The Hay-Herran treaty United States was to receive a canal zone six miles wide for $10,000,000 in cash and an annuity of $250,000. The Hay-Herran treaty was extremely unpopular in Colombia, and, on August 12, 1903, the Colombian Senate unanimously rejected ratification. Although Colombia was disappointed not to be offered more money, the Latin American republic also had reason to believe that the terms were a threat to Colombian sovereignty in Panama. Moreover, the French concession would expire in October 1904 and then the Colombians might be able to sell the assets of the New Panama Canal Company for a figure nearer the $40,000,000 bargain rate of 1901. The Colombian government's rejection of the treaty angered many Americans and they argued for armed action to occupy Panama. Others advo cated selection of the Nicaraguan The route. Meanwhile Bunau-Varilla Panama revolt and others set in motion plans for a revolt against Colombia by Panamanians. The conspirators, operating mostly in New York and Washington, were convinced that the United States would exert efforts to prevent a Panamanian revolt from failing. Bunau-Varilla advised the leaders of the movement in Panama that the U.S.S. Nashville would arrive at Colón, on the Caribbean side of the isthmus, on November 2, 1903. The day after the Nashville reached Colón, the Panamanians revolted. The Nashville prevented Colombian troops from landing to put Speedy recognition of Panama by Roosevelt down the revolt, and on November 4 Panama proclaimed itself a republic, independent of Colombia. President Roosevelt authorized recognition of the new republic within a couple of hours of the time he was informed of the action of the revolutionaries. Within two days, on November 6, formal recognition was accorded the republic of Panama. BunauVarilla was received as envoy from Panama on November 13 and five days later he signed a treaty with Secretary Hay giving canal concessions to the United States. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of November 18, 1903 granted the United States permanent Hay-BunauVarilla treaty rights over a ten-mile-wide zone across Panama for $10,000,000 outright and $250,000 a year. While the rapidity of action left the American public somewhat breathless, opinion generally supported the ends—if not entirely the meanswhereby the Canal Zone was added to the American empire. President Roosevelt boldly defended his actions and the precipitate recognition of Panama. He largely ignored the counterclaims that a canal could have been built across Nicaragua with less damage to America's prestige and reputation for fair dealing. In a speech at Berkeley, Califor ... nia, on March 23, 1911, at a time "I took when he was out of office but not the Canal...." out of politics, Theodore Roosevelt declared: "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate; and while the debate goes on the Canal does also."89 Although there is some legal justification for Roosevelt's actions in 1903, the Latin American nations in general, and Colombia in particular, saw in the administration's deeds and boasts a threat to the integrity of small and weak nations with valuable resources or desirable trade routes within their territories. Treaty negotiations to recompense Colombia For many years after the acquisition of the Canal Zone, there was some public support for movements to recompense Colombia for the loss of the valuable province of Panama. While Roosevelt was President these movements received no official sympathy and every effort of Colombia to have the issue submitted to arbitration was rebuffed. During the Taft administration several attempts to soothe the feelings of the Colombians resulted in failure. When Woodrow Wilson became President in 1913 attitudes changed. A treaty with Colombia was signed on April 6, 1914 whereby the United States would pay $25,000,000 and grant Colombia certain privileges in the use of the Panama Canal, including toll-free passage for Colombian military movements, on an equal basis with the United States itself. Through the efforts of ex-President Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his 39 New York Times, March 25, 1911, p. 10, quoted in Bailey, op. cit., p. 545. long-time friend, the treaty was pigeonholed in the Senate. Under President Warren G. Harding the treaty was amended to remove what amounted to an apology by the United States which the 1914 document had incorporated. Senator Lodge supported the amended treaty on the ground that it would improve commercial relations between Colombia and the United States. In the seven-year interval great quantities of oil had been discovered in Colombia. Whatever the underlying reason for the reversal, the Senate ratified the treaty April 20, 1921, and the United States began the payment of the $25,000,000 with $5,000,000 within six months and $5,000,000 in each of four annual installments thereafter. Even though the apology had been removed from the treaty, most of those who knew of the Senate's action regarded the money payment as an admission that an injury had been done to Colombia and that the United States was anxious to redress a wrong, possibly in the hope of receiving favorable treatment when oil concessions were distributed by Colombia. 8. Caribbean Interests of the United States to 1914 As an aftermath of the Spanish-American war the United States was closely concerned in the Caribbean area to a far greater degree than previously. The acquisition of Puerto Rico and of a naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, as well as of a leasehold on the Isle of Pines, made the Caribbean in effect an American sea. One of the primary problems of the region involved the status of Cuba. Cuba as an American protectorate Cuba's freedom from Spanish rule did not solve the problems of the war-torn island. Under the Teller amendment to the resolution for war in 1898, the United States had disclaimed any intention to annex Cuba. But America could not cut loose the new Cuban nation entirely -its impoverished condition, its uncertain politics, and its strategic location would leave it a prey to possible exploitation by some other European power now that Spain had been banished from the Caribbean. American military occupation was not the solution, since that would prove expensive to the United States and would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of both the Teller amendment and the Monroe Doctrine. The dilemma was temporarily resolved by the Platt amendment to the army appropriation bill of March 2, 1901. This provision was made a part of the Cuban constitution on June 12, 1901. THE PLATT AMENDMENT, WASHINGTON, MARCH 2, 1901: . . . in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint resolution approved [April 20, 1898] . . . the President is hereby authorized to "leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people" so soon as a government shall have been established . . . under a consitution which . . . shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows: . . . That . . . Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba. . . . That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which . . . the ordinary revenues of the island. . . shall be inadequate. Cuba consents that the United States may . . . intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States. All Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy . . . are ratified and validated. ... Cuba will execute . . . the plans . . . for the sanitation of the cities of the island. The Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to [a] future . . . treaty. . . . Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations. . . . Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States. The incorporation of these terms in the Cuban constitution made Cuba a quasi-protectorate of the United States and guaranteed that the island would not fall into the hands of another power. In May 1902 the American military forces were withdrawn from Cuba and the terms of the Platt amendment were reinforced by their inclusion in a treaty between the United States and Cuba in 1903. Soon after the American troops left Cuba the island reverted to its customary unsettled state. The disorders became so prevalent that in 1906 American forces were sent to the island to insure stability. In 1909 the troops were again withdrawn. From that time until a treaty was signed in 1934, Cuba re The Good Neighbor policy frees Cuba mained an American protectorate. While internal stability did not come about at once in Cuba, the island was relatively calm after the end of armed intervention by the United States. So, as a part of the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930's, the Platt amendment was dropped by the terms of the treaty of May 29, 1934, and Cuba became a free, unprotected nation as of that date. Actually, of course, any serious situation involving the independence of Cuba would not go unnoticed by the United States. (28) But there remains no legal attachment of Cuba to the United States now that the Platt amendment has been discarded. The Venezuelan problem, 1901-1903 During the first years of this century there existed in the United States considerable suspicion that Germany was seeking naval bases in the Caribbean-South American area. (27) The unsettled conditions in many Latin American republics made them possible objects of attention by Germany on this count. Venezuela was a typical case. Interminable civil wars in that republic imperiled foreign investments, mainly German and British, in Venezuela. In 1901 Germany proposed arbitration of her claims but the Venezuelan government of dictator Cipriano Castro refused. The British then suggested joint collection of debts by a show of armed force. President Roosevelt saw no affront to the Monroe Doctrine so long as intervention was for the purpose of punishing irresponsible Latin American governments and did not involve territorial acquisitions. Early in December 1902, Britain and Germany blockaded Venezuela. Italy later joined the two European powers. Castro agreed to arbitration and the United States acted as go-between. The blockade was kept in force until February 13, 1903, and the claims were finally settled by the Hague Court of International Justice in 1904. In 1916 ex-President Roosevelt published an account of the Venezuelan episode in which he asserted that he had delivered an ultimatum to the German ambassador in Washington which caused the Germans to agree to arbitration. It now seems clear that he issued no such ultimatum, although he did con Europe respects the Monroe Doctrine template sending an American fleet under Admiral Dewey to Venezuela. In any event, the Venezuelan affair indicated the respect with which Europeans regarded the Monroe Doctrine by 1901. For, unlike the practice on earlier occasions, the Europeans took extraordinary pains to ascertain before acting that their plans were not in conflict with the doctrine. In general, the Latin Americans found no fault with the handling of the Venezuelan matter. However, Luis M. Drago, Argentinian Foreign Minister, did enunciate the policy that armed intervention to collect public debts was contrary to international rules of action. This so-called Drago Doctrine was acknowledged by the United States in a modified form in 1907 when it was included in a convention adopted by the Second Hague Conference. The Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine Another problem area in the Caribbean was the Dominican Republic. Following a period of civil strife and corruption in government, the republic faced bankruptcy in 1904. With the Venezuelan episode fresh in mind it appeared to the United States that there was likelihood of European intervention, and this time the Monroe Doctrine might not receive as respectful attention as it had in 1902. President Roosevelt reached the conclusion that the United States would have to take some responsibility for the failure of Latin American republics to maintain their financial obligations. If the United States did not do this, European nations were likely to attempt to collect claims for themselves. Roosevelt thereupon voiced in his message to Congress what has become known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 6, 1904: . . . All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. . . If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency . . . if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States... in flagrant cases . ... to the exercise of an international police power. