General BRADLEY. There is no assurance that it would.

In other words, we do not believe the extension of it by extension of bombing would get decisive results. We have about 200 miles of enemy supply lines to work on now, and you would only extend that length back into Manchuria, and we do not think that it would be decisive.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, my time has expired.

Senator Connally?

Chairman CONNALLY. Suppose we don't use all of our half-hour? Chairman RUSSELL. Then, you have another round of questions later on.

Chairman CONNALLY. General Bradley, I want to say that I have a very high regard for your military abilities, your general abilities, and am very glad to have you here as a witness today.

I don't want to be repetitious, but it is somewhat difficult to avoid it. As I understand it, you have testified that all of he Chiefs of Staff agreed to the action taken with reference to the MacArthur matter? General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NAVAL POWER IN KOREA

Chairman CONNALLY. I want to ask you if you believe, or are of the opinion that air and sea, alone, without ground troops, could stop the Chinese hordes from coming over on us in Korea?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I do not.

Normally, you think of strategic bombing as going after the sources of production. The sources of production in this case are very largely out of reach of any strategic bombing because they are not even in China.

We think that such action could not be decisive, by itself.

That has been proven many times, that air, by itself, is not decisive; and General Vandenberg will tell you that in just as positive terms as I am telling you, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, as a matter of fact, in Korea, when these different waves of the enemy have poured in, the air power has not been sufficient to stop them, has it?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; because they move at night, they move across country, and while the Air Force has kept a lot of the bridges knocked out, both railroad and road bridges, it has been unable to stop the advance of the Chinese, both as to manpower and supplies.

It certainly has hampered, and without this air power, we would have been in a very bad way many times, but even though it has had tremendous effect on it, it cannot, in itself, stop it.

Chairman CONNALLY. And of course the sea power can't do anything in Korea?

General BRADLEY. The naval blockade of Korea, we think, has rather effectively stopped the import of supplies by water, so that it has been effective to that extent, causing the supplies to have to come by railroad and road.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, they would have to come in over the north part of Korea, from Manchuria, or from Red Russia?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

IMPORTANCE OF OUR ALLIES

Chairman CONNALLY. A good deal has been said about our allies. How important are our allies, looking at the global picture—how important are our allies to our own operations?

General BRADLEY. Well, I believe most everyone considers them very important. I think that was verified by the Congress when they approved the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to which we belong, along with 11 other nations.

Chairman CONNALLY. The reason I asked you that is, How could we "go it alone," on two fronts, one in Asia and one in Europe?

General BRADLEY. Well, it would be pretty tough, sir; because the more assistance you have, both militarily and industrially, the better off you are in combating communism, or in fighting a war.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, isn't it also of an advantage, a great advantage, psychologically, to have these allies, and have the world know that they are our allies?

General BRADLEY. Very much so, and if we should ever lose them completely, and be confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have an entirely different situation and different standards of living than we have at the present time.

ACTION AGAINST CHINA MAINLAND WITHOUT USING GROUND TROOPS

Chairman CONNALLY. Now, it has been suggested here that no American ground soldiers should set foot on Chinese territory, with which I agree. I don't want to see any American troops go into China. But if we have an all-out war, and the war should expand to include China, would it not almost inevitably follow that at some time in the future development of that, we would have to put ground troops on Chinese soil?

General BRADLEY. To get decisive results, in my opinion you would. Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I am asking about.

General BRADLEY. In other words, if you go to an all-out war with China, I think you would have to do something like the Japanese did. Go in and try to get a decision. I do not believe you could get any decision by naval and air action alone.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, naval and air action as against China without ground troops would mean just sort of a holding proposition, would it not?

General BRADLEY. Well, I think it would be a rather long-drawn-out affair in which you would try to knock out their centers of communication and knock out as much of their industry as possible, possibly try to limit them on supplies and food without taking any positive action inside China itself.

Chairman CONNALLY. Well, I just do not want to have an American Army bogging down in China. Ground troops in China I feel would bog down in that tremendous area under all the difficulties which are presented to us.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time. Chairman RUSSELL, Senator Bridges.

BRADLEY'S FIRST INDICATION OF MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. General, you were developing the sequence of the recall of General MacArthur. You said the first you knew about it was

on April 5 when you got a telephone call. Who made the telephone call to you?

General BRADLEY. I don't recall, Senator.

Senator BRIDGES. Did it come from the White House or the Secretary of State?

General BRADLEY. I don't know, sir, where it came from. It may have been from the White House, it may have been from the Secretary of Defense's office. I don't know, sir.

I just got a warning that this thing was coming up because the President was concerned about it, and I frankly do not remember where it came from, and I am not too sure it came by telephone. My memory is that I got a call from someone.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, that is important to know who originated the idea. It was not you that originated the idea of firing MacArthur then?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. It was not the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. But you did get it you think by telephone. It might have come from the White House or it might have come from the Secretary of State or from the Secretary of Defense?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I don't remember where it came from. I just got word that the President was concerned about it and I warned the Chiefs that they had better start thinking about it because they might be asked their opinions.

Senator BRIDGES. But you will admit that is a pretty important point which you can't remember, General?

General BRADLEY. Well, it might be important only to prove that the Chiefs didn't start it, but other than that I don't know where it came from or just what bearing it has.

WHEN FINAL DECISION WAS MADE

Senator BRIDGES. Well, now at the April 9 conference at the White House when the final decision was made, who was there?

General BRADLEY. At the time the decision was made?

