Another part of the complex: the very institution from whence Eisenhower had sprung. Every branch of the Armed Forces demands and sometimes gets more than it needs. Then, the President went on gloomily, there are the unions.

Contrary to what most people think, the nation's largest industrial employer is not the automotive industry. It's the aerospace industry. It employs 1,384,000 workers. Four-fifths of its sales are to the Federal government. Its workers and particularly its scientists are certainly an important component in the complex. Then you've got the electronics, ordnance and petroleum fellows, all with very real interests in the continuance of the war machines.

They are justifiably afraid of arms cutbacks, we agreed.
What then, I asked, was the alternative?

The President cheered up a bit. In a spiritual fashion he began to develop an analogy between the condition of American military-oriented industry when arms spending ended and that of the European nations whose production facilities lay in ruins after World War II.

The President spoke of the ingenious way in which Paul Hoffman, as administrator of the Marshall Plan, had operated. To Hoffman's way of thinking, our government's various bureaus and agencies would be the last to know the requirements of the various devastated European industrial complexes. And so Hoffman went to them and said in essence: draw up your own plans for reconstruction and recovery. You know better than we do what is required. Then get up a budget. How much can you lay out and how much help will you need from us?

That, the President said, accounted for the speed and efficiency of the recovery of the European industrial community. He would think that comparable measures could be effective with respect to the American military industrial community when arms spending halted or diminished sharply.

At the risk of dwelling too long on the issue of armaments and disarmaments, I posed one final question in this area, because it could best be answered by a man whose vast knowledge of military affairs and arms is equally matched by his passion for peace. There is probably no man with comparable qualifications in the world.

We were now spending $87 billion of our total Federal budget of $135 billion on arms or defense, call it what you will. These figures made the military budget during his Administration look like carfare. The President had written, again in "Waging Peace," that "so long as such proportion of the world's assets are wasted on excessive arms, our ability to help poorer people will be sorely and uselessly impaired."

Question: Would the $5 billion antimissile missile system recently announced by Secretary McNamara fall into the President's category of "excessive arms?" I wasn't prepared for his vivid response. Five billion! That was only the beginning, the President said impatiently. It would buy a pilot establishment, nothing else. And then we would have to go on and on until we had "the works." He drew a spiral in the air with his forefinger as he talked. You'd get up into the $20 billions, then the $30 billions, and the $40 billions-just for the United States. Every little town and locality would insist on having a shield. Even Gettysburg. And, soon, too, all your allies will insist on having it. The President had continued to trace the spiral until it had gone as high as his arm could reach. Right now our arm expenditures create economic difficulties, he said in a hard tone, as his spiraling arm dropped to his side. But, as of now, it is possible that we will have to take on this great additional cost.

He paused, swiveled to gaze out the window at the wind-stripped trees, and finally turned back to finish up on the anti-missile missile. He thought the value of the project was still questionable. Now, mind you, the President said, I wouldn't call it a form of excessive arms, if I thought it would be effective. But I tend to agree with McNamara when he minimized the need for the thing. If it's a "thin" defense, as they now describe it, it won't appreciably improve our defensive posture. And, anyway, it's still axiomatic that the best defense is a perfect offense. We've got that.

We then moved from the unthinkable, the madness, the insanity-to the sane. It was time to discuss what the President had meant when he said in 1956 "there can be no peace without law." Two preliminary questions about basic assumptions: (1) Did his use of the word "law" in the context of world peace imply the law of a world authority, capable of enforcement, as distinguished from a mere set of exhortations or injunctions, and (2) did the proposition "no peace without law" embody the concept that peace cannot be assured by a continued

arms race or an indefinite balance of terror, but only by universal disarmament, together with establishment of institutions in the world corresponding to those which maintain law and order in our country and others?

Obviously, the President replied rather impatiently, that was the kind of law he had spoken of when he said it was essential to world peace. I said I had suspected my two questions about assumptions would be unnecessary, especially in view of the President's uncompromising stance during the Suez crisis of 1956 when he emphasized that there could be no double standard of law in the world, i.e., one law for those opposing us, another for our allies. There could be only one law, the President had insisted then, or no peace. Many in the world believed his stand had prevented World War III.

To get that "one law for all in the world" Grenville Clark, a prominent American lawyer, champion of civil liberties and of peace through world federalism, had drafted a set of changes that could be made in the UN Charter and which would provide the UN sufficient authority to prevent war. That authority, Clark had made clear, would be strictly limited to war prevention. I hoped we might now go over some of the main provisions of the Clark proposals.

The President anchored on his glasses the better to study the Clark formula for the UN legislative body. It would eliminate the one vote-per nation provision in the General Assembly, for one thing. Secondly, nations would be given voting power according to a formula which took into account population and geographic factors. Assuming an eventual membership in the UN of about 130 nations (all nations now members, plus those expected to join) Clark had calculated a voting arrangement that goes like this:

The President scrutinized the formula most carefully, then whipped off his glasses. There was no doubt, none at all, he said, that we have gone overboard in bringing into the UN certain sovereign groupings which have no valid claim to nationhood. Groups which were not economically and/or politically ready for nationhood and a vote in the UN. But is was not entirely or even largely the fault of these new nations. It was partly the fault of the larger powers. They had expected too much, too much in too short a time.

