Nationalists down on Formosa, and other points. Was his viewpoint understood by the Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. I think, as I recall, although he did not make a specific recommendation originally, he indicated he felt he was being restricted, which is the same thing, and I think he felt that we realized he felt we should allow him to bomb in Manchuria.

Senator GEORGE. Now, in answer to Senator Johnson you recited three points that were in the mind and were expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I believe your first point was you said that the Joint Chiefs didn't approve, didn't find it desirable to have General MacArthur expressing his opinion about certain public policy matters, certain questions of policy. Did you communicate that decision to General MacArthur specifically?

General BRADLEY. We did on December 6. Up to that time we had not called his attention to it. As a matter of fact, up to that time we had not thought it was necessary because it is tradition and custom and common practice of military men, when speaking on policy matters, to submit them, submit their views, for approval.

Senator GEORGE. I understand, General; but you had not thought it necessary up until December-December 6?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.

Senator GEORGE. And in the December 6 statement that went to General MacArthur, you did undertake to call his attention to what you, the Chiefs of the General Staff or the Chiefs of Staff, thought he should have in mind, should bear in mind; is that right?

General BRADLEY. That is correct. It went to all theater commanders, not only to General MacArthur.

Senator GEORGE. Yes; I see. It went to all of them.

Wasn't General MacArthur's views and viewpoints about the value of Formosa well known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir: and

Senator GEORGE. To the President? Was there ever any doubt about where he stood upon that question, General?

General BRADLEY. Not that I know of. As far as the finding out of what was needed on Formosa, the defensive importance of Formosa, the value of Formosa, in the hands of an enemy

Senator GEORGE. That is what I mean.

General BRADLEY (continuing) There is no difference in the opinion of General MacArthur and ourselves on that.

Senator GEORGE. I understood that. That is the thing that mystifies me.

DECISION TO DEFEND FORMOSA

Now, General, you speak of losing our allies. When the decision was made to go into Korea did you consider the question of losing your allies?

General BRADLEY. Well, we went into Korea on a resolution of the United Nations, and I don't think-

Senator GEORGE. I understand; but then did you give any consideration to whether or not you would be weakening your hold with your allies at that time?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't think so, because they were fully with us on this in the United Nations voting. Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General, tell me in plain language why did we send our Armed Forces into Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, the decision was made that here was another act of aggression that, if we appeased in this case, something else would come along, and you either appeased again or took action in the next one, and I think it was fully realized by everyone, and it seemed to meet the approval of the people at that time, that one appeasement leads to another, until you eventually make war inevitable. That is

Senator GEORGE. That is the reason?

General BRADLEY. And that is the reason, perhaps, that the people thought we should take action at this time.

MISSION OF OUR TROOPS IN KOREA

Senator GEORGE. What did we mean for our troops to do when we sent them into Korea? Specifically? The defending forces in South Korea had been driven down a considerable distance in South Korea when we got into it, had they not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Most of the

General BRADLEY (continuing). And the South Koreans were retreating when we first went into it.

Senator GEORGE. They were retreating. Very well.

What did we mean for our troops to do when we sent them into Korea?

General BRADLEY. Well, the first commitment of troops was to help get our nationals out; and then the further commitment was to stop the aggression and carry out the United Nations resolution of stopping aggression of the North Koreans in South Korea, and drive them back.

Senator GEORGE. Well, that required fighting, did it not, General? You meant for the troops that were put in under General MacArthur and committed to Korea to fight, did you not?

General BRADLEY. Yes; yes, indeed.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

MILITARY FACTORS IN BOMBING MANCHURIA

Well now, General, General Marshall stated to this committee that if he knew or if we knew, that the Soviets would not come into this fighting, if we should bomb the supply depots, concentration points in Manchuria, that we would take that action, is that right?

General BRADLEY. I think that is correct. In other words, you would extend your bombing of a line of supply.

Senator GEORGE. That is it exactly, General, exactly. I think it is quite correct to say that that is true. That means then that from a strictly military point, the request to bomb the supply depots and concentration points in Manchuria was correct?

General BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't agree with that, sir.

Senator GEORGE. From a strictly military point of view.

General BRADLEY. No, sir; and I will tell you why I don't think so from a military point of view.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General BRADLEY. Korea is a poor place to fight a war, and a lot of military implications are involved in extending the war.

Now if Russia should come into this war, it would be very difficult to supply the troops in Korea or to get them out, and so speaking entirely from a military point of view, we do not want to take that risk.

Senator GEORGE. I understood, General, but I said if we knew Russia was not coming in, there would be nothing wrong in us striking back at the concentration points in Manchuria.

General BRADLEY. Yes; but who can tell us they won't?

Senator GEORGE. Well, I can understand that, General. How can you tell us that we won't get into war if we go into Iran tomorrow with the British and say that you must not take this oil or you must not nationalize? We are taking chances, General, everywhere. General BRADLEY. That is right.

Senator GEORGE. And that is all I am saying. I was asking you this simple question: That from a strictly military point of view, with the assurance that Russia was not going to intervene directly, there was nothing wrong with General MacArthur's request that his planes be permitted to break up the concentrations across the Yalu River, troop concentrations that were coming down on his own troops. General BRADLEY. If you put in the condition, the assurance that Russia would not come into it, naturally the answer to your question is, "Yes, it would be a military advantage."

Senator GEORGE. That is what I meant.

General BRADLEY. But no one can give us that assurance.

Senator GEORGE. I understand that, General. I am not insisting that anyone can give us that assurance.

