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Dr. Kay. I am trying to survive as we get close to things that are really sensitive. All U.N. members were requested to provide intelligence and a large number of U.N. members provided intelligence there. And let me tell you, the variability of the quality of that intelligence was the same across every group. There is not one that stands out as always having been right. That has got to be there. For me it is resources, people, and intelligence. The final element is leadership that is determined to end that program, not play a U.N. game of keeping the Security Council happy, but it is a dedication to really ending that program because you are going up against a regime that is determined to keep the program. So those are the four things, but Dick probably has some others.
Dr. SPERTZEL. I think it is appropriate. The problem that you are going to have is the multiplicity of sites that he could be using, and I don't see how you are going to be able to get around to all of those in a timely fashion and not having things moved. I once said that the only way I could assure you that absolutely Iraq had no biological weapons or no program remaining was that if you essentially have inspectors lined up hand to hand from the eastern border-southern border from the eastern side all the way out to Saudi Arabia and you began to march north and every time you got to a hole in the ground or a building you made a point of going in and looking. That is a gross exaggeration but that is what it amounts to, because his ability to move items is such that if you don't get there in a hurry you might miss them.
There is a committee with a noble sounding name of the Control of Biological and Chemical Materials. You know sort of sounds like our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or something along that line. That committee had members in every ministry. Those members were all part of the intelligence service, and that committee actually functioned as a way for Iraq to immediately mobilize personnel, materials and equipment. And they could do that within 24 to 48 hours. And that is what you are up against. So what it would take, lots of inspectors. I don't know how you would sustain-and I believe Dr. Kay was talking about a thousand total for all the disciplines—I don't see how you can sustain them.
Mr. SPRATT. Earlier in our previous witnesses, two other things were mentioned. One was the security backup that has been mentioned by the Carnegie Foundation. Of course they estimated the size of it as 50,000 troops, which is several divisions. That in itself is a huge logistical undertaking, but, in addition, the right to take key suspected scientists out of the country for questioning and interrogation. Would you put that in your charter?
Dr. Kay. I certainly would put the last in.
Dr. SPERTZEL. Here, again, it takes—I agree. I think that would be magnificent, but you are talking about something that I seriously doubt would be done under the U.N.
Mr. SPRATT. I am talking hypothetically.
Dr. SPERTZEL. You could get a hold of a few key individuals. And unfortunately in biology, I can't tell you who was head of that program. We knowingly did not ever talk to that person. It may have been somebody we talked to, but we didn't know it.
Mr. SPRATT. Here is one thing that concerns me, Dr. Kay. I also posed this question earlier. I have this fear that other members
have expressed that we send young men and women into Iraq and Saddam Hussein, knowing that the jig is up, unleashes with full fury his chemical and biological weapons on them early on, not when he is in a corner but early on to try and daunt their invasion. If we could one last time get in, is there some possibility that we might find caches of these weapons if we have this kind of charter, that could at least diminish, if not eradicate his ability to counterattack with these weapons when we send our young men and women in?
Dr. Kay. You can certainly get lucky. I had inspections that got lucky and found things that the Iraqis thought we wouldn't find and found them. Let me give you an example that describes the difficulty of conducting inspections and moving with security people. UNSCOM during its total history from 1991 to 1998, conducted 280 inspections. This doesn't count monitoring visits, but actual inspections.
Mr. SPRATT. That means facilities, sites?
Dr. Kay. Facilities, sites, vary from large to small. Of those 280—and we recently have done a reanalysis of those, less than half a dozen were genuine surprises. The Iraqis penetrated where we were going, either through human intelligence (HUMINT), inadequate communication security on the part of the teams, various means, and actually greeted us at those sites—actually fewer. The first surprise inspection that was a genuine surprise I conducted, I had six people that knew where we were going, only six. The rest of the team, it was “trust me, you are with me.” That was a genuine surprise because no one talked and we went to really fantastic lengths to keep a secret. If I have got to move around with—I mean I can't imagine moving around with a thousand security personnel. The issue of keeping that a secret and them not knowing where you are going strikes me as just impossible. The number might be useful if you get there and they say “no.” But the issue is, if they know where you are going—and Dick Spertzel described it very well—if they know where you are going you can bet when you get there what you want is not going to be there. They have perfected over 11 years a deception, denial, concealment program based on mobility, prior knowledge, and quick movement. We made them better than they were in 1991.
