Chairman RUSSELL. And that accounts for the fact that the President's letter, I believe you said, followed this directive, and these instructions, this study?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; and the one that was sent on the 12th was a military directive. The one that was sent on the 13th, outlining certain political reasons, specifically said: "This is not a directive."

BRADLEY'S FIRST AWARENESS OF MOVE TO RELIEVE MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. When did you first learn or when were you first consulted with respect to the advisability of relieving General MacArthur of his several commands? When did you first learn that that was under discussion? When was your opinion first asked?

General BRADLEY. If you don't mind, I will refer to notes, because when you start referring to back dates, unless you refer to notes, you are apt to get confused.

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir.

General BRADLEY. My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April. When I received the information—I don't remember where from, but I think I received it from a telephone from someone I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur, and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you next approached with respect to this?

General BRADLEY. On Friday, the 6th of April, there was a meeting in the President's office, right after a Cabinet meeting, at which they asked me to join certain others, including Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman; and we were with the President, I would say, from around 11:30 to 12:30, and that is the first time I had heard first-hand the concern of the President in the matter.

DISCUSSIONS OF JCS ON MAC ARTHUR REMOVAL

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you subsequently call another conference of the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. There were subsequent meetings with the same four people I believe General Marshall has explained that to you and then on Saturday we were told that the President would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman RUSSELL. What day of the month would that be?

General BRADLEY. That was Saturday, April 7. We were told they would like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we should give them to General Marshall at 4 o'clock Sunday afternoon. That would have been Sunday, the 8th of April.

So, I called the Chiefs together at 2 p. m. Sunday, the 8th of April, in my office, at which time I presented to them the concern of the President and what he had in mind, and two or three other subjects

were discussed between the time we met at 2 o'clock and 4 o'clock, when we went up to join General Marshall, and at 4 o'clock we went up to join him in a further conference, which lasted for about an hour, I guess.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were all of the Joint Chiefs present?

General BRADLEY. All the Chiefs were present.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were their opinions asked individually as to the wisdom of the course that was under consideration?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. After we discussed it and went up to General Marshall's office, he asked each of the three Chiefs their individual views, and there was some discussion in which they were all in agreement on the reasons that they advanced why they thought, from a military point of view, alone, he should be relieved.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were the Joint Chiefs unanimous in their opinion that, from the military standpoint, General MacArthur should be relieved?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you present when the final decision was taken to relieve General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. Yes. The final decision was made on Monday, the 9th of April, at the White House; and I was present when that decision was made.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the recommendations of the Joint Chiefsdid they approve of the immediate relief of General MacArthur? Was there any discussion as to delay in time, or did any of them express any objection to the immediate relief of General MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. I don't remember that the exact time of the relief was discussed. Maybe some of the Chiefs will remember. I didn't include it in my notes I made immediately afterward, as to the timing of it.

The question of whether or not he could be left in part of his position and relieved of the command in Korea was discussed and from a military point of view, the Chiefs thought that was not feasible. Chairman RUSSELL. They were unanimous in that opinion? General BRADLEY. Yes.

STATE DEPARTMENT INFLUENCE ON DIRECTIVES TO MAC ARTHUR

Chairman RUSSELL. You made some reference there in the opening part of your statement-I can't quote it verbatim-as to the part that political considerations play in military policy.

Have the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs as to our military policy in Korea been influenced by political decisions that have been made in the Department of State?

General BRADLEY. We have not had any proposed directive disapproved because of State action, as far as Korea is concerned. I think it is known that the military did recommend different action. with reference to Formosa about a year and a half ago, which was not taken because of certain political considerations, but I don't know of anything in Korea where a proposed military directive has been disapproved because of State Department objection.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were there any disagreements or misunderstandings between the Joints Chiefs or the Defense Establishment with

General MacArthur prior to the outbreak in Korea that you have any knowledge of?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't recall any.

DANGER OF RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IF WAR EXTENDED

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, in your opening statement, General, you referred to the fact that the Chiefs were in agreement as to the danger of Russian intervention if the war in Asia were extended as recommended by General MacArthur.

Was that finding as to the danger of Russian intervention a unanimous decision on the part of the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; they all feel that way.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Will you repeat that question, please, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. I asked him if the decision of the Joint Chiefs as to the danger of Russian intervention in the event of the adoption of the MacArthur program was unanimous.

Is that danger regarded as being remote or very real by the Joint Chiefs?

General BRADLEY. Well, we think there is a real danger. Now the degree of that is anybody's opinion, Mr. Chairman. In our case we believe it is a risk which we should not take at this time.

Chairman RUSSELL. What do you base your opinion on?

General BRADLEY. Well, the strength that they have in the Far East-I mean that the Russians have in the Far East; the fact that they have been supporting China in its operation; they were supporting North Korea previously; the question of whether or not they can afford to lose in Korea; and the fact that they have an arrangement with China whereby if China is attacked under certain conditions Russia will come to her assistance.

