It is my sincere hope that these hearings will encourage us as a Nation to follow a steadfast and determined course of action in this world, which would deny any free nation to Soviet imperialism, and at the same time preserve the peace for which so many men died in World War I, World War II, and in Greece, Indochina, Malaya, and Korea.

BRADLEY'S MILITARY CAREER

Chairman RUSSELL. General Bradley, just by way of background would you make a brief statement for the record of your long and distinguished military career?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I entered West Point from Missouri in August, August 1, 1911, graduated 1915, commissioned second lieutenant of Infantry and joined the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment. I served with that regiment for about 4 years at various stations in the West and Southwest and left the regiment in 1919 to serve as professor of military science and tactics at South Dakota State College for 1 year, at which time I was ordered to West Point in 1920, where I served as instructor in mathematics until 1924.

I went to the advanced course in the Infantry School in 1924 and 1925, at which time I was ordered on foreign service in Hawaii.

I served with the Twenty-seventh Regiment of Infantry, then known as Wolfhounds, and still called Wolfhounds in Korea, commanded by Colonel Michaelis recently.

Then I served with the National Guard and Reserve in downtown Honolulu in 1927 and 1928.

I then went to the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, where I stayed for a while, and then went from there to the Infantry School, 1929 to 1933.

I came to Washington to attend the Army War College in 1933 and 1934, after which I again went to West Point as an instructor in military science and tactics from 1934 to 1938.

I then served on the General Staff here in Washington from the 1st of June 1938 until the end of February 1941, at which time I was sent to Fort Benning, Ga., as commandant of the Infantry School.

After being there about a year, I was given command of the Eightysecond Division, which was being reactivated at Camp Claiborne, La. After being with it 3 or 4 months, I was transferred to the Twentyeighth Division, also at Alexandria, Camp Livingston. I took it to amphibious training in Florida during the winter, and in February 1943 I received orders to go overseas to join General Eisenhower.

I served as his personal representative and as deputy corps commander of General Patton's Second Corps until about April 15, in other words, about a month and a half, at which time I took command of the Second Corps in north Africa; and after the northern Tunisian campaign was finished on about May 12, 1943, I went back and planned for the Sicilian invasion, headed the Second Corps into Sicily, and was there until September 8, 1943, when I left Sicily to go to Englind to form a staff of the First United States Army and the First United States Army Group, and plan the invasion of France.

I commanded the First Army then, on invasion, and was with it until the 1st of August, in other words, about 2 months after D-day,

at which time we broke up the divisions then in France into two American armies, and I then became the Army group commander, Army group headquarters becoming operative, and commanded the Army group which had been changed to Twelfth Army Group in designation, until the end of the war.

I then came home, and as the chairman said, I was in the Veterans' Administration from August 1 until November-August 1, 1945, until November 30, 1947, a little over 2 years.

I then returned to the Department of the Army and became Chief of Staff of the Army on February 8, 1948, which position I held until I was made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15, 1949, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. The statement has been made here that you commanded the largest body of American troops that had ever been in action against any enemies.

Do you care to comment on that?

General BRADLEY. Of course, they referred to combat troops. I think at one time there were 45 divisions in my Army group, the total of the men assigned to the Army was about 1,200,000.

and

DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 12, STUDY OF JANUARY 12, AND PRESIDENT'8 LETTER OF JANUARY 13, 1951

Chairman RUSSELL. The memorandum of January 12 has played quite a large part in these hearings, General Bradley.

I wish you would outline for the committee your understanding of the four items in the January 12 memorandum to which General MacArthur referred, with special reference to whether that was a directive or whether there were any contingencies involved in the four items to which he referred.

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would like to go back a little on that, because I think there has been some confusion on this memorandum, because there are really three things that took place about that time.

There was a directive, dated January 12. There was a study which you speak of, dated January 12, and there was a letter from the President to General MacArthur, dated January 13. In other words, there are three things in this period. I will confine my remarks now to the study which you speak about.

Chairman RUSSELL. No; I want you to clear up the confusion. You have named those three documents. I want you to start with January 11.

General BRADLEY. Well, I will have to go back a little further than that on the study, sir. I just want to bring out to start with that there are three things involved and I think there has been some confusion here because there was a directive dated the 12th which I don't think has been discussed much here, there was a study dated the 12th which has been discussed a great deal, and then there was the President's letter to General MacArthur on policy dated the 13th. Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I have had some of the confusion and that is the reason I have asked you to clarify them.

General BRADLEY. May I take them up one at a time, sir?
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

DEVELOPMENT OF JCS JANUARY 12 STUDY

General BRADLEY. In late November, in fact November 28, when things were looking pretty bad in Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed one of their Joint Staff committees to make a study of possible lines of action which might be taken if the war in Korea developed into an all-out war against China, either declared or undeclared.

Now that was a directive which finally ended up with the January 12 study. They came up first with a study which was not agreed upon. There were split views in it between the services.

Then they reworked that paper and came up with another one, another version of it, dated January 3, which was also not acceptable, and that one was reworked and we finally got down to a paper on which the Chiefs agreed, dated January 12.

Now, when we consider one of these studies which are primarily for our own use, we consider a whole series, so to us we were thinking of this in terms of the conditions under which we started the study.

