30, 1954 amounted to, set new tasks for American diplomacy. Public opinion in the American United States found much in the public opinion events of mid-1954 to turn tradiquestions the value of France as an ally

tional attitudes of American friendship for France into disillusion, and ofttimes into expressions of disappointment. The French defeats in Indochina, the troubles and disorders in the French areas of North Africa, and now the French failure to participate in a security system for Europe which had been, in part, designed by the French themselves for their own protection, made many Americans wonder whether it was worthwhile to try to go on counting the French as one of the West's valuable allies. Such reactions may have been shortsighted, but they were human-and to many they were realistic, as well. But the times were too grave to permit the luxury of self-pity. (64) What had to be done was to find a way to reconstruct the European security system on a basis which would satisfy the French and yet not alienate the support necessary from the other nations of the West. For, with the Soviet Union and its satellites ready to capitalize on any division between and among the Western allies, the peculiarities of French politics and the long-nurtured French distrust of Germany could not be allowed to disrupt the program for building a strong and defensible Western Europe.

Throughout early September various measures were under examination. The West German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, on the first, had asked

Efforts to replace EDC

the United States and the United Kingdom to open negotiations for a substitute for the EDC arrangements for the Bonn Republic. Shortly thereafter the Soviet Union renewed its proposal for an all-European conference. However, the governments in Washington, London, and Paris jointly rejected the Russian plan.78 The next move came from Great Britain. Sir Anthony Eden, on September 11th, offered a plan whereby both West Germany and Italy would be brought into the Brussels Treaty group of 1948. Sir Anthony, in a rapid tour of West Euro

78 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:397-98, Sept. 20, 1954, for the text of the Western reply of Sept. 10.

pean capitals, explained his proposal to the various governments.79 Meanwhile, on the 14th, the Council of Europe recommended a European defense organization allied to NATO as a way out of the impasse created by the action of the French Assembly.

Secretary Dulles confers with European leaders

Secretary Dulles set out for Bonn on the 16th and conferred there with Chancellor Adenauer. Then he went to London to talk with British officials. Back in the United States on the 18th he was critical of the suggestions made to date, saying that so far no adequate replacement for EDC had been presented.80 However, the British government went ahead and on the 19th invited eight interested nations to meet in the British capital. That same day Dr. Adenauer and Premier Mendès-France conferred in Paris on the problem of the Saar. Mr. Dulles joined these two men the following day. In a rapid return to the United States, Secretary Dulles kept an engagement to address the opening session of the UN General Assembly on September 23rd on the subject of "Partnership for Peace." In the course of this speech the American Secretary of State said:

The problem of peace in Europe has become more complicated because of the recent setback to the construction of the European Defense Community. . . . The votes of the Communist deputies more than accounted for the parliamentary majority which in one country [France] shelved the EDC. Thus, they acted to perpetuate European dissensions which have recurrently bred wars.

81

London conference on European security

West German differences, the London conference made notable progress. In two days the eight nations represented agreed on a tentative plan for German rearmament, on a means for admitting the Bonn Republic into NATO, and on the expansion of the 1948 Brussels treaty to accommodate West Germany and Italy. By October 3d a final pact was negótiated incorporating these and other measures for replacing the scheme of EDC.83 Secretary Dulles, returning to Washington on October 4th issued a statement in which he hailed the achievements at London and gave full credit to the Western European allies for bringing about so acceptable an agreement.84 How successful the London conference had been was indicated on the 6th when Foreign Minister Molotov of the U.S.S.R. issued a denunciation of the London Pact from East Berlin, demanding that the plan to rearm Western Germany be dropped at once. As if in answer to Mr. Molotov's statement, the lower house of the Bonn parliament ratified the London Pact with unusual speed on the next day. On October 11th it was announced that the name of the new defense coalition would be the Western European Union (WEU).

Molotov denounces the London Pact

The
Paris Pacts

The French Assembly strengthened the position of Mendès-France, on the 12th, voting confidence in his action on German rearmament by a margin of 350 to 113. Following the plan presented at the London conference, the Western allies gathered at Paris October 20-23 to make the necessary arrangements to admit West Germany into NATO, and to bring Italy and Germany into the Western European Union. On the 23d, fifteen foreign ministers signed the Paris Pacts providing for West German sovereignty and for German partnership in the European defense system.85 An agreement putting the Saar region

83 The text of the London Pact is in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:515-28, Oct. 11, 1954. Another achievement of the London conference was the negotiation of an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia whereby the controversy over the Trieste situation was ended.

