Morse very ably brought out this morning that this alliance business is a two-way street and while we have much to gain from our allies, I still cannot help but believe that our allies have much to gain from

us.

So, I am not willing to assume that they would voluntarily desert us. It is possible, I suppose, in the fortunes of war if the world should become involved in a war that part of some of the countries might be overrun and certain areas that we are counting on as bases would not be available to us.

I would like to ask your military judgment on this matter. In the event that we should lose some of our bases in various areas of the world, would we be then foreclosed from strikes upon the Soviet Union if it were the aggressor or would we, with naval aviation, with the larger carriers that we have available to us, having the capabilities of handling various weapons, be foreclosed from making strikes upon certain of their vital areas or do you believe that we would still have access, at least to some punishment of the Soviet Union or any other aggressor?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, of course, the situation that you depict is one which could be interpreted differently in different areas. There are many different explanations.

I believe that because of the diversification of our base program and the availability of floating bases, that even though we would feel the loss of any particular base complex, that there are enough others so that we would not be foreclosed in carrying on the war.

Senator KNOWLAND. If I might interrupt you just at that pointyou would not consider, as a military man, that it would be sound strategically to have all our eggs in one basket if we can avoid it? Admiral SHERMAN. No, indeed, for many reasons. Because, being realistic, I think we have to face the fact that while all of our allies might be steadfastly with us, when we get into trouble some of them may move more slowly. That is the history of such matters.

I am greatly encouraged at the way our allies have behaved, particularly the small ones. Greece and Turkey in proportion to their manpower have done a great deal, after having, in the case of Greece, a conflict in which they received a good deal of internal damage. And there are numerous indications that our program of solidifying the western world is making headway. The elections in Italy the other day are a sample of the improvement that is going on.

PROGRESS OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Senator KNOWLAND. In his testimony before the committee on May 28, on page 3630—I am frank to say I was a little shocked at General Vandenberg's testimony to the following effect:

But the fact is that the United States is operating a shoestring Air Force in view of its global responsibilities.

I would like to ask if my interpretation of your testimony this morning, that you do not believe that we are presently operating a shoestring Navy, is correct.

Admiral SHERMAN. We are definitely not, sir.

Senator KNOWLAND. Do I understand your testimony correctly, that while, of course, there is always either a desirability or a necessity

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for some increases, that in the event we should be forced into a war against our will, that the United States Navy is prepared to carry out its mission at the present time?

Admiral SHERMAN. I believe that we are as well prepared as is reasonably consistent with where we were a year and a half ago. The force levels to which we are building up now in the Army, Navy, and the Air Force were agreed upon prior to the beginning of fighting in Korea. We have made rapid headway in reaching them.

The Army has reached its level first. We are coming along a little more slowly for administrative reasons. Then, of course, the Air Force has the most difficult problem of all of us because of their problems of aircraft production and new facilities and things of that sort, which are reflected in the Naval Establishment only in the case of naval aviation.

I think our interim levels are sound, and it may well be that after they are reached the world situation will call for additional increases; perhaps not.

Fortunately, that is not a decision we have to make today. We may have to make it within 6 months, but as of today, our rate of expansion is about as rapid as we can advantageously handle; a little bit later, we will come to a period where we do have more of a range for decision.

Senator KNOWLAND. I would just like to ask one final questionChairman RUSSELL. Senator, I am afraid, through inadvertence, I have let you run over your time.

Senator KNOWLAND. All right, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Hickenlooper.

NAVAL STRENGTH NEEDED FOR NOW AND NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many ships, squadrons or fleets, do we have in Asia right now, in the vicinity of Korea, Japan, and Formosa, Admiral?

The Seventh Fleet is there, isn't it?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. That is the only numbered fleet that we have out there.

[Deleted.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have a force in being out there; is our naval force in being out there at the present time comparable to the strength which will be necessary for such a blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, the force that we have out there

now

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What I am trying to get at is-Could the force we have out there now handle the blockade?

Admiral SHERMAN. Not without detriment to what it is doing. It would be much better to send out additional ships from the United States, even though that got us involved in more call-up of reserves, slower rotation, and that sort of thing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No question but what we have ample ships in reserve, is there?

Admiral SHERMAN. We have ample ships in reserve, and activating that many would give us administrative trouble; but that could be solved.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They come under the heading of "routine troubles"?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, sir.

They may be big troubles, but still they are troubles you have to face in any kind of an operation of that sort.

REASONS FOR CONCURRING IN DISMISSAL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am interested in this matter of the relief of General MacArthur and the incidents occurring around the 5th of April. I do not know whether you answered the question or whether it was asked you-I do not recall-as to whether or not prior to the 5th of April you had ever recommended that General MacArthur be relieved, that is from your position as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir; I had never made any such recommendation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will ask you this question which I asked General Bradley. Including the 5th of April thereafter until the relief of General MacArthur did he commit or do any acts which in your judgment warranted his relief?

In other words, from the time of the 5th of April on until he was relieved, was he guilty of any actions or activities which you believe warranted his relief?

Admiral SHERMAN. No, sir. My opinions were based not on any particular act, but more on a situation which was the accumulation of a number of things over a period of time.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The point I am making or attempting to make or find out about, Admiral, is that whatever reasons which led to your conclusions or concurrence in relief, whatever the reasons, they already existed at the time you made your conclusions prior to April 5. Admiral SHERMAN. As I recall it, sir, there is only one minor incident that occurred subsequent to the 5th, and that was relatively minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, what was that, Admiral?