However, as we went forward in writing these different studies, the preamble or the reason for the study dropped out of it, so when we got up to the January 12 study, taken by itself it does not have the conditions under which we started the study, and at that time it was boiled down to merely the statement that it is tentatively agreed, was the term used, on the following objectives and possible lines of action.

I want to emphasize again that it was not a directive. It was a study, and I would like to explain right there that when we send a directive to the Commander in Chief, Far East, we draw up a draft of the study, a draft of the directive, take it to the Secretary of Defense, who approves it or disapproves it, and if he approves it, if it has political implications we then discuss it with the Secretary of State or Department of State and then it is taken to the President who O.K.'s it or passes judgment on it.

It is then sent out as a directive. This particular study never went through that routine. In other words, it was never intended as a prospective directive to be handled in that way. It was a study for consideration along with other things that were going on at that time in trying to determine the policy, future policy toward Korea, and it was used for that purpose.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, what was the directive now as contrasted with this study or memorandum?

GENESIS OF JANUARY 12 DIRECTIVE

General BRADLEY. On January the 10th General MacArthur came in with a message pointing out that under the present conditions he thought we were going to have diffculty in staying in Korea. He pointed out that the morale of the troops was not too good after a long fight and some of the remarks that had been made about them at various places in the world, and it was rather a gloomy message.

The Chiefs proposed an answer to that, and it was discussed with the Department of State and they wanted to put certain political reasons also in this directive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to that. It ended up in a discussion at the White House with the President,

and the decision was made that the military part of this discussion would be pulled out and sent as a directive to General MacArthur, and then the State Department would prepare with the President a letter on political policy which he would send separately. So, the military part of that was pulled out and sent in the directive of January the 12th.

The political part of it was pulled out and fixed up with the President, and he sent it under his signature on the 13th.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now the January 12th directive was then in response to this communication from General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. It was in response to his communication 2 days before; yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you give us the broad outlines of that directive?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. It directed him to defend in successive positions if necessary, and always with the understanding that the security of his troops was paramount.

That is in brief form what it was. It told him, as I say, to defend in successive positions; in other words, to stay in Korea. In addition to that, we were so concerned with the situation as painted in General MacArthur's wire of January 10 that two of the Chiefs, General Collins and General Vandenberg, left on the evening of the 12th_right after we had cleared the directive and went to Japan and on into Korea to see for themselves just what the situation was. Fortunately, about that time the situation began to improve, and from then on the position was stabilized and we even started to come back.

Chairman RUSSELL. The January 12th directive then was to the effect that he should stay in Korea if that could be done without endangering the security of his forces?

General BRADLEY. I can give you a paraphrase of that message if you desire, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, that will be all right, give a paraphrase. I have been somewhat uncertain as to the sequence, the reason for these three papers since these hearings opened, and I want them clarified. General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I would like to emphasize again that the one that was started back in November ended up as a study. This one was a directive which took the formulation of it took-place over 2 days, and the political one really over 3 days.

Senator MORSE. Do you have the page from which the general is reading, Mr. Chairman?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I' have a paraphrase of a message I will give you, sir, if I may.

Senator MORSE. I thought you were reading from an exhibit.

PARAPHRASE OF JANUARY 12 DIRECTIVE

General BRADLEY. I am reading from a note I have in my book, sir.

We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented in your recent message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.

It would be to our national interests, however, and also to the interests of the UN, before you issue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from

83797-51-pt. 2——2

Korea to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort.

It is important also to the future of UN and NATO organizations, to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia, that maximum practical punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations. In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.

[Deleted.]

In your messages of 30 December 1950 and 4 January 1951, you had indicated it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.

Including consideration of the factors outlined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.

Directive contained in paragraph (c) of our message of 9 January meanwhile remains in effect.

That was, as I said, to fight in successive positions.

NATURE OF JANUARY 12, 1951, STUDY BY JCS

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, did you construe the four paragraphs which were outlined by General MacArthur in his address, I believe, the bombing of the bases, or air reconnaissance, and the use of Chinese troops, blockade of the coast of China-I believe that is the gist of it-did you construe that as having been contained in any order that was issued to General MacArthur or any instructions of approval of any policy he had promulgated, or was it perfectly clear that that was a matter that was still under study, in your opinion?

General BRADLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, to us it was clear that it was a study. Maybe it wasn't, and apparently it was not, to General MacArthur; but to us it was perfectly apparent that it was a study and was never handled as a proposed directive. It was a study which we used in the National Security Council in considering future actions if this thing developed into war against China.

Chairman RUSSELL. How was that forwarded to General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. It was forwarded in two ways. General Collins carried it to him, and discussed it with him when he arrived there on January 14. It was also sent to him later by the Army for information several days later; in fact, in a rather short form by message, by radio. So, it was actually sent to him in two ways, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Of course, General Collins would be the proper person to inquire of as to the nature of the conversations he had with General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I do not know the nature, the full nature, of those discussions.

REASONS FOR JANUARY 13 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

Chairman RUSSELL. Did I understand you to say now that the Joint Chiefs objected at a conference that was held at the White House to include the political considerations in the directive of January 12?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We thought that the military part and the political part should be sent separately.