Socialism and Constitutionalism, are likely to be fought on the Budget alone. Can a Conservative, it may be asked, consent to give the exclusive use of this tremendous weapon to a House of Commons which a turn of the wheel may make both revolutionary and unrepresentative? We admit the danger, but we think it must be faced. If tacking in its grosser form (for some degree of tacking there must always be) is excluded by a competent tribunal, the Budget proper is alone left, and against a revolutionary Budget the safeguard must be the common sense of the nation. We believe that in such a case the pressure exercised from outside upon Minister and member would make such a measure impossible, assuming that the nation were disinclined for it. The Budget affects all classes and is far more keenly scrutinised than any other type of Bill, so that there is ample room for the exercise of such pressure. If the nation were really inclined for wild experiment, then no Second Chamber, though it spoke with the tongues of men and angels, could long dispute the popular will.

We conclude, then, that in the present Conference there are present the essential conditions of agreement. For the moment we are not concerned with the nature of any scheme of reform. We believe that Liberal statesmen, equally with Conservative, are alive to the necessity of conserving what is of value in the present system: of altering, where alteration is needed, in accordance with the spirit of our Constitution. We possess an Upper House which has been the admiration of foreign critics. If we foolishly destroy the work of centuries we cannot re-create it in a month or two. The House of Lords has one cardinal merit as an institution; on the whole it has worked well. It might be made to work better; that is the justification of the Reform policy; but you cannot improve a machine if you begin by scrapping it. Liberal in the party sense it can never be; but it might well be liberal. Conservative in the party sense it is, and should not be; but like all effective Second Chambers it should be conservative. We are concerned, however, with the justification of the Conference and not with any speculation on its result.

The critics of the experiment are not confined to one party. Heady Conservatives declare that they have

nothing to surrender, and talk valiantly of forcing their views on the enemy at the sword-point. The unicameral Radicals are naturally hostile, but their quarrel is not with the Conference but with the majority of their own party. A certain number of Liberals are doubtful about the tactics, and hark back longingly to the bluff unreason of the Parliament Bill. They are afraid of concession, because, as they argue, Liberal demands are always pared down unless they are clearly a minimum. If the first Reform Bill had not been made the Liberal minimum,' they say, 'there would have been no reform at all.' There was never a more misleading parallel. Constitutional reform is one thing and constitutional destruction another. At present we are all agreed upon the need for reform, and are waiting with open minds to discuss ways and means. Had the Liberals in 1832 declared that they would not talk about reform, but insisted on disfranchising the landowning classes who had abused their power in the past, it would have been a fairly exact parallel to the attitude of the Liberal malcontents. Indeed, the opponents of the Conference, whether Liberal or Conservative, are only justified on the view that their respective parties are the repositories of some Divine revelation. If politics be a matter of human reason, there must be a good deal wrong on both sides, and a good deal right.

If the Conference is justified by the condition of its coming together, it is no less justified by an urgent public need. A war on the subject, if waged to the bitter end, would land all our institutions in the melting-pot. It would, we believe, destroy our party system, which in spite of groups and oddments is still very much alive and, as things stand, quite indispensable. It has succeeded in the past because the two great parties have been at one on the fundamentals of government, differing only in details, in emphasis, and in the kind of appeal they thought effective. We have had his Majesty's Government,' but no less, in Lord Broughton's phrase, his Majesty's Opposition.' A cleavage on an essential question, not of policy but of constitutional axiom, will make our traditional balance impossible. It would be only less dangerous than if one party were Monarchists and the other Republicans. There is no security for the ordinary citizen when a change of Ministry involves such violent

oscillations. A further ill effect would be the damage such a war would do to the Liberal party. Already that organisation comprises within itself some startling political divergences. If the Parliament Bill were proceeded with, after what has happened, it is difficult to believe that it would not strain the allegiance of the most valuable element in the party. It would in effect be a surrender to the unicameral Radicals, and a surrender not now justified, as it might have been in April, on tactical grounds.