The President was reminded of a story. Back in 1959 DeGaulle had brought together the prime ministers of ten or eleven African countries of the "French Community." He had asked the President to address them privately. He decided to begin with a question. In view of the fact, the President had asked the African leaders, that the world was becoming increasingly economically interdependent, why did they want to go it alone? And had they considered what they stood to gain if they would unite in some kind of economically-oriented regional federation?

Well, the President said, they just wouldn't buy it. They each wanted their independence. And the reason they gave: it would get each of them that one vote in the UN. The idea of forming a powerful, regional African grouping had no appeal. Now, it might have had appeal if the voting powers of UN members were apportioned on a more realistic basis.

The make-up of the UN, he went on, is discrediting the organization. How can the General Assembly function with one vote for each nation? The United States has the same voting strength as the Maldive Islands with-what was their population?-less than 100,000? It was like giving Rhode Island the same number of Representatives in the Congress as Texas or California or New York. It had been and continues to be a mistake to admit nations to the UN unqualifiedly.

Now that led to the Security Council, the President continued. It wasn't doing its job, either. Couldn't do the job, with the veto. Why couldn't some majority voting formula be worked out?

10

He replaced his glasses as I handed him the Clark formula for chan composition of the Security Council.

It would be as follows:

The executive body be enlarged to seventeen members, each el a four-year term by the General Assembly. The U.S., U.S.S.R., C India would have a representative at all times. Four of the ei largest nations would, in rotation, be entitled to membership, with viso that two of these four members should always be from Euro tions, the other two from nations outside Europe. The remain members would be chosen by the General Assembly from the other nations.

A simple majority would be ruled out. A majority of 12 out of the would be required for all but the "most important" decisions. In the Clark proposes that the majority of 12 must include a majority of eac two main groups of nations, i.e. the large nations and the much more n groups of smaller nations. The President thought it all made a great deal After going over the Clark proposals for compulsory jurisdiction by ternational Court and the establishment of a World Equity Tribunal to cases where legal principles were not applicable, we moved on to th disarmament phase. The Clark plan, if adopted and ratified, calls for an ate and precisely calibrated move toward universal disarmament.

The re-configured Security Council would appoint an Inspection Co to consist of five persons, none of whom would be a national of any of tl largest nations, and no two of whom would be nationals of the same nat They would conduct a worldwide Arms Census, supervise an arms p truce, and eventually supervise and verify by inspection, phased, prop disarmament which would leave all nations as equally strong or weak d disarmanent period as they were prior to it. The gradual and proportiona up of military forces and weapons would take place over a period of at the rate of ten per cent per year.

Rather startling, the President's response to this part of the Clark pla essence, why wait? Of course the main goal is complete disarmament. not run some experiments now? Let's open up all our bases, nuclear facilities, arms factories, the works-all of it located on or west of the M and invite the Russians to come in and look around. On condition, of co they would open up everything they had located on or west of the Vistula inspectors from the United States.

Now these inspectors would soon begin to understand the size and d of the problems of inspection and verification. They could learn a lot work together to develop a formula which would be workable and a to both sides, and to the other nations, too.

The President didn't see why we had to wait for full UN Charter He knew, as only a military man knows, that such an experiment as he put forth could pose no real threat to the security of either side. We the President urged. Try and keep trying!

The disarmament phase of the plan for a world security system a relatively short-term proposition. The concurrent build-up of wear and material for a UN Peace Force would lead to a permanent establi a military one-within the UN. The President's thoughts on this most enlightening. In essence the plan was this:

The United Nations Peace Force would be a heavily-armed disciplined world police force. To prevent domination of this any nation or group of nations, the number of nationals of any its standing component would not exceed three per cent of the tota of the Peace Force except in extreme emergencies. Units woul persed to avoid power concentrations, would be highly mobile, a be located in defensible positions. None of them would be station larger countries. The UN military staff would be under civilia The President studied the above plan quickly and, as I had expecte the ball and ran with it. You'd have, he began to plan out loud, world comparable to our U.S. Marshals. Backed by armed forces similar t tional Guard. When the U.S. Marshals go into a troubled area, if handle it, if they can't get compliance with Federal law, the Gua called in. You'd have the same thing on a world scale. Non-compli UN law and you send in the UN forces. He orchestrated this point at so

And too, he hammered away, the UN needs nuclear power. He bore down hard on the word "nuclear." The UN can't keep the peace with conventional weapons alone. The President, out of his enormous storehouse of military experience and knowhow, put forth some brilliant innovations on Clark's Peace Force plan. You know, he said, way back in 1953 I proposed that the nations turn over all nuclear weapons to the UN, keeping only that nuclear material necessary for peaceful purposes. The ultimate aim of my proposal at that time was to get those blasted bombs out the hands of the nations and into the hands of an impartial world body.

