« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
SIMS -sce i te dom tre really agoniz
3 ces 11 e Donne door and vote SSS I TE I DSSIST I resolution support
as I = Tere ind weariy we know + 25 e 2 wear. The Vice Presi
21 al veekend doing that. ans: m-star trny general who Ir I Tere re tot of retired
EST CIETE1 ipout this and they KI—han I whom I know * Pars Te Vary, so I respect 16 acre : mink I you can be
JE TE Dan ring to react. ***ZI * sometimes f we might 24 Tepie to over there
SO TU ears ne the most
mg muusands and thou-
17 Song are here in this
Hent in jur part. And I
v ru te. now would each
So, I just believe that when you are faced—and this is not-and I should have said this to Mr. Allen-it is not as if we are coming to the problem of Saddam for the first time in September of 2002. We have had 11 years of experience. And when he failed to live up to his obligation under Resolution 687 and 11 other resolutions of the U.N. to get rid of those weapons, I have absolutely no reason to believe he is going to change his spots.
I simply believe and what is so extraordinarily hard for democracies—that is, to protect themselves and risk the lives of their sons and daughters when they don't have overwhelming proof in the form of having lost the first battle. And I just think the consequences are far too serious this time.
But, look, I understand your agony, and I am glad I don't have that voting card.
Mr. SCHROCK. So you would not tell me how you would vote?
Dr. SPERTZEL. And I very much agree with that. If there was a way of getting that regime to truly want to get rid of their weapons of mass destruction and no longer deceive or conceal, and if there was a way of getting the complete unconditional backing of at least the P5 members so that inspectors would have a chance, then I would say, go that way.
But that is not going to happen. You know, even the French proposal that has been made—already, China has indicated they are going to abstain and Russia hasn't decided, but they think they might veto it. That tells you how much support the inspectors are going to have. And I can tell you right now that the last year-anda-half that inspectors were in the country—when we went there as a chief inspector—we were on our own. We could not rely on being backed up by anybody, and yet we were there to face Iraq. And I don't see anything at all that suggests that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) will face a better situation.
There is no alternative.
Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, let me make one more personal comment. When I volunteered to go into the country of Vietnam and my mother was very upset-my dad understood, but he wasn't happy about it—I couldn't understand their concern. And they said, some day, when you are a parent, you will understand.
My son was commissioned as an ensign three weeks ago, and my wife and I are now my parents; we understand. And I take that seriously, and I don't want to send those kids into harm's way unless we are doing it for the absolute right reason. And if we go into it to win and we don't play the Vietnam game that we played-because we didn't go in that to win, and we lost 55,000 great Americans. If we send them in this time, we have got to go in to win and then get it over with.
Dr. SPERTZEL. To me, the alternative is likely that you could have thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of American citizenswomen, children, elderly-being killed by a terrorist weapon. And, frankly, if I were about 40 years younger, I would be on the line volunteering to go.
Mr. SCHROCK. If I were younger, I would, too. I understand that, and I agree with that. Thank you very much.
how he preram e Procely. But, I am confident that having
<!-***iftit, l'Ova am and I say, he is sitting there AV WAV HN villaitteel. I have ou loubt that he has weap'n uit alcatus with this everybody is going to A little guante antihiace he.
Idehere OL dittte turers and our capabilities are We were the heat vut and anything else in that region She W Bul chunk he is atore confused right now rather
behark weg tot get hun, or we actually come We would you tell tv utover kitowing what you know men
the person we de ding with.
hulle very two questions. Let me tell you why I u hele land now, or he is "contained," we have
the of the word We one thatod tit 1991, when we had a fairly tight,
de wf keeping things out and controlling the amount of revenue he has to be that sells illegally. I am not talking about the oil for food poistett, but illegally has greater oil income DK And a
pily getting acressaluminum tubes Ache technology that will make his programs even more caare am trple, but the poemples are better than that-getting parle armpetent than they are today.
, know where his muclear Me is today with a great deal of preOlle Me he invece a lot of resources to keep us from knowVars Te entienan.
Vs Srs vu. Ir. Charman, and thank you, both ene, trene cuay. :IUS I upe I quescuns, and the first one has to
raz toute unes par vou saw played with Iraq. 2: No us havde pour insight into the mentality of en te regne dere zess he is the regime kust pays importantiy in the judgment we
ever expertise in particular on the nuclear side Sue to it'uer nat Sauuam äussein is a bad guy, that mit vie, na de las encai md biological weap
we eeu gans is Jwn and used them against 2. PUC 'ILY Uesavn ves back to something that1- L'ent was caik ng iour, chis whole issue of “Why poteulale What has aanged."
Untitetits that vuu naue, Doctor, was that we are sivut a Talvitai persn. nu ny answer to that would Teet Mitte wila vul, except what when it came to self
went that was a site and ur sie war. he sat down alerina hal would preserve us ability to be there
atre aitu v vel woung what he s doing today, a Porto start as he as human being, there is this sense
diline ved udfun, Neuticki ang biviogical. I am not sure rte were he and I was sitting there, I would
solved those technical problems, and with money, it will only get worse and not get better. So, over time, I see it a harder problem to deal with. And quite frankly, I would suspect if his nuclear weapons program-once you have two, three or four, it becomes a shadow that allows you to do other things, use chemical and biological against his neighbors and know that we won't go.
