General BRADLEY. We had no intelligence that they were going to enter the war. We had the intelligence that they were concentrating in Manchuria. You can only then consider their capabilities. They had the capability of intervening in the war.

Senator WILEY. If the Intelligence Department of this Government had that information, you would have had it right off the bat, wouldn't you?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator WILEY. So we have got that straightened around. There was no intelligence given to you people by any one of the intelligence forces in this Government that the Red Chinese were going to enter this war.

General BRADLEY. No, sir. We had the information that they had that capability and we always had the thought that they might enter it, but we did not have any intelligence to the positive effect that they were going to intervene.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AGAINST SUCH INTERVENTION

Senator WILEY. Now you know they were stationed up there. What additional precautions did you take or furnish MacArthur, with what additional air force or groups to meet that challenge, knowing that they were north of the Yalu? Anything at all?

General BRADLEY. Yes. We sent over some additional strategic bombers and we also sent over some jet-fighter groups to meet this threat if it came. In fact, a group of F-86's were sent over by the Air Force and some jet Navy planes were sent over without any request from General MacArthur. They were sent over because we saw this threat developing and we thought we should have them over there in case they were needed.

Senator WILEY. But when you did that you did not take off the inhibitions or limitations, did you?

General BRADLEY. We took them off up to the Yalu. We did not take them off across the Yalu, and we haven't yet.

MEMORANDUM ON EVENTS PRECEDING MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. Now, let us go back to this meeting. If you will refer to your memoranda, when did you write up this memoranda that you claim describes your meeting on April 5 with the President? General BRADLEY. I think it was the Monday morning as I remember it after the meeting with General Marshall on Sunday, I took the diary which is kept in my office as to where I am at various times so as to make sure of the times, and then sat down and dictated this memorandum for record.

Senator WILEY. But April 5 was Thursday, and it was not until the succeeding Monday that you attempted to recall the incidents of those dates-5, 6, 7, and 8; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. I think it was Monday that I dictated all of them.

MESSAGE ALETRING BRADLEY TO MAC ARTHUR DISMISSAL

Senator WILEY. You already stated in reply to Senator Bridges that you do not recall who it was that called you. But you did say

that there was a telephone call that came through late in the afternoon to the effect that the President was concerned about something. Now, what do your records show that he was concerned about?

General BRADLEY. As I remember it, he was concerned about some of the public statements made by General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Well, I ask you specifically, Was it in relation to the letter that was written to Congressman Martin?

General BRADLEY. It probably was. It came out about that time, if I remember correctly.

Senator WILEY. Well, now, this was an unusual occurrence in your life, was it not, General-that you should find out that a fellow general was about to have something happen to him? Now, what was this message that came? Just what did it say?

General BRADLEY. I told you that I did not remember where I first got this information. To the best of my memory it came by phone from someone, that the President was concerned about the statements of General MacArthur; and I warned the Chiefs that they had better be thinking about the matter because they might be called upon for a discussion of it. It is not unusual; if I know of something coming up, I warn the Chiefs that it is coming.

Senator WILEY. Then as a result you had your first meeting with the President. Was that on the 5th also?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; that was on the 6th.

Senator WILEY. All right. Now the point I am getting at is that this message resulted in your warning the Chiefs. Now that is a significant statement-warning the Chiefs that they had to get about and study. Was it then that you directed them to go back and find all the messages that MacArthur had before given to the public?

General BRADLEY. No, sir. I didn't give them any directions except to suggest that they had better be studying the matter and thinking it over.

Senator WILEY. Studying the matter. What matter?

General BRADLEY. The question of the President's concern about the possible relief of General MacArthur.

Senator WILEY. Oh, then the message was definite that came over that the President was thinking about how to handle the relief of MacArthur?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; not the how.

Senator WILEY: What?

General BRADLEY. Not the "how," but the question of whetherin other words, he had it under consideration, and somebody passed that on to me.

Senator WILEY. Well, was there anybody close enough to the President to have this information, or did it come right from the White House?

General BRADLEY. I frankly do not remember, Senator. . I get calls from various people during the day, and I do not remember where this one came from.

JCS MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1951

Senator WILEY. Well, again, can you give us the content of the message that resulted in your telling the Chiefs of Staff they had better get busy, or telling the group, rather-whom did you call?

General BRADLEY. I called the three Chiefs and asked them if they could come by my office at 5 o'clock.

Senator WILEY. Name them, please.

General BRADLEY. General Vandenberg, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman.

Senator WILEY. Told them to come by your office at 5 o'clock?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. Have you got any other information in your memoranda there as to what you said to them?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Is that all you said to them?
General BRADLEY. Until they got there; yes.
Senator WILEY. What?

General BRADLEY. Until they got there; yes.

Senator WILEY. All right. Now, when they got there what did you tell them?

General BRADLEY. I made no record of that. As I have expressed here several times, I told them that I understood the President was worried about something General MacArthur said and we might be called upon to express an opinion on it. I had not been told at that time that we would; I merely passed that on to them because that is my job-to pass on to them things which may come up for considera

tion.

Senator WILEY. They came back to you on the 5th at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. How long were they in consultation with you that time?

General BRADLEY. Well, according to my diary they were in there about 30 minutes. I don't know whether we were talking about anything else at that time or not.

