continuing urgent need to permit a German military contribution to the defense of Europe and through the Contractual Agreements replace the present occupation regime of Germany. Both Governments agreed on the necessity of the establishment, with minimum delay, of the European Defense Community. . . . The importance of a settlement of the question of the Saar was recognized and it was agreed that this should be sought at the earliest opportunity on a basis which would provide a European status for the SAAR conforming to the principles of the European Defense and the Coal and Steel Communities. The French delegation explained in detail the reasons which, in its view, justify and render necessary a Franco-German agreement on such a settlement prior to ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. . . . The two delegations recognized that the European Defense Community is to be constituted within a constantly developing Atlantic Community. . . .

The insistence of France upon a settlement of the Saar question before the EDC treaty could be ratified, of course, presented a problem whose

Chancellor Adenauer visits the United States

solution would depend in large measure upon the attitude of the Bonn government of West Germany. When Chancellor Adenauer visited Washington in early April, the Saar

29 The death of Josef Stalin on Mar. 5, 1953, while of great importance for the future, had no immediate impact on the conduct of American foreign policies.

question "was discussed and it was agreed that an early agreement should be sought in the common interest.' "30 A number of matters of concern to the United States and Germany were brought up in the sessions with Herr Adenauer and several agreements on economic and cultural policies were negotiated.31 But the delays occasioned by the failure of the Western European nations to ratify the EDC treaty prevented these springtime conferences from accomplishing all that had been hoped for by the American policy makers. With European problems overshadowed by developments in the Far East, President Eisenhower went before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and delivered a significant address on American policy. Those portions of the speech in which the President dwelt on European issues are given here.

President Eisenhower's address on American policies

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS ON "THE CHANCE FOR PEACE," WASHINGTON, APRIL 16, 1953: . . . [The] free world knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, embracing a European Defense Community. It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community and that this, for Germany, is the only safe way to full, final unity. the United States is ready to assume its just part. We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria. . . . We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon that foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community. . . . This community would include a free and united Germany. . . . This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe. . . .

32

At the Paris meeting of the NATO Council, opened on April 23, Secretary Dulles headed the United States delegation.33 The objective of the

30 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:565, Apr. 20, 1953. 31 Following the meetings in Washington, Chancellor Adenauer made a hasty trip to the Pacific coast and stopped at a number of American cities before returning to Germany. This was the first time a German chancellor had ever visited the United States. * The full text of this speech is of pertinence to the question of American policy toward Soviet communism. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:599-603, Apr. 27, 1953.

33 Sec. Humphrey of Treasury, Sec. Wilson of Defense, and Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security, were the other U.S. representatives, who joined William H. Draper, Jr., Permanent U.S. Representative to the Council. A large staff of advisors and observers was included in the delegation.

American representatives was to Paris meeting find practical ways of strengthening of NATO NATO. As Secretary Dulles obCouncil, served, "We went at this with some April, 1953 new ideas, largely drawn from President Eisenhower's own personal experience and judgment."34 According to Mr. Dulles, emphasis was put on getting greater strength by less costly methods, by improving the quality of military components rather than seeking large increases in the quantity of men and materiel. The Americans also sought to fill the gap in European defenses represented by the lack of German forces, but met with the practical difficulties raised by the failure of European parliaments to ratify the EDC treaty. The NATO Council did agree on a firm military program for 1953, and a provisional program for 1954. It also adopted a resolution stressing the fact that the Atlantic Community attached "paramount importance to the rapid entry into force of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

Churchill calls for a "parley at the summit"

"135

Despite the urgings of the United States, and the general agreement by European governments that early ratification of EDC was essential to the forward motion of European preparation against the Soviet threat, nothing much seemed to get done. All at once, the nations of the world were struck by a suggestion made by Prime Minister Churchill. On May 11, 1953, in the course of a debate in the House of Commons, the British leader called for "a conference on the highest level . . . between the leading Powers without long delay. . . [and] confined to the smallest number of Powers and persons possible."36 This "parley at the summit," as it has been characterized, represented Churchill's idea that a meeting with President Eisenhower, Premier Malenkov, and himself, joined possibly by one or two other leaders, such as Premier Mayer of France, might lead to agreement among the big powers of the East and West and result in something like the Locarno Treaty of 1925 which the Prime Minister called "the highest point we reached between the wars.

34 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:671, May 11, 1953. 35 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:675, May 11, 1953. 36 Vital Speeches, XIX:526, June 15, 1953.

President Eisenhower seeks evidences of Russia's good faith before conference can be held

On May 13, 1953 the State Department issued a press release commenting upon the Churchill proposal, praising its sentiments but not committing the United States to participation in such a high level meeting. The following day, at his press conference, President Eisenhower endorsed the State Department release. However, he raised doubts as to the possibility of such a meeting achieving success. "He had no objection to Sir Winston's proposal, he concluded, but he would like, before he committed this Government to participate, something that would be evidence of good faith all around."38 Such evidence, the President had suggested in his April 16th speech would be Soviet willingness to sign an Austrian peace treaty, to release prisoners of war held in Soviet camps since before 1945, to work for the achievement of an honorable armistice in Korea, and to perform other such acts leading toward peaceful settlement of the world's problems.

