plete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression. . . . we are ready... to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. .. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two Governments differ.... we are determined to prevent . . . [our difference of view on this point] from interfering with our united effort. . . . On the question of Formosa. ... We agree that the issues should be settled by peaceful means ... and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends. . . . In the circumstances which confront us throughout the world our nations have no other choice but to devote themselves with all vigor to the building up of our defense forces. We shall do this purely as a defensive measure. We believe that the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and China could, if they chose, modify their conduct in such a way as to make these defense preparations unnecessary. The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation. Just a week after the end of the Truman-Attlee meetings, the President delivered a radio address to the nation in which he explained that the situation in the Far East impelled the United States to take certain courses of action. These he listed as the following: ... President Truman proclaims a "national emergency," December 16, 1950 PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 15, 1950: . . . Here are the things we will do: First, we will continue to uphold and, if necessary, to defend with arms, the principles of the United Nations-the principles of freedom and justice. Second, we will continue to work with the other free nations to strengthen Our combined defense. Third, we will build up our own Army, Navy, and Air Force, and make more weapons for ourselves and our allies. Fourth, we will expand our economy and keep it on an even keel. . . . Because of all these things . . . I will issue a proclamation . . . declaring that a national emergency exists. President Truman issued the proclamation on December 16, 1950, placing the nation in a state of emergency readiness. The "police action" had developed in six eventful months into a threat of large-scale war in the Far East, if not in other many quarters of the globe as well. From De Red Chinese intervention makes Korea "a different war entirely" cember 16, 1950 onward, the United States was involved in a vital struggle with the forces of communism in Korea, and those forces were primarily Red Chinese backed by the power and the ideology not only of communist China but also of Soviet Russia. From the time of the Chinese intervention in November 1950, it was as General MacArthur tersely phrased it-"a different war entirely." 7. The Korean War and the MacArthur Controversy Korean war a tangle of contradictions When the Chinese Communists entered the Korean war on the side of the North Koreans in the autumn of 1950, the conflict took on a very different complexion than it had displayed when it was merely a UN police action aimed at driving the North Korean aggressors back from the 38th parallel. It was still a cooperative UN action against aggression but it was also a war against the UN forces by an officially neutral power (Red China), supported by one of the major members of the UN (Soviet Russia). Moreover, since Great Britain, France, and other UN members with forces involved in the Korean fighting had recognized the government of Red China, here was a war in which UN contingents were battling forces of a nation with which they were at peace and with which they were on ostensibly friendly terms. These complications made the Korean affair one of the most tangled in international history. And the injection of the Korean war into American domestic politics did very little to help clarify the situation. Militarily, the first half of 1951 was indecisive for the UN forces in Korea. By January 1, 1951 the Chinese invaders were at the 38th parallel and on January 4th they captured Seoul. By mid-March the UN troops were again in possession of Seoul and in early April had pushed the Chinese Reds over the 38° line. Another Red offensive threw the UN forces back on several points, but by June the various UN contingents were Reds capture Seoul in January 1951 but lose it in March 41 Throughout the Korean war, Red China and the Soviet Union maintained the fiction that the Chinese Communist troops fighting in Korea were "volunteers" and that the Chinese communist government had at no time participated in the war. American casualties alarm the American public The Korean war became more and more unpopular with the American people. They were distressed by the mounting lists of dead, wounded, and missing. They were disturbed by the danger of a global war growing out of this intensification of the East-West struggle. They were impatient with the failure or inability of UN allies to supply larger forces for the Korean fighting. They were doubtful about the wisdom of the administration's policy in respect to Far Eastern affairs-if they admitted that a policy existed at all. They were frustrated by the apparent limitations upon freedom of action in Korea-they could not agree whether General MacArthur should be restricted from bombing military objectives in Manchuria. They were angered that high taxes, onerous price control regulations, and interferences with personal freedoms were not providing compensatory satisfactions in the form of victories for the UN allies and distress to the Soviet Union and its satellites. In brief, a majority of the American people were fed up with the whole affair by 1951 and could not see a way out of their dilemma. Into this atmosphere, and partially as a contributing factor to its high humidity and obscurity, was injected what became known as the MacArthur controversy. From time to Development time in American history fiercely of the partisan quarrels have influenced MacArthur our foreign policy. In the spring of controversy 1951, the proverbial man from Mars would have wondered whether the inhabitants of the United States could ever again lay claim to the title "united." American foreign policy-or the lack of it-was laid bare in the press, debated on the radio, exposed in its skeletal form before congressional committees, and argued on street corners until every potential enemy of the United States must have been able to put his own estimate on the probable course, strength, and temper of our future actions. And every ally of the United States must have questioned the advisability of depending upon so undecided and so mercurial a peoples as the Americans. In the end nothing fundamental was changed. A general, with qualities of greatness and unfortunate blind spots, had apparently misread the basic facts of American constitutional government and was relieved of his command. A president, limited in qualifications for his high office but conscious of the prerogatives of that office, had made an unpopular, if constitutionally correct, decision and stuck to that decision. The chronological facts of the MacArthur incident are not difficult to list, although to do so here would require many pages. But to describe and analyze all the factors surrounding the controversy would engage the time and abilities of many students and access to volumes of testimony, classified records, personal correspondence, and whole libraries of press and periodical comment. The cardinal facts are these: 1. General MacArthur during the autumn of 1951 grew increasingly impatient with the limits imposed on him by Joint Chiefs of Staff orders to create a neutral zone short of the Yalu River boundary between North Korea and Manchuria, beyond which UN action would not be pursued. 