84 See ibid., XXXI:519, Oct. 11, 1954.

85 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:719-33, Nov. 15, 1954, for the texts of the Paris agreements. The pacts were sent to the Senate by Pres. Eisenhower on Nov. 15, 1954, for ratification. See ibid., XXXI:847-49, Dec. 6, 1954, for the Presidential message of submission. They were ratified Apr. 1, 1955.

Paris Pacts. When these agree

ments were accepted by the various signatories, then, the three western powers said, they would be willing to discuss such a plan as the Russians had put forward.87

Dulles reports to the first televised cabinet session

Secretary Dulles, back from Paris, made a report to the President, his Cabinet, and to the American people by radio and television on the evening of October 25th. This special session of the Cabinet was the first ever televised and the first at which the public had ever been "present." Millions of Americans were able to see and hear the Secretary as he told the President and his colleagues of the significance of the Paris accords. In the course of his remarks, Mr. Dulles said:

... I feel pretty confident that the Soviet Union doesn't like what is going on. . . . There is behind this program [to strengthen European defenses] a sense of urgency and momentum, so that I don't believe the Soviet Union will be able to break it up.

What has happened during these last few weeks has demonstrated that there is a basis for a good partnership on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.88 In all, Mr. Dulles indicated that he was greatly encouraged by the way in which the Western allies had recouped the losses sustained in the French reluctance to ratify EDC. The new Paris agreements, he believed, were more satisfactory as a basis for Western European unity than had been the EDC arrangements.

Late October was marked by two events which gave impetus to the thought that Western Euro

8 This agreement on the Saar followed the general plan of earlier agreements reached between France and Germany. It had the effect of making the Saar area an international zone, but gave France considerable control over the economy of the valley. 87 See ibid., XXXI:902-905, Dec. 13, 1954, for the allied reply of Oct. 23rd to the Soviet note.

88 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:677, Nov. 8, 1954. Mr. Dulles replied to a number of questions put to him by cabinet members after he had made his more formal report. For the text of Mr. Dulles' written report, delivered to the President on Nov. 12, 1954, see ibid., XXXI:849-56, Dec. 6, 1954.

Trieste restored to Italian rule

pean cohesion was at last becoming a reality. On October 26, in conformance with the agreements reached at the Paris conference, the city of Trieste and the zone surrounding it were turned over by the American and British occupation authorities to Italian control. This ended more than a decade of controversy involving a triangular grouping in which Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Anglo-American allies were frequently at odds with one another. The Italian authorities undertook full control of the restored territory and Italians in the Trieste area, as well as in a number of cities of Italy, celebrated enthusiastically the reestablishment of Italian sovereignty in this long-disputed region at the head of the Adriatic.

The other event of note was Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington, October 27-29. While in the capital the West German Chancellor

Chancellor Adenauer visits Washington

conferred with President Eisenhower. The two leaders issued a joint statement on the 28th reaffirming their opposition to the Russian suggestion for talks on German unification until after the Paris Pacts had been ratified.89 Dr. Adenauer addressed the National Press Club on the 29th and declared that he would be in favor of a nonaggression pact between the western allies and the Soviet Union, but only after the western nations had solidified the unification begun at Paris. Another event of the Adenauer visit was the negotiation by him, as West German Foreign Minister, of a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States on October 29th.90

Soviet Russia countered the Western moves for European unity with an invitation to twenty-three European countries and to the United States for a European conference on collective security to be held in late November.91 Almost at once the principal Western powers answered that the time set by the Russians was too short to permit

Western Powers reject Soviet proposal for an

all-European conference

See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:680-81, Nov. 8, 1954, for the statement.

"It will be recalled that Dr. Adenauer holds both portfolios in the Bonn administration: Chancellor (Prime Minister) and Foreign Minister.

See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:905-907, Dec. 13, 1954 for the text of the Soviet invitation. The U.S. replies are in ibid., XXXI:901-902, Dec. 13, 1954.

acceptance, since the agenda would have to be discussed and agreed upon before the Western allies could undertake to participate in such a conference.92 During a four-day visit to Washington, November 17-20, Premier Mendès-France joined with Secretary Dulles in reiterating opposition to a Big-4 meeting before the ratification of the Paris accords.93 The British House of Commons had ratified the Paris Pacts on November 18th with all but seven of the Labour Party members abstaining from casting their votes.94 The cabinet of the Bonn Republic on the 19th also agreed to advocate approval of the treaties and to present them to the West German parliament for ratification at an early date. With these evidences of Western unity on record, it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union, on November 20th, offered to delay the proposed European conference if the Western nations would likewise delay moves to ratify the Paris Pacts. This suggestion met with no favor in the Western capitals. The Russians therefore went forward with plans for a meeting of the European satellite nations to which the government of Red China was also invited.