Senator BRIDGES. Yes; April 9.

General BRADLEY. Secretary Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and myself met with the President.

Senator BRIDGES. There the final decision was made. And was it at that time the decision which General Marshall testified to to have Secretary Pace notify General MacArthur was made?

General BRADLEY. I can't remember whether it came up at that time or whether it came up the next day when we presented to the President certain ideas and drafts of messages for his consideration which would carry into execution his decision made the day before. I don't remember whether we had any of those discussions on the 9th or whether or not they were all on the 10th.

POSSIBLE LEAK ON MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator BRIDGES. And General Marshall testified that the reason the Pace notification method was not carried out was a leak. Do you know where the leak came from?

General BRADLEY. I am not too sure it was a leak. Of course General Marshall is entitled to his own opinion. I am not too sure there was a leak on the matter.

Senator BRIDGES. Do you mean then it was deliberately given out? General BRADLEY. No, sir. I am not sure that General MacArthur knew that this was coming. There had been so much in the papers a few days while this discussion was going on, you can't hide the fact that certain people go to the White House, there had been so much in the papers about the discussion and speculation as to whether or not the President was going to relieve him, that I think everyone was jumping at conclusions, and I in my own mind have not said that there was a leak. It just may have been that people were jumping to conclusions as to what might happen.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, then you disagree with Secretary Marshall on that?

General BRADLEY. I don't disagree. I don't admit to myself that there was such a thing as a leak. I am not sure there was.

Senator BRIDGES. How did certain foreign countries get the information in advance about MacArthur's recall?

General BRADLEY. I don't know; I didn't know they did.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, for instance, certainly Madam Pandit, the Ambassadress from India, announced in the papers that she knew it between 11:30 and 12, and that was sometime in advance of when the formal announcement was made publicly, in which you courteously attempted to reach members of this committee and tell them.

Now it is quite important here whether there was a leak, whether it was deliberately given out, and who informed foreign countries, which I think is a very bad thing, before officials of the United States Government know.

General BRADLEY. I wouldn't know because I didn't even know until this time that they had known in advance.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, that appeared in the papers.

Now did the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever take a formal vote to recall MacArthur?

ACTION OF JCS ON REQUEST FOR MILITARY OPINION

General BRADLEY. They unanimously agreed, that from a purely military point of view they thought he should be relieved, and they gave those reasons to General Marshall, and I repeated them to the President.

Senator BRIDGES. But they did not take a formal vote?

General BRADLEY. We never take a formal vote of holding up hands or anything like that. We have a discussion, and if there is any disagreement it comes out. In this case all three of them stated their reasons why they thought from a purely military point of view he should be relieved.

Senator BRIDGES. Well, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if they did not take a vote, did they request the ouster of General MacArthur? General BRADLEY. No, sir. They were asked for their opinion, and they expressed it; and it was asked from a military point of view, and they expressed it from a military point of view.

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, the origin of the firing of MacArthur occurred first on a political level. You do not know where

at the White House, Secretary of State, or just where it came from. And the only action the Joint Chiefs of Staff took was in response to that, where they agreed to the recall?

General BRADLEY. I think it is not quite a question of agreed. They were asked their opinion from a military point of view, whether or not he should be relieved, and they said "Yes".

Senator BRIDGES. In other words, they did not initiate the request? General BRADLEY. They did not.

Senator BRIDGES. They made no request?

General BRADLEY. They did not.

Senator BRIDGES. They took no formal vote?

General BRADLEY. Well, they never take a formal vote that you are talking about. We get around a table and express our opinions, and if they all give reasons why they think this thing ought to be done, that is a vote in itself. There is no such thing as a secret ballot or holding up of hands.

Senator BRIDGES. But they did finally concur.

FIRST LOYALTY TO COUNTRY

Now, General Bradley, what do you consider your first loyalty?
General BRADLEY. To my country.

Senator BRIDGES. To your country. When you took your oath of office, you took it to uphold the Constitution of the United States? General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator BRIDGES. And you believe that General MacArthur took his oath to uphold the Constitution, do you not?

General BRADLEY. I am sure he did; yes, sir.

Senator BRIDGES. And his first loyalty is to his country?
General BRADLEY. Right.

ADVISIBILITY OF SPEAKING OUT IN BEST INTERESTS OF COUNTRY

Senator BRIDGES. Therefore, you consider your first loyalty to your country, and you concede that General MacArthur probably considered his first loyalty to his country; and then if he felt very deeply or if you felt very deeply something was against the best interests of your country, don't you think you have a right to speak out or General MacArthur had a right to speak out?

General BRADLEY. Yes, but I think I would say it to those in authority instead of carrying it to the public.

Senator BRIDGES. Well now, for instance, I have here an advance. copy of your book, which I have enjoyed reading, and it is very interesting. I quote from page 543:

With Ninth Army on the Elbe, the First on the Mulde, and the Ruhr shrinking under the pressure of three corps, I was anxious to push southeast, rout the enemy out of Bavaria, and clear the United States zone of occupation to the Austrian frontier. From there we would push on down the Danube to head east toward Vienna and cut off the enemy force from withdrawal into the redoubt. By now I was especially anxious to occupy all of the United States zone of occupation, for though we would be forced by agreement to quit the Russian zone, we had no such assurance that the Red army would get out as willingly if they occupied ours. Rather than make a test of Russian compliance with the zonal ageement, we would sweep up our own United States sector without help from the Red army.

Now, that is a very positive statement of your views at that time.