DATES MAC ARTHUR FIRST RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL ACTION

Chairman RUSSELL. When did General MacArthur first recommend to the Joint Chiefs approval of his policies for extending the war into Manchuria by air bombardment and by a blockade of the China coast?

General BRADLEY. Well, about as soon as the Chinese began coming in. His first message on the subject was about November 6, in which he wanted to attack the bridges across the Yalu, and this was the first intimation that we had that they were coming across in great force. And we held him up on that bombing until we could check on it, and then gave him permission to go ahead and bomb the Korean end of the bridges. And then from then on there were intimations that he would like to go right on into Manchuria and bomb the bases across the Yalu, beginning, oh, around November 6 or 8, from then on. Chairman RUSSELL. Did he bring in his views on the desirability of employing the Chinese Nationalist troops at the same time, or was that a later recommendation?

General BRADLEY. Well, he had discussed it before that. In other words, back in August the question had first come up. At that time he did not recommend the employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Then when the attack came on in such strength and around the end of November, then he made a recommendation that the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa be used in Korea.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REACTION TO MAC ARTHUR RECOMMENDATIONS

Chairman RUSSELL. Will you state briefly the reasons why the Joint Chiefs did not approve of that recommendation?

General BRADLEY. In our opinion the Nationalist troops on Formosa had very limited capabilities, particularly for offensive action. As General MacArthur himself had pointed out, they would have to have almost complete logistical support from ourselves, transportation furnished. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their leadership, equipment, and training were all of such a state that they would be of limited use in offensive operations.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you favor the imposition of an economic blockade on China?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. Economic sanctions is what I think you mean.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, economic blockade; that means sanctions. Do you favor a naval blockade against China under the existing circumstances?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I believe that was one of the points that General MacArthur made-that he favored a blockade. It must be realized that a naval blockade is actually and can be taken certainly as an act of war; and in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs, the naval blockade would not be effective unless it was a United Nations blockade and not just a United States blockade.

EFFECT ON ALLIES OF EXTENSION OF WAR

Chairman RUSSELL. You stated something in your opening statement about the loss of our allies in Europe. What effect do you think it would have on our allies if the war were extended in Manchuria or into China?

General BRADI EY. Well, if it were extended by United States action alone, I think we might stand the chance of losing some of our allies, because they are under the gun more or less in Europe and they are very reluctant to see anything done which might bring on a world war III at this time, so consequently it is our opinion that they would be very reluctant to join in extension of the war beyond Korea, and therefore that is why I say that we stand the chance, if we take that action ourselves, of having them drop out on us and discontinue their support.

IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE TO UNITED STATES

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you wish to elaborate on your statement as to the importance you attach to maintaining a free Western Europe? I believe you mentioned it in your statement. How is it important militarily to the United States?

General BRADLEY. Well, that is where we have a lot of our trade. Furthermore, getting back specifically to my statement, Western Europe contains the manpower, the resources, the know-how, and industrial capacity which if added to what Russia already has would make her a very formidable opponent.

Right now we have a great advantage on Russia in production of steel and other industrial products. If she should overrun Europe and take on the additional manpower and industrial capacity there

and add it to her own, it would be about equal to our own, I would guess.

RUSSIAN CAPACITY FOR WAR IN FAR EAST

Chairman RUSSELL. What is your professional military opinion as to the potential for waging war of the Russian forces that are now stationed in Asia?

General BRADLEY. Well, in my opinion they have the capability of causing us a great deal of difficulty to say the least.

[Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. How about the difficulty in supplying those forces, would they be effective in any military action extended over any period of time?

General BRADLEY. That has always been one of Russia's weaknesses in the Far East, the fact that she has only one railroad line. It is true, it has been double-tracked, so that they have increased its capacity. However, for the last several years, they have attempted to increase the war production in the Far East so as to make it less dependent upon the industries of Urals, and of western Russia.

Undoubtedly she has enough supplies there, already in her supply dumps, to supply for a considerable length of time, the divisions she has in that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. General, one thing hasn't been brought into this discussion.

PREWAR RUSSO-JAPANESE ENGAGEMENTS IN MANCHURIA

I recall that before World War II there were constant reports of large engagements between Russian and Japanese troops along the Manchurian border, or somewhere in that area.

It was referred to as an undeclared war in some newspaper articles I saw.

Do you know anything about those?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. That went on for several years, and the engagements involved units up to the size of a corps, on each side. Chairman RUSSELL. An army corps?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not Russia experienced any difficulties in supplying those troops during those engagements? General BRADLEY. I know nothing about the supply problem at that time, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe my time is about out, but I have one more question I want to ask you, General.

BEST POLICY IN KOREA

Is it your professional military opinion, concurred in by all of the Joint Chiefs, that the present policy in Korea is the best policy for this country to pursue?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. We think that we should try this policy, and hope that we can get decisive results without extending the war outside of Korea.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, do you think that the adoption of the MacArthur policies would hasten an end to the struggle in Korea?