While the United States believed that a conference of the leaders of East and West could not be profitable until there was prior assurance that the Soviet bloc would agree to and then carry out promises looking toward the easing of world tensions, the United States was willing to listen to proposals for further action.

It was announced in Washington on May 21, 1953 that President Eisenhower would meet with Sir Winston Churchill and René Mayer in Bermuda in June to explore the possibilities for conferences with the Soviet leaders. Before the Bermuda meeting could take place Premier Mayer resigned and France entered

Events delay a Big 3 meeting

31 Vital Speeches, XIX:525-26, June 15, 1953.

38 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:748, May 25, 1953.

Czechs release Oatis

Prior to the last of these developments, however, there occurred several events in Europe which were to have considerable impact upon the affairs of that troubled continent in the succeeding months. On May 15th the State Department announced that President Zapotocky of Czechoslovakia had pardoned William Oatis, an American newsman who had been imprisoned for 22 months on charges that he had engaged in espionage in behalf of the United States. Reports differed as to the reasons for President Zapotocky's action, but after Oatis had been released by Czech authorities on May 16th, the White House said that President Eisenhower had written a personal letter to the Czech president in March which prompted Mr. Zapotocky to pardon the American correspondent.40 Another relaxation of Iron Curtain barriers occurred on June 7 when the Soviet Union modified Austrian occupation policies. And still another opening of the roadblocks against international intercourse came with the lifting of certain restrictions on foreigners wishing to travel inside the U.S.S.R.

These were but small crevices through which outsiders could catch a glimpse of what was going on behind the Iron Curtain. A more revealing

Anti-Soviet

riots in East Germany

view was vouchsafed the Western world in mid-June when the laboring peoples of the Soviet zone of Germany struck and rioted in a series of demonstrations against the Soviet-controlled administration. On June 16, 5,000 construction workers in East Berlin protested against a decree ordering a 10% increase in work quotas. The next day anti-communist riots, in East Berlin and almost spontaneously throughout the Soviet zone, brought nearly a quarter mil

39 Joseph Laniel was chosen Premier on June 26, 1953. 40 On June 5, 1953, the United States lifted some trade and travel restrictions applying to Czechoslovakia, which had been imposed following the arrest of Oatis in 1951.

lion workers into open conflict with state police and Soviet occupation troops. By June 28th when the riots died down after the East German government had met some of the demands of the workers for higher wages, lower work quotas, and better housing, clothing, and schools, some 100 Germans had been killed, many more wounded and imprisoned. The shaky basis upon which the Soviet puppet government of East Germany rested was revealed by the June riots. The Soviet military commander in Berlin accused the western powers of fomenting the disorders, charges which were quickly denied by responsible authorities in the several western capitals, as well as by the representatives of Britain, France, and the United States in West Berlin.

President Eisenhower in a reply to a June 21st message from Chancellor Adenauer stated the case for the West in regard to the East German outbreaks.

President Eisenhower reiterates American policy toward German unification

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S REPLY ΤΟ CHANCELLOR ADENAUER'S MESSAGE ON THE EAST GERMAN WORKERS' UPRISING, WASHINGTON, JUNE 25, 1953: . . The latest events in East Berlin and Eastern Germany have stirred the hearts and hopes of people everywhere. This inspiring show of courage has reaffirmed our belief that years of oppression and attempted indoctrination cannot extinguish the spirit of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. It seems clear that the repercussions of these events will be felt throughout the Soviet satellite empire. Although the Communists may be forced . . to moderate their current policies, it seems clear that the safety and future of the people of Eastern Germany can only be assured when that region is unified with Western Germany on the basis of free elections. . . . It is still our conviction that this represents the only realistic road to German unity, and I assure you that my Government will continue to strive for this goal..

...

Thus the first six months of the new administration ended with a reaffirmation of the aim of the United States policy toward Germany and Europe German unity based on free choice by all Germans, and German integration into a western European community based on the common purpose of defense against the threat of the spread of communism.

9. The Quest for European Unity in 1953

From the mid-point of 1953, when the East German riots disclosed the temper of the workers living under the Communist oppression, to the mid-point of 1954, when the stresses and strains of an anxious year threatened to disrupt the western alliance against Soviet communism, is only a matter of twelve months on the calendar. But it seems much greater than that when one attempts to analyze the course of events leading to the discouragements of 1954. This section will attempt only to describe briefly the efforts made. by the United States to bring about a unification of Western Europe during the last six months of 1953. A later section takes up the story from the beginning of 1954 onward.