But there is one reason more weighty than any other. No war, however bitterly fought, can be decisive. If the Conference breaks down, and the Parliament Bill is made the cry at a General Election and forced upon the House of Lords, it will be law only so long as the Conservatives are out of office. When the whirligig of time brings them back to power, it is impossible to believe that one of their first duties would not be that of restoring an authoritative Second Chamber. It is a commonplace that to make a great measure permanent you must convince the majority of your opponents. Such conviction may come slowly, as in the case of the Repeal of the Corn Laws, but come it must if the work is not to be undone. For ourselves we cannot conceive of the Conservative party ever acquiescing in a policy which strikes at the very foundations of their faith. This general assent is especially needful in the case of constitutional changes, for there can be no speedy adjustment of the national outlook to embrace them, as happens with a new financial policy. The pinch of the shoe would remain as a perpetual reminder. In altering the Constitution you touch, not the purposes of the machine, but the machine itself. No one can contemplate with pleasure the kind of strife which can never issue in victory. And the strife is the more foolish since both sides are so near agreement. In Mr Galsworthy's play the strikers after a desperate war get no better terms than they could have got weeks before without any suffering. That's where the fun comes in,' is the bitter comment of the Union secretary.

6

The admission that a Conference is possible and the fact that it is now in session are really admissions that it should be successful. There is no question of either side Vol. 213.-No. 424.

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being false to its principles. The co-ordinate authority of the two Houses is as much a Liberal as a Conservative tradition. Both parties are agreed on the necessity of reforming the Lords, and on the general lines which such a reform should take. No doubt there will be wide differences of opinion on the details, but these differences will cut across party lines, and will not involve the embittered disputes which arise when party loyalty is involved. The British people are good partisans, but they can get too much of party warfare, and they are not very tolerant of unnecessary squabbles. Only a few fanatics and election-agents are perpetually itching for battle. The side which sets the machinery of party in motion for a trivial cause is fairly certain to suffer for it in the long run. We have to-day a situation which above all things calls for reason and good sense. Our constitutional machinery is breaking down in many parts and needs overhauling. Reform of the House of Commons is, from the standpoint of national interest, at least as urgent as reform of the House of Lords. In the work of reconstruction, in which both parties are vitally interested and in which there is a growing agreement, success, as we have argued, is only possible by friendly co-operation. If the party trumpets are to sound over every detail we shall never get an inch forward. We wish to keep our Constitution intact, King, Lords, and Commons playing their due part in national policy. Of late years the Lower House has been changing its character, and becoming more and more the obedient tool of the Ministry and the party caucus. The crisis of last winter has probably done something to arrest the decline. It is well to emphasise the historic rights of the Commons, even though we may hold that they have often been lamentably overstated. But the cause of the Commons is not served by exalting it at the expense of the other House, and so attempting to break up the organic unity of an historic system. It is well to be a House of Commons man, but it is far better to be a Constitution man; for it is to the whole Constitution, and not to any one part of it, that has been entrusted the defence of the safety and liberties of the people.

THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. 425.-OCTOBER, 1910.

Art. 1.-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN TIME OF WAR. 1. Economic Inquiries and Studies. By Sir Robert Giffen, K.C.B. Two vols. London: Bell, 1904.

2. Finanzielle Kriegsbereitschaft und Kriegsführung. By Dr J. Riesser. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1909.

3. Report by the Committee on a National Guarantee for the War Risks of Shipping. London: Wyman, 1908. 4. Europe's Optical Illusion. By Norman Angell. London: Simpkin, 1909.

THE question of financial preparation for war is one of vital importance to this country; and yet it may be said that this aspect of the problem of national defence has been practically ignored hitherto. London is the citadel of the international financial system; and, in the event of war with a European Power capable of challenging our naval supremacy, the London money-market would be immediately subjected to a financial panic of unparalleled magnitude and severity, a panic which could hardly fail to involve the whole community in incalculable losses, unless certain measures of precaution be taken.

The country which can hope to conduct a great war with the minimum of distress to its civil inhabitants, and to emerge from the conflict with the least permanent loss to its citizens, must possess, in addition to its naval and military forces, great national wealth, a prosperous and well-employed population whose food-supplies are assured at reasonable rates, well-ordered national finances which do not place an unduly high burden of taxation upon the people, and, finally, money-markets organised upon a sound basis, and banks and financial institutions able to meet with ease all their money engagements. It will be Vol. 213.-No. 425.

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