So that is why you are getting this pessimism. Would it be worth it if you could accomplish reducing the threat somewhat, getting more evidence that was physical that would convince allies to join you? I understand all those reasons. And my skepticism is, if your objective is to eliminate the WMD program, I don't see it useful. It may well serve other purposes, although I would not underestimate the difficulty of doing that.
Mr. SPRATT. The likelihood of accidentally finding it, if you look at what allegedly Iraq had done with their biological weaponssome of them were stored in a hole in the ground at the end of a dirt runway covered with a tarpaulin and then unearthed. Others were buried in pits, along the Tigris Canal, again covered with tarpaulin and sand. Others were inside railroad tunnels no longer being used for trains. The likelihood of inspectors finding those without good intelligence information that says they are there is somewhere between nil and none. It is just not going to happen.
Thank you very much.
Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for testifying. I am sorry—I was watching your testimony from my office during other meetings, but I did read your statements and I was here for the classified portion. First of all, in response to Mr. Andrews' questions we ought to put it on the record that in fact, relative to the possibility of a smallpox incident, there was a war game conducted last May at Andrews Air Force base called Dark Winter. You are both probably familiar with that. That war game simulation was paid for by the Army and was conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Sam Nunn played the role of the President. Jim Woolsey played the role of the CIA Director and the incident-basically, the war game envisioned a deliberate outbreak of three cases of smallpox, individual cases in each of three states: Pennsylvania, Alabama and Arkansas. Within 2 weeks, 2 million Americans were afflicted with smallpox, not 2,000, 200,000 but 2 million.
So we actually have a war game that has been conducted by our military that goes into very specific detail about the problems associated, and that was done, by the way before 9/11. It was done in May of 2001. One of my concerns is that the problem in Iraq was caused by lack of control of proliferation during the 1990s. It was a big concern that I raised consistently. In fact I had documented 38 times that we had evidence that Russian entities and Chinese entities illegally sent weapons of mass destruction and conventional technology into Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea. One of the most egregious violations was when we caught the Iraqis receiving not once, not twice, but three times, the accelerometers and gyroscopes. And what did the administration do at that time? Pretend that we didn't see it. We never imposed the required sanctions. That was in 1997, I believe. I was in Moscow a month after we found it and we didn't even want to ask the Russians about that because it would have embarrassed Boris Yeltsin.
So my question to you, first of all, is—and I am not totally satisfied that this administration has taken enough aggressive steps to stop proliferation into Iraq. There was a recent report that perhaps Ukraine has supplied some military technology into Iraq. So my first question to you is are you satisfied that proliferation controls are better today than they were in the past relative to this kind of technology going in that could enhance our capability in the area of weapons of mass destruction?
Dr. SPERTZEL. I will give you a quick answer in biology because I think it is probably simpler than the nuclear side. The answer basically is no, I am not because there was no-Iraq had no problem getting critical items, even while the inspectors were there, being imported through-ostensibly clandestinely across the borderam not sure about that—from Jordan into Iraq as well as from Syria into Iraq. We know that there was direct evidence of that. We had one company that told us that, “oh, yeah, he sent his representative to Amman and ordered what he wanted.” And we saw the signed slips indicating that he had received it. And there is no indication that things have improved any since 1998. Sanctions are not working. The borders of Iraq are as porous as can be.
Dr. Kay. I share that view. I think it is in the areas of nuclear and ballistic missiles a somewhat similar problem. When you combine money with how far the Iraqis are and the way technology progresses it has become a much worse problem. Let me give you the case of the aluminum centrifuge rotors. The Iraqi centrifuge pieces that a team I was on discovered were made of marging steel. Marging steel is harder to get access to. It is a more specialized technology and not everyone can produce it. They were going to carbon fiber rotors, because carbon fiber winding machines, although controlled because they are relevant to missile technology, as you know, Mr. Weldon, in addition to centrifuges were still at that point where they were becoming generally available because of Callaway golf clubs, high performance fly rods, and a whole series of other issues. So they were on the slope and they understood it. By going to carbon fiber, they were better off. Going to aluminum is even easier because a number of countries that have the capabilities to extrude high performance aluminum tubes is almost in any country that has a machine tool industry.
