GUIDELINES SHOULD BE GENERAL

Now, I think that you would have to be very general in these guidelines. But I think no guidelines at all are an extreme impediment to any forward movement.

Senator CASE. This is what I wish you would develop, the reasons for that thought.

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, the statement was just made by Mrs. McVitty that she thinks the absence of guidelines is a real impediment to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping role that the United Nations can have, and I have just asked her if she would be rather specific.

As I understand it, you did assert or suggest a country might be more willing to accept a United Nations military force or peacekeeping mission or intervention if it knew the limits of the activity which it might expect either on its own soil or affecting its own interests here.

I wonder if this is a good idea or not. I think that is the question. Mrs. McVITTY. I think it is not only a matter of the parties who will accept the force or not accept the force; I think it is a matter of a government like the Soviet Union or France, who I do not think really believe it is better to invoke chapter 7 and call out the troops and decide the issue by combat every time when they say, "We would rather do it under chapter 7."

I think what they are afraid of is a precedent being set that has no limits and no definition and no specific at all. They are afraid that if they condone one peacekeeping operation there will be another, and then that other might do something they very much dislike, and they have taken the line that this is all illegal, it is illegal because they are afraid of what it may do.

It seems to me that you can avoid some of the difficulty; you never can avoid all of the political difficulties, but I think you might avoid some, if you had advance agreement on definitions and some rules or guidelines, whatever you want to say.

I think you could improve the effectiveness of the force by such guidelines. I think you could reduce the political opposition, and I think you could put peacemaking and settlement of the political issue together with the deployment of the force, and have the two things going along simultaneously.

Unless you have a little architecture for this thing nobody knows where they are going.

SPECIFICS OF A MILITARY FORCE

Senator CASE. The question really is not if you are going to have nothing; the question is what are you going to have, and it seems to me we ought to now get, perhaps, to the point of considering it in specific terms.

I notice several of the other witnesses are interested in the discussion, and I wonder if they have any comment and whether it would be appropriate for them to make it.

Senator CLARK. I think we ought to move now, if you are through questioning Mrs. McVitty.

Senator CASE. I do not want to cut Mrs. McVitty short.

Mrs. McVITTY. I have one paragraph I would like to read because you asked for a specific.

Senator CASE. Sure.

Mrs. McVITTY. I have two specifics. One was the one I have already mentioned, the moving through a more decisive process of peaceful settlement as you go through an operation.

The other is how you could keep the United Nations from becoming overmilitarized in these peacekeeping operations, lest they be taken with hostile local forces, and I have four specifics.

I think the United Nations should be permitted to disarm irregulars. I mean, that is, ununiformed, unidentified people running around with guns. They had them in the Congo and in Cyprus.

Senator CLARK. They have the same problem in the United States. Mrs. McVITTY. The United Nations should have the right to neutralize regular armed forces in the area by confining them to barracks or incorporating them, if appropriate, under the U.N. command.

In an area of emergency operation the United Nations should have competence over individuals who impede or oppose mandates. I am thinking of the mercenaries in the Congo.

Paragraph 4. The United Nations should be authorized to halt at the borders of an emergency area military materials or personnel being sent in from outside for the use of any of the parties.

These would not all apply in every case. It would be something that was the limit of what they could do.

Senator CASE. I am very glad that we did get to the matter of specifics, because I had some slight misunderstanding before I realized that your suggestions for guidelines were in the nature of limitations rather than a statement of the powers that a peacekeeping force might exercise. Now I think we do understand each other much better.

Mrs. McVITTY. Yes.

Senator CASE. And I have no dispute whatever with the specifics that you suggest to us.

(The prepared statement of Mrs. McVitty follows:)

TESTIMONY IN FAVOR OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 47

My name is Mrs. Marion H. McVitty and I testify as Editor of The Independent Observer, a publication of commentary on major issues in the United Nations. I have been at the United Nations since 1951 as the accredited representative of the World Association of World Federalists. From 1960-1964 I acted also as confidential correspondent at the UN for the Economist Intelligence Unit of London, covering the UN Congo Operation.

My experience and concern with problems of United Nations peace-keeping prompt me to endorse Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 as a most enlightened guide for United States policy in this regard. It is both practical and forwardlooking, and it embodies some creative proposals which merit detailed consideration.

In the desire to contribute to that consideration, I address myself particularly to paragraph (3) of the Resolution. The guidelines as proposed in this paragraph suggest solutions to several of the most serious difficulties encountered thus far in United Nations peace-keeping operations.