The President went on to outline, specifically and vividly, how the UN would use its nuclear power, without anyone getting hurt. Take this example, he hurried on. You have two countries in a border argument. The UN orders the matter to be taken to the International Court. One or both of the disputants refuses to submit to compulsory arbitration. They build up their troops along the border.

Then your UN aerial surveillance teams report that armed outbreak is imminent. The UN, which by now has in its possession a fleet of submarines armed with nuclear missiles deployed around the world, orders one of the submarines to proceed to the area. The world is then told that if firing breaks out for any reason whatsoever, a tactical nuclear weapon will be delivered onto the disputed territory. If this threat fails to prevent armed conflict, you back it up with action.

But, the President quickly added, no nuclear bomb would ever need to be delivered, he felt sure. The threat would be sufficient to roll back the opponents from the border-indeed all the way back to the International Court at The Hague.

There can be no effective supernational organization without power, the President emphasized. He had said that in 1953 at the United Nations and he insists on it today.

We fell silent for a moment. Was the President thinking about the possible shock effect his ideas might have in some quarters? Grenville Clark had often said that what the world probably needed to get moving on disarmament and world law was a series of severe shocks. As to my own thoughts during those brief silent seconds, it seemed to me that what the President was really saying to the UN and about the UN was: Get tough! Diplomacy, kid gloves, cadenced speeches, behind-the-scenes deals have not worked and won't ever work! Demand the men and the weaponry you require to do the job. Get tough! Get tough!

It came then, down to this: How do you get from here to there?

The President had long been guided by the early period in our national life and the men who shaped it. Would it be stretching the point too much, I asked to equate the Articles of Confederation and the problems of the thirteen original states, with the present UN Charter and the problems of the 123 nation-states today? And, if an equation could be made, could the President then agree that a UN Charter revision conference, similar to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 might result in the carving out of a Constitution for the World, as strong, equitable and sound as the U.S. Constitution?

The famous grin broke out. Here was, he said, an analogy which many Americans would understand and accept. The President then spoke, as though he had struggled right along with Jay, Madison, Washington, Hamilton, Franklin and the others, at Philadelphia during that long hot spring and summer of 1787 in Philadelphia where the Convention was underway.

He delineated the various stresses and strains within and without the thirteen states and why their centers of gravity varied, some having closer ties to foreign governments than to the Confederation. The attempt to save the Confederation by strengthening it faltered again and again. The Virginia Plan and the New Jersey Plan were so far apart that compromise appeared unattainable.

We both then recalled the words of Chairman of the Convention, George Washington:

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."

The same situation, the President said, could very well prevail at a United Nations Charter Revision conference. But the lesson of 1787 was that intelligence, the ability to give a little, and the over-riding requirements for survival can prevail over sovereign or narrow-minded interests. It was the ability and willingness to compromise for the sake of the larger interest which had created the Constitution and the strongest democracy in the world. This could work on a world level.

And the President added forcefully, the ability and willingness to compromise might, in the end, serve to create a world constitution, the provisions of which would enable the world's people to live without the fear of war ever happening again.

He had a proposal to make before I left. Why, the President asked, why can't we say that the entire program for one year (of the United Nations Association) will be to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for peace?

I knew what he had in mind. It wasn't necessary to ask him to spell out the details. For if Dwight D. Eisenhower thinks the United Nations Association and all its members can and should mount such a one-year program, there are plenty of brains around to work out the details.

I stood to leave. My time had been up a long while ago. The President got up from his desk and walked into the middle of the room to say a last word. He was, he maintained, essentially an optimist. He had always been one and would remain so. He was still hopeful that man's intelligence would outwit his inventiveness.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND SENATOR CHURCH

Hon. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Gettysburg, Pa.

APRIL 3, 1968.

DEAR GENERAL EISENHOWER: I have read with great interest your interview in the recent issue of VISTA on various questions relating to the preservation of peace. As reported, your comments on giving the United Nations power to enforce World Court decisions, in particular, are most valuable to a discussion of peacekeeping by the United Nations.

This brings me to the point of this letter. On May 1 and 2 the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations has scheduled hearings on S. Con. Res. 47, relative to the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, a copy of which is enclosed. While this resolution is the immediate subject before us, I hope that the Subcommittee will address itself to the broader issue of maintaining the peace, particularly through the United Nations. Your views, elaborating on the comments made in the VISTA interview, would be a great contribution to this exploration. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I respectfully offer a very sincere invitation to you to appear before us.

I might add that a similar subcommittee benefited greatly in 1955 by the advice of our former Presidents Hoover and Truman on matters relating to revision of the United Nations Charter.

I hope you will give this invitation your most serious consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

FRANK CHURCH. INDIO, CALIF., April 9, 1968.

DEAR SENATOR: My interview as reported in VISTA expresses my convictions fairly accurately. Even so, if I were to be in the Washington area at the time of your Hearings I would be glad to meet quietly with your Subcommittee to discuss the possibilities of a stronger United Nations. However, since I am still in California, and my doctors discourage any transcontinental journeys except in emergency, I must regretfully inform you that I cannot be there.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.