Senator WILEY. And can you recall what you said?

General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you make any memoranda of what you said? General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Did you make any memoranda of what they said? General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. Was this young man sitting next to you in the presence of these four?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; just us four.

Senator WILEY. What?

General BRADLEY. No; just us four.

Senator WILEY. I see him nodding his head, that is all, and wanted to know why he is so wise on the subject. General BRADLEY. Beg your pardon? Senator WILEY. Just the four of you? General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator WILEY. Now in half an hour you can say a lot, General. General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; and I say I don't know what all we talked about. I just do know that I told them about this one. The same way Sunday afternoon we spent 2 hours before we went up to General Marshall, but we were not talking the whole 2 hours about this. Whenever we get together we talk about various things. I do happen to remember we were talking at that time about NATO command in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

Senator WILEY. In that half hour?

General BRADLEY. No; in this 2-hour conference.

COMPILATION AND JCS DIRECTIVE OF DECEMBER 6, 1951

Senator WILEY. Let's take the half-hour conference, get back to that, because we've got several other meetings we've got to talk about. At that time had they gathered the information that now appears in the communiqués in committee print, Compilation of Certain Published Information, starting in December 6, 1950, from there on? Did they gather that for your information?

General BRADLEY. Not at that time; no, sir.

Senator WILEY. Not at that time. If you have that book there, General, I would like to have you refer to it. Have you got it? General BRADLEY. This one, sir [indicating]?

Senator WILEY. Yes. Now please refer to page 178, because if you go down to paragraph 6, you will find that there the Chiefs of Staff prepared a memorandum where they say, and I quote:

The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government. Do you see that paragraph?

General BRADLEY. I see it, but I don't know what the implication of it is offhand. It is apparently from the New York Herald Tribune of April 12, 1951.

Senator WILEY. This is a quotation, General, from the message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur under December 6, 1950. We will let the language speak for itself. You and I both understand English, so we will go right back now.

JCS DISCUSSION OF APRIL 5, 1951

We will go back now to page 186 and ask you whether or not in this meeting where you four got together there was any discussion about the Martin letter.

General BRADLEY. I do not remember.

Senator WILEY. Haven't you anything there at all in your notes? General BRADLEY. No, sir.

Senator WILEY. What did you discuss?

General BRADLEY. I told you that I warned them that this question might come up soon, and that the President was disturbed about some statement General MacArthur had made.

Senator WILEY. Yes; but I am talking about the afternoon meeting, when they came over to see

General BRADLEY. That is what I am talking about, too.

Senator WILEY. Meanwhile, had you gotten any more telephone calls from anybody? You can't recall?

General BRADLEY. NO.

Senator WILEY. Or any communications from anybody?

General BRADLEY. No; not that I remember of.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, APRIL 6, 1951

The first time I really came into this, and found out what it was all about, was on Friday morning, April 6, when I met with the President, and the others in his office, at which time he explained what his concern was.

Senator WILEY. All right, now; we are coming to April 6, the one you just mentioned, Friday morning.

You said that at that time there was the President; there was the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I did not say the Joint Chiefs.

Senator WILEY. I beg your pardon.

You said there was Marshall, Acheson—and who else?

General BRADLEY. Harriman and myself.

RELATIONSHIP OF ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT

Senator WILEY. All right.

Now, tell us what was said then.

General BRADLEY. Senator, at that time I was in a position of a confidential adviser to the President. I do not feel at liberty to publicize what any of us said at that time.

Senator WILEY. Well, that raises a question, I suppose, that the Chair will have to rule on.

I didnt' raise it with Marshall, because I was in a hurry; but when you come before a committee, sir, to give information as to a very important matter that the public is entitled to know about, unless it goes to the question of endangering the public welfare, it seems to me that you waive the right you claim now, as to the President

General BRADLEY. Senator, it seems to me that in my position as an adviser, one of the military advisers to the President, and to anybody else in a position of responsibility who wants it, that if I have to publicize my recommendations and my discussions, that my value as an adviser is ruined.

I may be wrong in this. I will abide by whatever the committee says, but it seems to me that when any of us have to tell everything that we say in our position as an adviser, that we might just as well quit.

Senator WILEY. I am not going to ask you to do that.

There is one issue before the bar of public opinion, and only one in this matter, as I see it, others disagree with me, and that iswhether or not this action, taken in the manner it was taken, can be justified by the facts, before the bar of public opinion.

Now, the President exercised the authority that he had, constitutionally, but he, sir, agreed to present you before this committee. He had a right to say "No," to it, you need not come. It seems to me that he has opened up the whole case, and that evidence ought to be given to the people, as to just how it happened that this very unusual and cruel action was taken by the associates of General MacArthur, and by the President of the United States.

I might say that there was a lot of testimony and evidence to the effect that some of you defended MacArthur. If you did, I would like to know it.

It would seem to me it would add something into this picture of strength and worthwhileness, but I am asking for the chairman to rule that my question is pertinent and relevant and should be answered. General BRADLEY. May I correct my statement a little bit? I am not too sure that I would have the right to say that I would be guided by this committee.

Maybe I should take this to the President and get his permission to do it because I was acting as his adviser at the time, and I am not