While in the United States Mr. Mendès-France in an address to the UN General Assembly proposed that a Big 4 conference be scheduled for

92 Premier Mendès-France, in Ottawa on Nov. 15 on his way to Washington, said that France could not attend such a conference. Foreign Secretary Eden told the House of Commons the same day that the United Kingdom felt likewise. Chancellor Adenauer also replied to the same effect, as did the U.S. State Department on Nov. 16, 1954.

$3 See ibid., XXXI:804, Nov. 29, 1954, for the communiqué issued at the close of the Franco-American talks.

The Labour Party leadership had directed that its delegation in Parliament abstain from voting on the issue as a protest against the government's unwillingness to meet with the Soviet Union for discussions. In the British Parliament, party discipline is traditionally respected on such occasions, but in this instance seven members broke with the leaders and voted against the government.

95 The UN speech was delivered Nov. 22, 1954. The following day the French premier addressed the Foreign Policy Association.

President Eisenhower seeks a "modus vivendi❞ for peaceful coexistence

With the crisis over Formosa gaining increased attention at this time, European matters tended to be pushed into the background. However, President Eisenhower, on November 16th had said that the United States and Russia must search for a better method of living in peace than the continuation of the "cold war" policy which, he charged, the Soviet Union was constantly pursuing. A week later the President warned that the two nations must find what he had come to call a "modus vivendi," a way of coexisting peacefully in the same world. The only alternative to peaceful coexistence, the President declared, was war-and the United States definitely wanted to avoid that alternative.

A few days later Secretary Dulles was in Chicago to make a scheduled address to the National 4-H Club Congress. In this speech the Secretary dealt with a number of facets of American foreign policy. Because of the importance of the address a major proportion of it is presented here.

SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON "THE GOAL OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY," CHICAGO, NOVEMBER 29, 1954: . . . Let me begin by em

Secretary Dulles addresses the 4-H Club Congress

on our

foreign policy goals

phasizing the goal of our foreign policy -it is to enable you and me and our children to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty. . . . One ever-present danger is the danger of being fooled into dropping our guard before the peril is really past. The international Communists are masters at the trick of using words which mean one thing to them and another thing to us. . . . Now the tricky word is "co-existence." To us it means tolerance of differences. It remains to be seen what it means to international Communists. It is true that the Russian Communists have recently talked more softly. But it is equally true that the Chinese Communists have talked and acted with increasing violence. . . . Perhaps international communism is trying by a new way to divide the free nations. They seek to be soothing in Europe. They are provocative in Asia. . . . Of course, we look anxiously for signs of real change in the attitude of international Communists. . . . We must have policies to meet both the military risk and the subversive risk. . . . Our continental defense system depends on Canada. And the free nations cannot have effective retaliatory power to deter aggression without airfields in widely scattered places. Therefore, a vital part of our foreign policy is to have friendly rela

tions with many other countries. The relationship must be for the common good. So the common defense includes many areas outside the UnitedStates.... Western Europe is a prize of first order to any who seek world domination. So it requires special protection. It gets it by NATO. But NATO needs, at its core on the Continent, a greater measure of unity, with German participation. That was the purpose of the historic agreements made... at London and Paris. These agreements should end the constant warring of European nations against themselves and at the same time provide Western Europe with effective defense. In addition to local defense within treaty areas, there is striking power by air or sea. . . . We must have the capacity to respond at places and by means of our choosing." 96 This ... does not mean that any local war would automatically be turned into a general war with atomic bombs being dropped all over the map. The essential thing is that we and our allies should have the means and the will to assure that a potential aggressor would lose more from his aggression than he could win. This does not mean that the aggressor has to be totally destroyed. It does mean the capacity to inflict punishing damage. We believe that we and our allies have the power to do that. We also believe that so long as we do have that power it is unlikely that there will be armed attack upon the areas covered by our security arrangements. . . .97 Our policies do not exclude international conferences, even with those who are hostile to us. . . . we do not want to talk with the Soviet representatives when their only purpose is to divide the free nations and prevent their taking necessary measures for their own security. We had one such meeting at Berlin last January and February. The ostensible purpose was to unify Germany and to liberate Austria. In fact, the Soviet Foreign Minister only sought to block the plans for Western European security. We do want to find out whether the Soviet Union will sign the Austrian treaty and whether, after the London and Paris accords are ratified, it will talk seriously about uniting Germany. . . . We are also . . . deeply interested in the limitation of armaments. A principal purpose of the LondonParis accords is not merely to create defensive strength in Western Europe but to limit and control that strength so that it can never be an aggressive force. . . . the United States, by every standard of measurement is the world's greatest power not only materially but spiritually. We have national policies which are clear and sound. They fit a civilization based on religious faith. They are strongly implemented but at a cost we can afford to live with. They have evolved on a non-partisan basis, and, in broad

