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In considering the long-term aspects of the question to use force, I am reminded of Carl von Clausewitz's maxim in On War: that in strategy it is "imperative...not to take the first step without considering the last." We must think through carefully and NOW--before we authorize military force-how the United States would manage Iraq after Saddam fell. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan took years before the end of World War II. In today's dynamic battlefield, we don't have the luxury of years to prepare. How can we build a stable and democratic Iraq that takes all major groups-Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd-into account? How will we handle members of the Baath party and those scientists and engineers that designed Iraq's WMD programs? What military commitment will be required from the United States at the time of our victory and in the years to come?
Any decision to act against Iraq must begin with answers to these questions about the strategy for achieving victory and long-term responsibilities that come with doing so. With answers to these questions, I will look forward to supporting the President and in helping to craft a congressional authorization to do so. I thank both witnesses for being with us today, for sharing their expertise and hopefully for providing answers to the questions I have outlined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIERS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE 1 TH CONGRESS
I welcome the opportunity to share with you the nature of the threat that the Iraqi regime presents to the United States, our forces and our allies. I also welcome this chance to share with you what you the improved capabilities our Armed Forces possess today.
As it has for the past decade, the Iraqi regime remains a significant threat to our interests and those of our allies. Despite the presence of UN sanctions, Iraq has repaired and sustained key elements of its offensive, conventional forces. Iraqi armed forces maintain over 2,000 main battle tanks, more than 3,500 armored personnel carriers and more than 2,000 pieces of artillery. Today, Iraqi ground forces have 23 divisions, to include 6 Republican Guard divisions. Its Air Force operates over 50 key air defense radars and has about 300 jet aircraft, to include a limited number of Mirage F-1s and MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft.
Since 2000, Iraq's air defense forces have engaged coalition forces enforcing the UN mandated No-Fly Zones over Northern and Southern Iraq more than 2,300 times. Since August of 2001, Iraqi hostile actions have downed 3 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In the last 2 weeks, over 25 coalition aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones have been engaged by Iraqi anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.
Despite these hostile actions, in the aggregate, the regime's military forces are down by roughly 50 to 60 percent, compared to 1990. Poor morale is reportedly widespread in many units and the quality of training is low. Iraqi forces employ aging weapon systems. Nonetheless, Iraq continues to invest heavily in rebuilding its military, including air defense systems and command and control networks. The Iraqi army also has preserved some limited countrywide mobility for its armored forces. The nature and type of these military forces are similar to the offensive capability Iraq used to invade Iran, to invade Kuwait, to attack the Kurds, and to crush popular uprisings against Saddam's regime.
At the same time, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program represents a greater threat to American lives, our interests and those of our allies and friends. When UN inspection teams were forced to leave Iraq in 1998, they documented that Iraq had failed to fulfill UN disarmament mandates and to accurately account for its most dangerous weapons. In response to ejecting those inspectors, the US and our coalition partners conducted Operation DESERT FOX in December 1998. In 70 hours, the coalition dealt a limited blow to Iraq's WMD and missile programs. At the time, we estimated that we set back its programs by six months to a year. In the four years since, Iraq has continued to develop chemical weapons, primarily mustard agent, the nerve agent Sarin, and VX - an extremely potent nerve
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borders. Over the past few months, with the demise of their safe haven in Afghanistan, some al Qaida operatives have relocated to Iraq. Baghdad's support for international terrorist organizations ranges from explicit and overt support to implicit and passive acquiescence.
Iraq is governed by a terrorist regime. From a military perspective, Iraq's conventional forces and WMD programs represent a threat to the region, our allies and US interests.
US Military Capabilities Today
Our Nation's military forces enjoy the respect of the vast majority of countries and their armed forces. This respect stems from our forces' professional skills, superior intelligence assets, agile power projection capability, unique C2 networks and the lethal combat power that our Joint Team brings to the fight. As we have done in DESERT STORM, in Bosnia, in Kosovo and most recently in Afghanistan, our armed forces are always ready to integrate the military capabilities of our allies and partners into a decidedly superior, coalition force.
In a contest between Iraq's military forces and our Nation's armed forces, the outcome is clear. Our joint warfighting team, in concert with our partners, can and will decisively defeat Iraqi military forces.
Many will remember the results of the last encounter between our coalition forces and Iraq eleven years ago. Since then, US combat power has improved. Today, our nation's joint warfighting team enjoys improved intelligence, command and control, is more deployable and possesses greater combat power. Let me briefly address each of these areas.
In terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability, our operations over Afghanistan demonstrated our improved ability to observe the enemy. Our network of sensors, combined with the improved flow of tactical information to commanders and warfighters at all levels, have allowed us to react faster to a fluid battlefield environment. In DESERT STORM, our only unmanned aerial vehicle, the Pioneer, was limited to a 5-hour sortie and restricted to line-of-sight from its command center. Today, Predator and Global Hawk provide our forces day and night surveillance capability for extended periods of time far over the horizon.
In a similar manner, our warfighters have more updated intelligence for their mission. In DESERT STORM, pilots used target photos that were often 2-3 days old. Determining accurate coordinates often required 24 hours and was done exclusively in the rear echelon in the United States. This process was good, but not as responsive as it needed to bc. Today, our aircrews have photos that are often only hours old and can determine coordinates for precision engagement in just 20 minutes.
A critical component of the information needed by our warfighting commanders is to monitor and detect the presence of chemical and biological agents in the tactical environment. Today, our forces have an improved ability to detect suspected Iraqi chemical and biological agents.