Admiral SHERMAN. As I remember it after the 5th there was the incident of his statement concerning arming the South Koreans, vis-àvis arming the Japanese police force.

As I say that was only minor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that in the report here, so we can get the date?

Chairman RUSSELL. It is in the compilation.

Admiral SHERMAN. It came to my attention actually after the meeting on the 5th.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that page 186, message from General MacArthur to Henry Hazlitt of the Freeman magazine?

Admiral SHERMAN. Yes, sir. But I say that is relatively minor. Senator HICKENLOOPER. The thought I have in mind is this, and I have asked other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It seems clear from their statements here that their conclusions and their concurrence with the idea of the relief of General MacArthur existed on what they say were cumulative reasons prior to April 5. Yet when those reasons existed, insofar as I know, no member of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested his recall. Yet the reasons upon which their later concurrence was based all existed prior to the 5th of April.

Now I am wondering whether this entered into your thinking as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and your concurrence: That it was entirely within the province of the President as Commander in Chief to recall, replace or reassign the officers in the whole military establishment if he wanted to, and that from a military standpoint that was perfectly all right.

You could raise no particular objection from a military standpoint to his exercising his constitutional rights, could you?

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, to use a hypothetical case to illustrate a point, if it had been-if the case had come up where a commander in chief who was a naval officer was being relieved, and I felt that he should not be relieved, I recognize the right of the President to do it, but I would certainly feel that it was my duty as his statutory naval adviser on the conduct of war to give him my recommendation, whether I agreed with him or not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes; but wouldn't you feel it also your duty as Chief of Naval Operations, to affirmatively recommend-or take steps to relieve that commander or do whatever you should when the conditions upon which that relief should be based became in being? I hope I am making clear what I am getting at. The reasons upon which these so-called concurrences were based all existed prior to the 5th of April, and yet no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were designated as the agency that dealt with the general, no member individually, nor the Joint Chiefs collectively, ever formally recommended his recall prior to the time that it was indicated that the President was thinking about that. It runs in my thinking that probably it is an obligation of the responsible senior officer, if conditions exist warranting the recall or reassignment or some disposition of an officer, to go forward with the recommendation if he believes that it has come to the point, and recommend that some action be taken, instead of coming in afterward and concurring.

I am just a little mystified as to why the Joint Chiefs now all join and did join on the 7th or 8th of April in the concurrence. I am wondering why they did not go forward in March before that and say, "Here, let us say, in effect, that this commander is not doing things we think he should do, and we think he ought to be reassigned, recalled, or something done with him."

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, I see your point, sir. To my mind, the situation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their commander in chief in the Far East, particularly the great many exchanges of messages, great many public statements-the whole general atmosphere was not the ideal one as between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the officers who exercises unified command under them.

At no time had that situation gotten so acute that I, as Chief of Naval Operations, would have felt any responsibility to initiate anything of that sort.

However, I was increasingly aware of the magnitude of the problem, and when I was asked for my opinion, as I said this morning, with considerable reluctance and regret, I had to give my military opinion when it was asked for.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN KOREA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Admiral, isn't it a normal objective of military action to terminate it as quickly as reasonably possible under all the circumstances and save loss and destruction of life and property?

Isn't that the normal objective and program?

Admiral SHERMAN. Normally that is advisable.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And aren't the Joint Chiefs of Staff now requesting a study and guidance on what our policy is in Korea? Hasn't that request been put through by the Joint Chiefs of Staff? process now?

Isn't that in the

I say that because I believe General Bradley testified that he had, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested a study to outline and determine our policy and objectives in Korea.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, those studies have been going on continuously and there is in process now a redraft, a summarization of all existing directives to General Ridgway in his capacity as commander in chief for the United Nations in Korea and also his normal United States capacity as commander in chief, Far East Command.

In connection with that we, of course, are continuing to work with and consult with the State Department in connection with the matter of the political objectives, which always control military action; but I feel that we have been, as far as I know, as continuously informed of the political objectives as was feasible in the circumstances.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you consider that we are operating today in Korea under clear-cut, understandable, delineated objectives for this situation, or are we acting in a sort of partial vacuum?

I have asked questions of all these people about what do we consider the termination of this. What is our goal outside of broadest generalities? We all want peace. There is no question about that, and we all advocate peace. We all want victory and we all advocate victory. But what are the details that will come when we can put them down one by one and say, "These have been accomplished. This is the victory that we want"?

Do we have such a clear-cut policy? I have been unable to get such a policy from anyone, at least to my own understanding.

Admiral SHERMAN. Well, sir, I can only recount to you the objectives and the policies as I understand them.

As I see it, it is our objective, as I said this morning, to defeat the Chinese Communists in Korea, as we have previously defeated the North Korean Army; having done that, then to achieve a settlement which will leave Korea as a political entity, in which certainly the South Koreans and as much of North Korea as possible have a chance to work out their salvation themselves with such assistance as they can get.

In other words, I go back in my thinking to the operation in Greece, with which I was quite familiar.

There we had an invasion, more or less covertly, but often physically quite openly, across the border. Eventually the invaders were destroyed and driven out and the country is now improving its position rapidly.

In Korea the situation is much worse but to me the principle is the

same.