So the problem has become porous. We have not found an effective way of dealing with it, but let me tell you, I am pessimistic that there is an easy way to deal with it other than replacing the regime. We are very much into talking about export controls and all, and I am certainly in favor of them relevant to Iraq. It is very much like putting your finger in the dike when in fact you ought to be examining the nature of the flood control system as a whole there and it is why you have the problem. It is much worse than it was in the 1990s.
Mr. WELDON. One final question and this gets to the point you both made which I was going to ask and you have already answered it, and that is you are convinced that the only solution is a regime change, and I am coming to that conclusion very quickly myself. But knowing the kinds of considerations that our colleagues have to make on an up and coming vote, I think it is going to behoove us, whatever step we can, to convince overwhelmingly our members that that is the course of action we have to take. So therefore, I happen to believe that we have to put more pressure on Russia.
Russia just signed a $40 billion energy deal with Iraq. They are hugely involved in Iraq and have had both political and economic ties to Iraq. We spend about a billion dollars a year in Russia, most of which I support, in the area of economic investment, cooperative threat reduction, agricultural and environmental assistance. So therefore, what I am trying to organize, and I talked to some of some my Russian colleagues in the Duma over the weekend as a follow-up to a trip you took with me, Mr. Saxton, to go to Vienna to negotiate a framework to end the Kosovo conflict, which they involved themselves in, to take to Russia a delegation that basically says to the Russians, “It is time for you to join the foray directly. You are getting our assistance and you have told us you don't want conflict. You are against us going into Iraq. Here is the set of criteria that we want with you with us to get Saddam to agree upon," which I think is going to be impossible on the face because, one, they won't want to do it and, two, Saddam won't accept it. Can you help me and members of this body, and this will be both Democrats and Republicans. In fact, there were two Democrats that asked me to do this can you put together, not today but in the next couple of days a very short one-page of what would that scenario be, what would those conditions be? Obviously, uncontrolled access to any site, so that we can go and take this to the Russians, who we support and help, and say, okay, here is what we expect you to do? You got leverage with Saddam. We need to end this. And so we can use that leverage to convince, if not the Russians that they can could do this, but to show our colleagues in the House before the vote that we will have taken every possible attempt that we could take to try to provide a mechanism to allow the process to move forward as was originally required by the U.N. resolutions?
Could you help us define what those parameters would be?
Mr. WELDON. Do you also believe that Russia in fact, can and should be playing a much more aggressive role in getting Saddam to do what we want him to do, given our assistance to Russia?
Dr. SPERTZEL. I don't think there is any question that they should be, but I seriously question whether they will because the conditions that would
be required are such that anybody wantsthe French learned. The French started taking a tough line with Iraq about a year and a half ago. As a result, Iraq promptly signed several contracts with Moscow to exploit the oil field east of Kut, and now Russia is Iraq's leading trading partner and not the French.
Dr. Kay. I am more optimistic and let me tell you, I think this is true of our European allies. I think the difficulty of convincing them to take the tough argument and overcome some economic costs is that they haven't believed we are serious. Once they can believe that we are serious about regime replacement and the Iraqis can do it the easy way or they can do it the hard way, that changes the entire equation because they know they are not going to be dealing with the old Saddam. They may be dealing with either a new regime—and this exists in what a physicist calls imaginary space-a new Saddam, a kinder, gentler, honest Saddam. In either case they know they have to cut a different deal. The problem is for literally—this goes back to 1991–they have not believed that we are serious about that issue. So in their own self-interest, they have cut the most logical, rational deal with the guy who has got the money. So I can be more optimistic if I believe we are indeed serious and can convince our allies and our friends like the Russians that we are serious.
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Snyder.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If it seems like you have been here for hours it is because you have been here for hours. So we appreciate you being here.
The cooperative threat reduction that you mentioned earlier in your testimony, Dr. Kay, and I took from your comments that you have been supportive of the program. Senator Lugar has made the suggestion that we, Congress, ought to authorize and the administration be able to expand that to other countries. Now that we have some newer members of the nuclear club, do you agree with that concern that we ought to be looking perhaps at a country like Pakistan or India, if we thought they needed some help, that we could