Much of the political opposition which has arisen around UN peace-keeping seems to be due to uncertainties as to how UN Peace Forces might be used, or misused, on future occasions. The UN Charter does not specify terms for carrying out UN emergency actions of this kind. UN resolutions authorizing UN peace-keeping operations have been extremely vague. Guidelines as pro

posed in S. Con. Res. 47 could define and delimit this method of collective security, and thus improve both its acceptability and UN performance in the field. United Nations experience gained in Congo and elsewhere has provided valuable lessons to this end.

UN Peace Forces have all been used on a voluntary basis, with impartiality as to the rights and claims of the parties, and in a non-combatant capacity. All these characteristics were wittingly or unwittingly misunderstood in Congo, and in some other areas.

With respect to the voluntary aspect of UN peacekeeping operations, the hasty withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Middle East has demonstrated the danger of equating host country consent to the deployment of UN Peace Forces with unilateral host country control over termination of the operation. While that was a dramatic instance of peremptory withdrawal of consent to a UN operation, it was not the only instance.

In the early days of the Congo Operation, Lumumba demanded the withdrawal of the UN Force in Congo. On that occasion the demand was not taken too seriously by the United Nations, because it was already a question as to whether Lumumba or Kasavubu was in authority, and the two Congolese leaders did not agree on UN withdrawal.

In the case of Congo, the untimely withdrawal of national contingents was a more immediate threat to the success of the UN Congo Operation. Key national contingents were withdrawn from the UN Force at a crucial moment as an expression of political disaffection with the operation. They were replaced only with the utmost difficulty. Thus it was shown that the United Nations also should have greater control over contingents once they have been Vountarily contributed.

Guidelines to cover contingent withdrawals and the duration of UN emergency actions might be derived in part from UN experience in Cyprus. The mandates for the UN Cyprus Operation have authorized the deployment of UNFICYP for three- or six-month periods. During those periods it has been tacitly assumed by all concerned that only the UN, itself, could terminate the operation or approve contingent withdrawals. In future, this practice could be formalized to provide that host country consent and the voluntary contribution of contingents, once offered, would be binding for a limited period, specified in advance, and renewable, if necessary, with the further consent of the parties and participants.

Paragraph (3) of S. Con. Res. 47 also provides for "guidelines to govern concomitant machinery for peace-making where peace-keeping forces are in use". This is a most essential requirement, since United Nations experience has shown that UN peace-keeping operations have ultimately failed or been indefinitely prolonged at great cost, because of the unwillingness of the contending parties to settle the issues between them by peaceful means.

For lack of funds, the Congo Operation was terminated after four years while that new country was still in a chaotic state. However, in the Middle East and in Cyprus, time and conditions have existed for settlement if the will of the parties and the insistence of the international community had been strong enough. However, in the absence of adequate settlement procedures, the presence of UN Peace Forces has seemed to provide just enough immediate security to diminish the impetus toward settlement.

It would seem necessary to provide in future that parties to a dispute requiring the deployment of UN Peace Forces should assume at the outset an obligation to settle their differences within a reasonable length of time. To this end, guidelines might stipulate that with each extension of a UN peacekeeping mandate, the Parties would resort to progressively more decisive methods for settlement. The UN body authorizing the operation would determine how the settlement process would move through negotiation, mediation, and inquiry toward binding arbitration or judicial decision in any given case. If such a process were prescribed the Parties might find it preferable to settle before the more onerous methods became applicable.

Guidelines proposed in the Resolution for "training and equipping" UN Peace Forces, raise certain questions which may require further consideration. UN commanders with experience in the field are likely to recommend that future UN Peace Forces should be more numerous and more heavily armed. They contend that UN Peace Forces may be overwhelmed or discredited unless they have preponderance over local forces in emergency areas. This problem has been particularly emphasized with respect to the Congo, but has also threatened the

effectiveness of the UN Force in Cyprus. UN officers point out that the mere symbol of the UN blue beret has not protected their men from hostile attack; that at times UN forces could not be interposed between more heavily armed local contenders, lest the UN troops be decimated; and that UN forces have been drawn into unnecessary combat, as in Katanga, because they were unable to inspire respect and restraint by an obvious show of superior UN competence.

The need for UN preponderance over local forces in some emergency situations seems to be borne out by the facts. At the same time, there are likely to be financial and political objections to increasing the military capability of UN forces of this type. UN preponderance might be achieved, however, by decreasing local force, rather than by increasing UN forces.

In the past the United Nations has been able to take some measures to alleviate the effects of inimical local forces, which suggest guidelines that might achieve UN preponderance in this less dangerous manner.

Efforts were made in the early days of the Congo operation to disarm irregulars. An attempt was even made to disarm the Congolese army. One regular unit of the Congolese army was incorporated into ONUC under UN command toward the end of that action. The Greek garrison on Cyprus has been confined to barracks. British forces from the British base on Cyprus have been incorporated in UNFICYP. The UN took a decision that no assistance of a military nature should be sent into the Congo save under UN auspices. The UN was authorized to expel individual foreign mercenaries from Katanga.