2. President Truman, on December 6, 1950, issued a general directive ordering all government officials not to deliver any speech, press release or other public statement concerning foreign policy without prior clearance by the Department of State, or, if concerning military policy, by the Department of Defense-and in either case such clearance was to be communicated to the President. Fundamental facts beneath the MacArthur incident 3. On March 24, 1951, General MacArthur issued a call to the Communists to surrender saying that he stood ready to confer in the field with enemy commanders on terms for an end to the fighting. This call was announced at the time the administration was preparing a proposal for peace negotiations to be submitted to our UN allies for approval. The administration thereupon withdrew its peace proposal on the ground that General MacArthur had compromised its usefulness. General MacArthur later denied he had any knowl edge of the peace proposal, but other authorities say he had known of it. 4. On April 5, 1951, Representative Joseph W. Martin, Republican leader in the House, released a letter received from General MacArthur, dated March 20, 1951, in which the General endorsed Mr. Martin's statement that Chinese Nationalist troops training on Formosa should be used in Korea to fight the Reds. General MacArthur in this letter also criticized the actions of diplomats concerned with implementing American foreign policy in the Far East. 5. President Truman, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided to remove General MacArthur from the UN command and from his post as commander-in-chief in the Far EastSCAP. His decision was reached on April 10, 1951 and made public early the next morning in a statement from the White House. President Truman decides to remove General MacArthur from his Far East commands ... MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations. . . . Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element of the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. Because of a breakdown of communications, word of the President's action reached General MacArthur in Tokyo through a news bulletin before he was officially presented with the order from Washington relieving him of command. On the evening of April 11th, President Truman made a radio address to the nation in which he explained his action. in the light of the threat to world peace. President Truman explains his action to the American people PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADDRESS ON PREVENTING A NEW WORLD WAR, WASHINGTON, APRIL 11, 1951: . . . In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war. I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. . . . Now, many persons . . . have forgotten the basic reason for our action. It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today. . . . The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dan gerous move the Communists have yet made. The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia. . . . The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. . . . So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war. . . . the forces of the United Nations will strive to limit the conflict if possible. . . But you may ask: . . . why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China? If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. . . . First of all, it is clear that our efforts in Korea can blunt the will of the Chinese Communists to continue the struggle.... Second, the free world as a whole is growing in military strength every day. . . . If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize that it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: To make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war. A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy. . . . The change of commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States.... We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading. . . . But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. . . . In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. . . . The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war. That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming... In the public statement and again in this speech Arthur from his Far Eastern commands loosed torrents of emotionalism throughout the United States. Rarely has an act of an American Presi dent called down upon the head of General the Chief Executive such bitter deMacArthur's nunciation and vituperative crititriumphant cism. General MacArthur left Tokyo homecoming on April 16, 1951, stopped in Hawaii the following day and reached San Francisco on the 17th. Both at Honolulu and at San Francisco he was received by cheering crowds. His welcome in Washington in the early General MacArthur's speech to Congress, April 19, 1951 morning of April 19th was equally tumultuous. Later that day he addressed a joint session of the House and Senate while many in his audience wept as he moved in measured oratorical phrases phrases to his declaration, "War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there is no substitute for victory." He recommended four courses of action in the Far East: 1. Intensification of an economic blockade against Red China. 2. A naval blockade of the Red China coast. 3. Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of Red China's coastal area and of Manchuria. 