The atmosphere of the 1953 Washington meeting of the Big Three foreign ministers was friendly enough. Secretary Dulles was host Big 3 meet to the Marquess of Salisbury, acting in Washington, British Foreign Secretary, and July, 1953 Georges Bidault, of France, from July 10 to 14, 1953. The French representative stressed the situation in Indochina, without making a direct request for American aid in that troubled area. And all three nations voiced their intention to renew the fighting in Korea if the Red aggressors moved again in the peninsula after an armistice was achieved.41 The conferees issued a final communiqué on July 14 stating the views of the Big Three on the many points discussed at the meetings.

In their statement the three foreign ministers reaffirmed their belief in the importance of NATO and of the European Coal and Steel Community. They stressed the need for rapid ratification of the EDC treaty, and called for an early reunification of Germany. On this last point, the July 14 communiqué stated that "the three powers have resolved to make a new effort to bring to an end the division of Germany. The three Governments have therefore decided, in consultation with the German Federal Government, to propose a meeting in the early

Big 3 communique stresses need to solve German question

41 The Korean armistice was signed July 27, 1953 at 1001 Korean time and hostilities ceased at 2201 the same day.

autumn of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States . . . and the USSR to discuss directly the first steps which should lead to a satisfactory solution of the German problem. This meeting should also consider the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty."42

Soviets make counterproposals

The Soviet reply to this joint suggestion countered with two notes, dated August 4 and August 15, 1953. The latter note proposed holding a German peace conference within six months and asked that a temporary government for all of Germany be set up immediately so it would be able to represent both East and West Germany at the suggested peace conference. In the American view the Soviet answers put the cart before the horse. The Russians once more said they were willing to confer, but that they wanted to talk about worldwide situations before discussing Germany and Austria. And on the questions of Germany and Austria, the Russians had made proposals which Washington believed would seriously interfere with the chances of success at a conference. On September 2, 1953, therefore, the State Department sent a note to Moscow setting Lugano, Switzerland, as the place and October 15 as the date for a meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers. Rather tartly, the American note observed, "The United States Government is convinced that progress is more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by a further exchange of notes."43 And Secretary Dulles, at a press conference on September 3rd, declared: "The continued partition of Germany is a scandal. It is more than that, it is a crime. . . . It was never intended that Germany should be indefinitely partitioned. . . . The response of the Soviet Union to... [our] proposal [for a meeting at Lugano on October 15th] will be another test of whether the Soviet Union desires in good faith to solve outstanding problems which threaten inter

Secretary Dulles

proposes

a Big 4 meeting at Lugano

42 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:105, July 27, 1953. Identical notes were sent by the Big Three to the Soviet Union on July 15, 1953, proposing an early conference to discuss free elections in all sections of Germany and the establishment of an all-German government.

43 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:352, Sept. 14, 1953.

national peace and which create grave international tension.

Adenauer coalition wins West German elections

44

The hand of the Bonn government was strengthened materially on September 6th when the West German election returned comfortable majorities for Chancellor Adenauer's coalition administration in the Bundestag.45 These victories democratic further bolstered the forces in West Germany in their opposition to Soviet propaganda and to domestic diversions from both the neo-Nazi Right and the Red-tinged Left. As the autumn went on it became more and more clear that Adenauer was emerging as one of the strongest statesmen of Europe and that he and West Germany must be reckoned with in any plans for the future of Europe.

United States rejects Soviet plan for a 5-power meeting

The U.S.S.R. still put off the allied suggestion of a Big Four meeting, and on September 28, replied to the American note of September 2nd. The Soviets reiterated their proposal that such a conference include the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Peoples Republic for discussions on worldwide tensions and that the order of business relegate Germany to second place. To this note the United States answered on October 18, 1953, suggesting a postponement of the meeting originally scheduled for the 15th until the later date of November 9th.46 As for the fivepower conference proposed by the Soviets, the American note had the following to say:

The United States Government is always ready and willing to discuss the underlying causes of . . . [international] tension with a view to their removal. But it wishes to do so under conditions which offer reasonable prospects for positive results and assure that the views of the directly interested governments are properly represented. . . . [The] United States . . . has already agreed to the political conference on Korea in the form proposed by the Communist side in the Korean armistice negotiations. . . . All five governments mentioned in the Soviet note could be

44 Ibid., p. 353. Sec. Dulles was criticized in Germany by the Socialists for saying that a defeat of Adenauer in the forthcoming elections would be "disastrous" for the cause of German

reunion.

45 Adenauer's Christian Democratic party won 244 of the 487 seats. The Free Democratic (48) and the German (15) parties made the coalition total 307. The Social Democrats won 151 seats; the Refugee party 27; and the Center party 2. The Communist party failed to win a seat in the Bundestag.

46 Sec. Dulles was attending a meeting of the Big Three Foreign Ministers in London at the time of this note.