But you put your finger on the heart of the issue, and that is what sort of person he is and what does he care about his survival. We have a hard time-let me be sure I am not held by the chairman in contempt-we have a hard time believing that politicians mean what they say. If you read Saddam Hussein's statements about Israel, about the United States, about Saudi Arabia and all, this is an individual who, given-I am extraordinarily reluctant to believe we should give the awesome power and count on him being rational, to always believe his survival, and so he should threaten them and not use them.
And also, he is surrounding neighbors that are of two types, that I find we are not paying enough attention to the risk we are running. Most of his neighbors do not have enough military force to interfere in their own affairs. They are weak states. They depend on us for whatever security they have.
There is one exception as an immediate neighbor, and that is Iran, which is engaged in a weapons of mass destruction program for which we have a hard time bringing any pressure to bear, because I think in our hearts those of us who dealt with them in the region recognize that that program in part is designed against Saddam. I suspect if Saddam stays in power and his weapons program goes ahead, the Iranian program will go ahead, and that just becomes a very, very dangerous region.
The reverse of that, however, is true and we haven't spelled that out. A replacement regime for Saddam Hussein that is committed to dealing peacefully with its neighbors is a tremendously attractive proposition in the Middle East.
Rich Spertzel and I can tell you in great detail about our appreciation of the middle class in Iraq, of the dedication of the scientific and technical learning they have. Imagine what would change if we had an Iraq that was committed to some form of democracy, such as it might as in the Middle East, and living peacefully with its neighbors. What a challenge that would pose for the Saudis, a challenge to the Iranians. The reverse side is one that I would prefer to deal with: the optimistic, hopeful side of what it might be without Iraq.
And let me say in my testimony—and Mr. Allen cited a point right below it-said Iraq is not Libya and that is why it is harder to eliminate the program. It is much more like post-Versailles, Germany.
But, Iraq is also not Afghanistan in terms of a functioning society that can be recreated. The ratio of population to oil to two river valleys, that for centuries have been irrigated, is a tremendous possibility for peace in a region that sadly needs it.
So I guess it is a personal decision. I would prefer not to run the risk of greater weapons in the hands of an individual like Saddam that attracts his neighbors either to cut deals with him or to develop their own weapons of mass destruction and try to deal with
the Auture without him. I basically believe that is a lot better for *** (ney and for his neighbors.
P Ntet. And I would like to add, if I might, that I guess (po pot my tattutions is that it seems to me that the decision is hos homething to change that regime's mind—and if that
the the regime, so be it or we decide we don't really
the door and we are willing to live with it, because don't har hent. It hasn't worked. Embargo hasn't worked. The dress leaky as a sieve trying to hold water. We
WP w ample evidence of prohibited items that we Inson on doing in our routine inspection sites. And inspectors aren't brinda una tash it five you without a change in attitude and without the and support of the permanent five members, which you Hide and again to get. So the decision is either we do something had 4" we don't do anything. But then let's stop talking about IN MANILA Mr. Chairman, will you indulge me? The second
ille de la very quick answer from both of them. IN UNIT* All right. Very quick.
ANAE Nuclear knowledge, because you have it and I Accent Analility for Iraq to both have nuclear arms and a delivery
hutomos here to the United States—I believe, not talking und walking in theough terrorism. Terrorism I put in a different non it is something we are at war with right now. How far in yolu bout estimate would that be for him?
With regard to a weapon, a device that would work, go Results vild if he had the material, my best guess is somewhere
month. Months not years, I have said, to do it. If he Irrivatop the tissile material himself, I can do no better than The f***Malimate, which is three to six years, but doesn't tell
the clock started running on that three to six years. The delivery method I am not talking about terrorism. A ship
Mainoi that has a global positioning system (GPS) device or pennend device strikes me, if I send it here I mean, we are Lihat believing that the only way you can deliver weapons of
want sonction is ballistic missiles or high-performance aircraft. Tapah Te other ways to do it if you have a different model to do
Think it he wanted to destroy Tel Aviv, if he had a missile he W cetnimly prefer to use it. But, I think he will think of other 11414 to it, delivering other than a missile.
Thund in terms of his missile delivery program, the crucial indid that we don't know enough about, but we have just got to ovidence in foreign assistance. He has clearly gotten for
tance on his solid missile fuel production facility. We din now exactly where that came from. If the sanctions come off The inney runs, Could he get enough-I think that's end of the
de noxt somewhere in the next decade for missile delivery. Hi I would hate to see any policy based on that as the only way 111441 deliver a weapon of mass destruction. For biology, for exdinle, an experts will tell you, a missile is a lousy way to deliver Sandwical weapon.
A SANCHEZ. I am not talking about biology. I am talking about Londomar I am sure he has got the other and got a way to deliver s. Hut, to us here, not in a typical walk-across or the nuclear suit