TAKING THE WRAPS OFF THE NATIONALISTS' TROOPS

Now then, I did not understand General MacArthur-I listened very carefully to him. I did not hear his speech before the Congress except over the radio. I was ill, and I heard his opening statements here before this committee and most of his statements before this committee.

I did not understand that General MacArthur ever at any time recommended that Generalissimo Chiang's troops in Formosa be sent to the mainland of China.

My understanding and my interpretation was that he said, "Turn them loose and leave Generalissimo Chiang to determine himself where, if at all, he would employ his troops." That was my understanding of his position.

And with respect to retaining Formosa, that is to the extent of not allowing it to fall into unfriendly hands, I have never been able to see any difference between the viewpoint of General MacArthur and the General Staff, the Chiefs of Staff.

There was at one time a difference of viewpoint, a very different and very marked difference of viewpoint on the part of the State Department, but that is a different matter and would not involve you in it. At this time, according to Secretary Rusk in New York just within hours, it is very difficult to see why he has not gone all the way that General MacArthur would go in taking the wraps off of Chinese Nationalist troops in Formosa and leaving it up to their own gen

erals, their own commanders to determine what, if anything, they would do with those troops.

General BRADLEY. Well, from the military point of view there is no objection, as I see it, to removing any restrictions on his doing these things, provided he doesn't get mixed up in such a way as to involve our own forces.

Senator GEORGE. Well, I do not agree myself, General, with every thing that I have heard here from General MacArthur's viewpoint about the use of those troops, but so far as turning them loose is concerned and leaving it up to their judgment, with the provision that you have put in, I can't see, strictly from a military point of view. why it would be harmful.

General BRADLEY. I can see none from a military view except that if by so doing they took such losses both in men and equipment that they then jeopardized the security of Formosa. Then you might get into military reasons.

Senator GEORGE. I think undoubtedly that would be true if we were going to supply them heavily. That raises in my mind a different question altogether. If we are going to supply them for an invasion of the mainland, why, the obligation that would be implied, of course, would be very clear, and I think that would be altogether a different question. But I do not see, General, why General MacArthur's suggestion could be objectionable from a strictly military point of view-to take the wraps off of Chiang Kai-shek down in Formosa and off his troops.

The element of uncertainty, certainly, of what he might do might have proved helpful to General MacArthur when he was moving up toward the northern boundary of North Korea and when the Chinese had not come in in force. Now when the Chinese came in in force, why, it looked then, of course, that China is in this war. There is not any doubt about that is there?

General BRADLEY. NO.

Senator GEORGE. You speak of an all-out war with China, and you mean all-out on our side, do you not, General? So far as you know China is doing about as much to us as she can at this time, is she not? General BRADLEY. By that I mean the extension of it outside of Korea, so that you-

Senator GEORGE. Yes. General, of course, everybody I think would agree that we would not want to extend this war.

General BRADLEY. May I finish the answer to the other question? Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

General BRADLEY [Deleted.] There are a lot of things that they can do that they haven't done yet. So I don't think we could say that China is at all-out war against us yet any more than we are at all-out war against them. In other words, the conflict is being plyed under certain ground rules which are short in the case of both China and the United States as to what each can do to the other one.

CASUALTIES OF UN IN KOREA

Senator GEORGE. General, let me ask you a question on an altogether different line right now. How many of your troops, that is, of the UN troops or of the American components of the UN army in Korea, who have been recorded as missing in action or taken as prisoners of war, do you estimate are still alive? Have you any means of esti

mating the number of the missing in action troops that are still alive? General BRADLEY. We have no way of estimating that. We do know that of those taken by North Koreans before China came into the war, many of them undoubtedly lost their lives. We do know that some of them were moved north and kept just out of reach of our forces as they advanced rapidly into North Korea. We also know that in certain cases the Chinese have released prisoners of war who have come back. So I think it would be very difficult to try to estimate the number that are alive either in the hands of the North Koreans or in the hands of the Chinese-that is those that are listed as missing; because a lot of those that are listed as missing in a retrograde movement undoubtedly are killed and left on the position. Others are captured and others are wounded. So those that are killed and left on position we naturally carry them as missing in action because we do not know whether they are dead or prisoners, and I do not see any way you could make an estimate of it. Senator GEORGE. No.

INITIAL REQUIREMENTS TO REPULSE NORTH KOREANS

Now, General, I asked this question of General Marshall, and I think he rather referred the matter to you. I think my recollection is correct. I asked what was the initial estimate of the number of troops that would be necesary-ground troops I am speaking of now, in connection with whatever air we employed-would be necessary to repel the invasion of South Korea and drive the North Koreans back. Can you give the committee the initial estimate of the number of the troops that would be required?

General BRADLEY. We estimated early in the conflict that the divisions that were in Japan, plus the additional divisions we sent them, would be sufficient to accomplish the mission.

Senator GEORGE. Well, was that in the beginning or as it progressed? General BRADLEY. That was after it progressed to some extent. The first few days we did not know just how good these North Koreans were, and it was some time before we could get a good picture of it.

MAC ARTHUR'S ACTION ON MILITARY ORDERS

Senator GEORGE. Do you concur with General Marshall's statement that with respect to strictly military orders there had been no insubordination on the part of General MacArthur in that he failed to carry them out?

General BRADLEY. I know of none.

Senator GEORGE. You know of none?

General BRADLEY. NO.

Senator GEORGE. Your judgment and the judgment of the Chiefs of Staff was very largely based upon the three points which in the beginning of your testimony this morning you detailed to the committee?

General BRADLEY. That is correct; and we never did say that we thought he had been insubordinate.

Senator GEORGE. So far as his strictly military duties and responsibilities were concerned?

General BRADLEY. That is correct.