4. Removal of restrictions on the forces of Nationalist China on Formosa with effective logistical support to enable them to operate against the mainland of Red China. He declared that he believed these views were shared by "practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff." And he denied that an all-out war with Red China would be likely or that the Soviet Union would move against our forces if such actions were taken in the Far East. Then in a moving peroration he bade farewell with the words, ". I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-bye." A sympathetic citizenry, however, would not be denied the opportunity to say good-bye in person. For several weeks cities all over the nation clamored for an opportunity to do him honor. On April 20th, 7,500,000 New Yorkers lined parade routes to see the General and do him homage. Other cities followed suit in later months. But the controversy was not to be settled in city streets or balanced by shouting multitudes. Senate hearings on MacArthur removal On May 3, 1951 the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on the Armed Services opened a joint inquiry into the removal of General MacArthur. The hearings continued until June 25th and some thirteen principal witnesses, led by MacArthur, himself, were heard. The terms of the inquiry led the senators into virtually every facet of American foreign and military policy from pre-Pearl Harbor days downward. The total wordage in the final record topped 2,045,000. The committees, with Senator Richard B. Russell, Democrat, of Georgia, as chairman, decided not to make a formal report of the findings. On August 19, 1951, eight Republican members of the committees issued a statement as to their conclusions. They agreed that President Truman was acting within his constitutional authority when he issued orders recalling General MacArthur. But they criticized his method of doing it, and they found considerable fault with the conduct of American Far Eastern policy by the administration.43 Equally significant in view of the emotions aroused by the MacArthur controversy was the statement issued by Senator Russell at the close of the inquiry: STATEMENT BY SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL ON SENATE INQUIRY INTO RECALL OF GENERAL MACARTHUR, WASHINGTON, JUNE 27, 1951: ... The inquiry has pushed to its very limits a principle to which the Senator statement on inquiry findings American people jealously cling - the right of every man to say what he thinks.... To those critics of our form of government who contend that public discussion of such matters creates dissent and breeds confusion we have a simple answer. Those who are still privileged to breath the air of freedom utilize such discussion as a means to temper the steel of national determination and unity. . . . The fact that we do not always speak with a single voice does not mean that we have weakened in our united purpose. . . Even as the free world has no reason for dismay, neither should the Communist world he deceived by the searching review given our global strategy. It would be well for those who may con 43 Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Republican, of Massachusetts) on Aug. 24, 1951 agreed in the main with his eight colleagues on the committees, but said that "differences arose which made it clearly impossible . . to continue" MacArthur in command. template aggression to understand that disagreements among individuals or groups will not deter the American people and their Government from the relentless quest for our ultimate security. . . . If the MacArthur inquiry showed anything beyond the inner workings of our planning and policy-making agencies, it revealed that the con MacArthur hearings do not alter fundamental constitutional control of military by civilian authority cept of civilian control of military agencies was still a fundamental of our form of government. On this there was a large measure of agreement, although here and there a word of dissent arose. However, even among those who accepted this basic fact, there was no denying that the MacArthur controversy supplied valuable ammunition to the foes of the administration and of its foreign policies. How effective this opposition was when the presidential campaign of 1952 rolled around is a matter for analysts and researchers. There is no doubt that much antiadministration sentiment was concentrated among those who disregarded the constitutional question and saw only the personalities involved-the valiant "old soldier," the loyal Chiefs of Staff, the "inexperienced" President, the "distrusted" Secretary of State, the lesser figures (both sycophants and upright servants of the people). Whether the handling of the MacArthur incident weighed largely in the defeat of the Democrats at the polls in 1952 is hard to say-so many other factors became involved as the campaign progressed. But the removal of General MacArthur did not end the question of bombing Manchuria, or of supporting Chiang Kai-shek. And, just as surely, it did not end the war in Korea. For while the senators queried and the public clamored, the war went on. 8. Negotiations for a Korean Truce While the MacArthur inquiry claimed public attention in the United States, events in Korea and in the UN took a course which eventually led to a slowing down of hostilities in the field. Some of these events had their beginnings before the recall of General MacArthur, but it has seemed more proper to insert that episode into the story and then to retrace steps to pick up the narrative from the early months of 1951. The main military chronology of the first half of 1951 has already been indicated. We now turn to the diplomatic side of the picture. Red China demands seat on UN Security In January 1951, with military successes as a background, the Red Chinese demanded that the UN remove Nationalist China's delegate from the Security Council and seat a representative of the Peiping communist regime in his place. The Red Chinese case was strongly supported by Andrei Vishinsky and by delegates Council held by from the Soviet satellite members. Nationalist The Security Council went so far as China to invite a Red Chinese group, headed by Wu Hsiu-chan, Mao Tse-tung's foreign minister, to appear at the UN and present its proposals. The debate was vigorous and acrimonious, but finally the Security Council declined to unseat the Chinese Nationalists.44 In the midst of the debate, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and representatives of an Arab-Asian bloc of twelve nations made separate suggestions on terms for a cease-fire in Korea which would be agreeable to the Chinese communists. Failing to get approval for a proposal to set up a truce commission, the United States delegation, on January 30, 1951, succeeded in having a UN General Assembly brands Red China as an aggressor resolution naming Red China as the aggressor in Korea adopted by the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly. The vote was 44 to 7 with 8 nations abstaining. On February 1, 1951 the General Assembly voted by the same margin, 44 to 7, to brand communist China as the aggressor.45 This action by the UN was regarded as a distinct victory for the free nations, and especially for the United States. The resolution as adopted provided for a 14-member committee to consider collective action against the Chinese in Korea and a three-member committee to seek a peace settlement. During February several other 44 Since China was a charter member of the UN and of. the Security Council the question could not be solved by a proposal to admit the Red Chinese to the UN, for this would be vetoed by the Nationalist representative on the Security Council, and probably by the United States also. Thus, the only way would be for the Security Council to vote to substitute the Red for the Nationalist delegate. 45 Voting in the negative were Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, the Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. Abstaining were Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. |