outline, they are overwhelmingly backed by our people. Such policies . . . will peacefully prevail. As the last month of 1954 opened, the Sovietcontrolled "all-European" conference declared its intention to pool the military strength of the eight Soviet and satellite nations if the rearmament of West Germany was carried out by the ratification of the Paris accords. Meanwhile, several further indications were given by Britain and the United States that they would be willing to open general talks with Russia once the ratifications were achieved. But, it was emphasized again, not before this was accomplished.

Secretary Dulles flew to Paris on December 14th to attend a meeting of the NATO Council to be held there on the 17th and 18th. NATO This meeting reached, among other Council decisions, a determination to auapproves use of thorize the NATO commanders to nuclear weapons for European defense

base their planning on the availability of nuclear weapons for use in the defense of Europe. This important decision assured the NATO forces that any attack by Russia on Western Europe could be met by instant retaliation with all the power at the disposal of the Western allies. It also served notice on the Soviet Union that there would be no withholding of the West's most devastating weapons if the occasion for their use was created by Soviet aggression.98

Russia had warned France, on December 16th that its treaty with the French for mutual assistance would be broken if the French ratified the Paris Pact. On the 20th the U.S.S.R. notified the United Kingdom that as a result of Great Britain's ratification of the treaties it was abrogating the 1942 treaty of alliance with that nation. The British replied that, under the terms of the 1942 pact, it took two to abrogate it and the British still considered it in effect. The Russian threat to France did not deter the French Assembly from opening debate, December 20th, on the treaties. signed in Paris on October 23rd.

The situation was thrown into confusion on December 24th when the French Assembly in a parliamentary manoeuvre voted 281 to 257 to re

* See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXII:10-12, Jan. 3, 1955, for the communiqué issued at the close of the NATO meeting. Sec. Dulles declared on his return to Washington Dec. 21, that the NATO decision developed "a forward strategy,' thereby strengthening European defense. Ibid., XXXII:10-12, Jan. 3, 1955.

French Assembly delays action on German rearmament treaty

ject the treaty providing for German rearmament.99 This attempt by the French parliament to embarrass the Premier caused great concern in Washington. However, Mr. Mendès-France rallied his supporters and in a series of votes during the week after Christmas the initial rejection was reversed. On December 30th the French Assembly, faced with the demand by Mendès-France that that body act favorably on the treaties or dismiss his government, finally gave

its approval to the series of treaties France and sent them on to the French finally approves Senate for final action. This yearGerman end victory for Mendès-France was rearmament hailed in all the Western capitals. The fact that it revealed how slight was the control by the Premier over his parliament was regarded as a serious threat to the stability of the French administration.1 But, whatever the cost to the strength of Mr. Mendès-France, the ratification was seen as further evidence of the inevitability of the unification of Western Europe.

100

Secretary Dulles, in a summing-up of the accomplishments of 1954, cited the growing certainty that Western Europe would be joined in a community of free nations banded Prospects for together for the greater strength of European unity all as one of the major achievements brighten at of the postwar period. 101 Of Western end of 1954 European Union, he said, it "reproduces much of the good contained in the EDC."102 It is true that WEU was still far from being a functioning unit, and the way to its goal of providing a working coalition of free powers still contained serious roadblocks. However, at the end of 1954 the path seemed smoother and the way ahead less obscured. Now that the French Assembly had taken the difficult, but definite step of reconciling German rearmament with French concern over a reestablished Germany, other problems confronting the planners appeared

"The Italian Chamber of Deputies had voted approval of the treaty setting up the Western European Union on Dec. 23, 1954.

100 The Mendès-France cabinet was overthrown early in 1955. After a series of parliamentary moves, M. Edgar Faure was named Premier.

101 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXII:43-44, Jan. 10, 1955, for Sec. Dulles' assessment of the gains of 1954. 102 Ibid., XXXII:43, Jan. 10, 1955.