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression. . . . This Roosevelt corollary meant that the Monroe Doctrine could be used by the United States to justify intervention by it at the same time it prohibited intervention by a non-American power. President Roosevelt followed this declaration with an arrangement to control the customs houses in the Dominican Republic. A protocol, Control of customs as a device to collect debts drawn up on January 21, 1905, specified that the United States would assume the function of collecting customs and reserve 45% of the receipts to meet Dominican expenses, while 55% would go to reduce the outstanding debts of the republic. When the Senate went out of session without ratifying the protocol, Roosevelt accomplished his aims by executive agreement. For more than two years the collections went on under this agreement and then the Senate ratified a treaty, February 25, 1907, incorporating substantially the terms of the 1905 protocol. At the time Latin American republics paid little attention to this turn in the development of the Monroe Doctrine, and the Dominicans, deprived of the funds which supported and encouraged revolutions, had a number of years of peace and relative prosperity. involved guarantees on the part of the American government in behalf of American investors abroad, Taft and Knox were well aware.(28) One of the first applications of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean came in Honduras where in 1909 the State Department tried to get American bankers to take over the debt of Honduras to British bondholders. In 1910 Secretary Knox induced four New York banking firms to invest in the National Bank of Haiti, primarily to safeguard American capital in that country. In Nicaragua a revolt in 1909 gave Knox an excuse to insist that the revolutionaries negotiate a loan with American bankers as the price of recognition. Later, in November 1911, an American was appointed collector of customs in Nicaragua. To protect American investments in Nicaragua and to support the collection of the customs, American U. S. Marines enforce the rules of dollar diplomacy marines were landed on several occasions when disorders threatened to upset the arranged flow or profits. Whatever advantages to American business can be found in the dollar diplomacy program, the Latin Americans saw no benefit for themselves. While American capital probably did improve conditions in some areas, the domestic propaganda value of the "Yankee imperialist" to Latin American political leaders cannot be denied. They effectively used opposition to the United States and its methods in their home lands, and they spread the word abroad that the Americans were more interested in dollars than in justice, more anxious for profits than for friendship and respect. Wilson changes the policy Woodrow Wilson attempted to retrieve some of the lost reputation of the United States by attacking dollar diplomacy soon after becoming President. On March 11, 1913 he stated that his administration would not continue to support special groups or interests in Latin America. Later that same year in a public speech President Wilson set forth his policies toward Latin America. ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON, MOBILE, ALABAMA, OCTOBER 27, 1913: . . . The future is going to be very different for this hemisphere from the past. . . . States that are obliged . . . to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs. What these [Latin American] States are going to see... is an emancipation from the subordination to foreign enterprise. . . . We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not. . . . the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest. . . . She must regard it as one of the duties of friendship to see that from no quarter are material interests made superior to human liberty and national opportunity. . . . In spite of these encouraging words, President Wilson was not able to avoid some excursions into dollar diplomacy. As a legacy from the Taft administration, Wilson had a NicaraWilson resorts guan treaty providing an exclusive to intervention option on a canal route as well as renewable 99-year leases on the Corn Islands and on a naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca. The United States would pay $3,000,000 for these privileges, and Nicaragua would use the money to pay off debts to American bankers. President Wilson attached a clause to the treaty in the style of the Platt amendment, but the Senate refused approval. In 1916 the treaty, without the protectorate feature, was ratified by the Senate. Why Wilson failed to use this Nicaraguan treaty to strengthen his announced policy for Latin America is not clear, but it is thought the advantages of getting a perpetual option on the canal route outweighed those of forsaking dollar diplomacy. Other events of Wilson's early years in the White House likewise proved embarrassing when set against the Mobile speech of .1913. Intervention of American armed forces in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and other areas of Central America was an all too frequent occurrence in the years just before World War I. As Bailey remarks, "It is an ironical fact that [Wilson's] administration carried out more armed interventions in Latin America than that of any of its predecessors."40 This demonstrates that a diplomatic policy is often easier to preach than to practice, even when the policy is sincerely voiced by a strong advocate of fair dealing among nations.(29) ... In many respects Mexico was the least trouble 40 Bailey, op. cit., p. 596. The Lodge corollary to the Monroe Doctrine company sought to lease a large area of land on Magdalena Bay-a site highly favored by the United States naval enthusiasts. The Japanese abandoned their project when the State Department indicated its disapproval. But Senator Lodge chose the occasion to enlarge on the Monroe Doctrine by introducing a resolution in the Senate which declared that the United States did not favor the transfer of strategic points in the Americas to non-American private companies which could be acting as agents for a foreign nation. The resolution passed the Senate 51 to 4 on August 2, 1912. This Lodge corollary to the doctrine extended its application to Oriental countries and also to business concerns. The State Department has utilized the corollary several times since 1912 to forestall Americans from disposing of holdings in Mexico to Japanese. To this degree, therefore, Lodge's corollary is recognized as part of the expanded Monroe Doctrine. But the major troubles with Mexico stemmed from the Mexican revolution which began in 1910. In May 1911 Francisco Madero succeeded in forcing Diaz into exile. The Taft administration placed an embargo on shipment of war materiel to |