The UN decision to ban the importation of military materials and personnel into Congo was not accompanied by guidance as to how the importation was to be prevented. The Secretary General could actually do little more than plead for compliance with governments thought to be responsible. Although the UN was authorized to expel mercenaries from Congo, it had no right to detain them. As a result the mercenaries which were expelled were able to re-enter the country with very little difficulty.

U Thant has repeatedly called attention to the dangerous build-up of men and weapons from outside for both factions in Cyprus, but has not been in a position to halt that traffic.

The measures cited to reduce local forces in emergency areas were all either so tenatively negotiated, or were so imprecisely authorized (always after the fact), that they could not be implemented effectively. However, these methods already tried out might be sharpened and formalized in guidelines to the following effect:

1.) The UN should be permitted to disarm irregulars;

2.) The UN should have the right to neutralize regular armed forces in the area by confining them to barracks or by incorporating them, if appropriate, under the UN command;

3.) In the area of an emergency operation, the UN should have competence over individuals who oppose, or impede, a UN mandate;

4.) The UN should be authorized to halt at the borders of an emergency area, military materials or personnel being sent in from outside for the use of any of the contending parties.

Flexibility would, of necessity, have to attend the application of such guidelines to each specific emergency action. Not all of these conditions would be applicable in every case, and in some instances, none of them would be required. Where these guidelines were applied, great care would have to be taken to insure equitable application to the parties involved.

In this testimony I have tried to spell out a little what kind of guidelines might improve UN peace-keeping. These have pertained to UN control over withdrawals, to peace-making procedures to accompany peace-keeping, and to ways in which UN Peace Forces might gain preponderance in emergency areas without greatly increasing the UN military capability.

It may be felt that the guidelines which I have put forward might make parties involved in a crisis situation unwilling to sanction a UN Peace Force when the interposition of such a force seemed imperative to the preservation of peace. Application of the conditions suggested might seem to the parties too big a price to pay for pacification and settlement of a conflict out of which each side still hoped to gain some advantage.

Experience to date, however, shows that consent to the deployment of a UN Peace Force has been obtainable only when the governments concerned cannot gain their ends or control the situation by any other means. Should such obligations as have been suggested here actually inhibit recourse to UN peace-keeping,

it may be pertinent to question whether, without those commitments, the UN should in future be thrust into precarious efforts to save well-nigh hopeless situations.

It is difficult to see how UN peace-keeping effectiveness can be assured on any easier terms than here set out. It is hoped that by agreement in advance to better defined and clearer peace-keeping mandates, political opposition will be reduced with the reduction of uncertainties surrounding a relatively new, and still evolving, UN method for achieving the central purpose of the Organization. S. Con. Res. 47 seems to me to recognize that adequate UN peace-keeping cannot be obtained without delegating a measure of real authority to the United Nations.

April 1968.

Senator Clark. Thank you, Senator.

Before we proceed to the questioning of the witnesses, I would like to, if the Senator would agree, go back for a couple of procedural

matters.

HOUSE RESOLUTIONS

At the beginning of the hearing there were 67 Members of the House of Representatives who introduced into the House resolutions largely similar to Senate Concurrent Resolution 47, and I would like to ask the staff to prepare a list of those 67 Members of the House and have that list inserted at the point of the hearings immediately after Senate Concurrent Resolution 47 was put in the record. (See p. 1.)

There are, I understand, about a dozen additional similar House resolutions and I would like the staff to prepare a list of the sponsors of those 12, and a very brief statement to be put into the record which would summarize the differences between those resolutions and this one. (See pp. 2 and 3.)

We have a letter from the Department of State dated November 1, 1967, and signed by Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs, Mr. Macomber, which endorses Senate Concurrent Resolution 47. I would like to have that entered in the record immediately after the House data.

I would like at this point to read the key paragraph from that letter of approval, and I am quoting:

Keeping in mind the above considerations, the Department would consider the adoption of the concurrent resolution a welcome expression by the Senate of confidence in United States policies and a constructive demonstration of American support for a cardinal purpose of our participation in the U.N., namely to share equitably with other nations responsibilities for keeping the peace.

(The letter referred to follows:)

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, November 1, 1967.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of October 13, 1967, requesting comments on S. Con. Res. 47, relative to United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking.

The Department in the past has commented on similar resolutions relative to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force.

The Department continues to support the basic objectives of such resolutions. They accord with the consistent United States position, which has been supported on a nonpartisan basis since the establishment of the United Nations in