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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DUNCAN HUNTER
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
September 18, 2002
Today, the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of United States policy toward Iraq.
This morning's hearing marks the second of a number of planned public sessions designed to educate and inform the Committee, and the American people, on the various issues surrounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nation's resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction, and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States, the Middle East, and the international community.
Last week, the Committee received a classified briefing from the CIA and DIA. We also heard from former, senior UNSCOM inspectors about Iraq's illicit weapons programs, and Saddam Hussein's persistent efforts to thwart the efforts of the U.N. inspectors so that he might preserve, and advance, his weapons of mass destruction programs.
Tomorrow, the Armed Services Committee will hear how the Iraqis built and sustained their weapons of mass destruction programs
through the legal, and illegal, acquisition of Western technology, and how the United States' own export control system may have contributed to the problems we are now facing with Iraq.
We also continue to plan further hearings for the coming weeks that will examine in greater detail the various aspects of the policy options before us.
Today, however, we are honored to have Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the Committee to discuss U.S. policy toward Iraq. He is the first cabinet-level official to appear on the Hill regarding Iraq, so we are all anxious to discuss these matters with him today.
Secretary Rumsfeld is joined by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Welcome gentlemen.
Mr. Secretary, before we ask you for your opening remarks, I want to invite Mr. Skelton, the Ranking Democrat on the committee, to offer
any comments he might have.
Thank you Mr.Skelton.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the floor is yours.
Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
September 18, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers for being with us today to answer the many questions shared by our colleagues and the American people.
This is a critical time for us to be considering U.S. action against Iraq. President Bush has made clear to the Congress, the United Nations, and the American people his determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize the threat posed by the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. I applaud his realization that the threat posed by Saddam is one that faces the United Nations as a whole. I think we all agree that Saddam is a despot who has violated the Security Council's resolutions for years.
But having recognized the central role of the United Nations, we must take seriously its collective judgment about how to enforce these resolutions. I am not suggesting that Congress will or should only consider an option fully supported by the United Nations, but the administration must be able to answer fundamental questions about any decision to use force. Why must action be taken now? What is the threshold beyond which the United States can no longer wait for Iraqi
compliance with Security Council resolutions or for U.N. action in the
face of Iraqi defiance?
Beyond the decision to act with or without the United Nations, I have wrestled with a series of questions which I have shared with the President. Exercising our constitutional responsibilities requires Congress to take into account not only these near-term considerations of HOW to act, but also the longer-term implications for U.S. security interests globally of using military force against Iraq.
Some of these questions have to do with waging the broader war on terrorism. How will the United States ensure that we continue to have international support for our efforts against al Qaeda, even if the administration seeks military action without Security Council approval? Do we have the forces, fiscal resources, munitions, and other military capabilities to wage both campaigns effectively? How is the United States preparing to deal with likely Iraqi efforts to draw Israel into the conflict by launching missiles, possibly with chemical or biological warheads? What type of planning is going into succeeding in sustained urban operations or on a battlefield made toxic by chemical weapons? As members of the Armed Services Committee, we all share the
commitment to making sure that our troops can succeed on the battlefield at the lowest possible level of risk if we decide to put them in
In considering the long-term aspects of the question to use force, I am reminded of Carl von Clausewitz's maxim in On War: that in
strategy it is “imperative...not to take the first step without considering the last.” We must think through carefully and NOW_before we authorize military force—how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of World War II. In today's dynamic battlefield, we don't have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and democratic Iraq that takes all major groups—Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd-into account? How will we handle members of the Baath party and those scientists and engineers that designed Iraq's WMD programs? What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come?
Any decision to act against Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and long-term responsibilities that come with doing so. With answers to these questions, I will look forward to supporting the President and in helping to craft a congressional authorization to do so. I thank both witnesses for being with us today, for sharing their expertise and hopefully for providing answers to the questions I have outlined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.