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They understood, they call it a struggle for survival. To be a struggle through military and armament and as such, their basic aim is to have a fighting force, which is basically impregnable and basically the strongest in the region and do their own through their own will build that fighting force using Iraq's huge oil resources as a basis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So the entire party would have to be removed from the government?

Dr. HAMZA. The whole party system has to be removed which is ingrained. It has its own literature, its own law, its own history. It is huge. It is like the Communist Party.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. If Saddam Hussein or the party had a nuclear weapon completed, ready to be used, and this is an opinion from you, what do you think he would do with it?

Dr. HAMZA. It depends. If he is in a corner, he will use it. That was made clear during the Gulf War when he ordered us to make one crash nuclear weapon and it is called the crash nuclear weapon, which is declared by Iraq in 1996 and is officially admitted by the Iraqi government to turn the French fuel we had into one nuclear weapon.

Now that makes no sense unless you intend to use it as a last resort. What would you do with one nuclear weapon? If you test, you lose it. So that terrified us at the time and our chemists saved us by dragging their feet and claiming they cannot get 18 kilograms we need to make one nuclear weapon out of the French fuel, which is 31 kilogram. So there is the intent. Then, they made two other crash programs, which are chemical and biological weapons, which were put on the way of the U.S. forces in case they came to Baghdad. We don't know what they intended to do with them. Our guess, and the word was they would be blown up on the face of whatever incoming force there is and claiming that the Air Force destroyed them.

So this is one angle also to watch out for, is that the depots he can use. So, it is just the total belief that weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction, because Iraq cannot make any other kind of weaponry, it cannot make conventional weapon. The weapons of mass destruction is all it can make is the base for the survival of the regime and its power base.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, it interests me that you said, I believe the program in 1987, if I am correct what you said, was to develop six a year. I find that a little more than just, if I am backed into a corner.

Dr. HAMZA. That is the orders we got. We had to reduce that order actually gradually and make it into something like we could live with, like two a year, but we always got back orders that once we are through this stage one, we have to think ahead of time and to jump in to a larger production facility.

Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady, and you have got about a minute left on this vote, but I think that they will hold it open for a while as they usually do on the first one, so—I thank her for her line of questions.

Gentlemen, let me take you back to Mr. Spratt's questions, and this is kind of a complex thing and let's kind of walk through what

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we have in terms of controls,

what we had before 1991 and what we put in place afterwards. The essence, I think of Mr. Spratt's questions, Mr. Milhollin, was the effect that we still—there are still ostensibly controls in place, for example, for the aluminum tubes, even if the tubes fit under this so-called classification of something that is mass marketed. And, your response was that you are still going to have a problem as a result of us essentially legalizing those sales. Could you explain that in a little more detail?

Dr. MILHOLLIN. Right now, aluminum tubes are controlled for export by all the countries in the nuclear suppliers group, which contain, which includes most of the countries in the world that can make aluminum tubes of this kind. That is also true for maraging steel and carbon fibers. So if we look around the world, we see our principal trading partners and allies controlling things in the same way we do. They control all of these technologies for export, which means that-it doesn't mean that there is a prohibition against the export. It means that if you want to sell it to somebody, you have to get a license and the reason for that is that these things are specially-can be used to make nuclear weapons.

Well, if we detect a shipment on the way somewhere of a controlled technology, the fact that it is controlled gives us a diplomatic place to stand when we talk to the country that is supplying it. We can say to them, “Look, this is controlled. You have obligations here. We don't think you are meeting your obligations, therefore we are asking you to stop this shipment.” If the-if we change our law now and de-control these things, we will no longer have that platform. There will no longer be any basis for saying to another country, “Look, you are undermining world security by selling this, because there won't be any decision by the world or by multi—through a multilateral export control regime that these things are dangerous and should be restricted.” That is my point.

Mr. HUNTER. You know, I thought that the one statement by Dr. Hamza was—reflected a tragedy in the way our system works in that you mentioned Hewlett-Packard having told you that theyyou couldn't buy a certain system from them directly, but you could buy it from their Singapore outlet. What was that system again, Dr. Hamza.

Dr. HAMZA. Just at the time the 368 process for the desktop computer, which just came out, was restricted for a country like Iraq. Just a simple desktop computer.

Mr. HUNTER. But nonetheless, simple things like that are important for your weapons programs, are they not?

Dr. HAMZA. Yes. We bought a fax machine also this way from London, which was fast at the time for our weapon design program.

Mr. HUNTER. But, Hewlett-Packard told you that they couldn't sell that to you directly from a U.S. outlet of Hewlett-Packard, but that you could go to their Singapore store and buy it. And, the reason I think that is such a tragedy is because David Packard was such a great American defense leader.

At one time, I believe was head of Defense Research and Engineering for a U.S. administration. Was certainly a chairman of the Packard Commission on and lent a great deal of expertise to our country in terms of trying to keep us strong and invulnerable. And yet, his company, ultimately playing by the rules, but nonetheless,

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Mr HLVER. Well, tren word you basica agree with-when we had two, haceriors in here last week who icid about their frustratung 30d their feeing trat they made a most no progress. And. 606, of our merrten said, Well, what depth of inspection do you seed to be sure that you are really sanitizing that entire weapons corrigier" And, the answer was, You need virtually an occupation of the owntry to be able to know that.' Is that your —

Dr. Havza. Yeah, that's correct, because in no other way can you really get around to know where things are and get your hand on thern borause somedy is carrying before you go there and picking things ahead of you. And, unless you have a force to really control this, what is going on, there is no way you can get your hand on

Mr. BESTER, Yeah, I think the person who was told two weeks ahead of time that an inspection team was going to be at a certain facility, and when they arrived, there were lots of nuclear weapons materials lying around and then he had to go explain that to Saddam Hussein. I would hate to be in his shoes at that point. It would be an act of gross negligence on the part of one of their governmental officials not-after they got the tip-off that the inspection team was coming, not to have moved the materials. So, it looks

like we are going through an exercise, which is totally symbolic in nature, to invite inspectors back in on the basis that somehow that is going to solve this problem.

Dr. HAMZA. How would it solve in the future? Suppose we solve it. We agree. I don't agree we are going to solve it now even. What is there cannot be found now. It is already organized in such a way it is impossible to find. But, suppose you did find it. Suppose inspectors can claim knowledge they don't have and can go in and take what is there. What guarantee do you have it is not going to put together, put back together again in the future and the whole program won't be rejuvenated and working in say two years from now, three years from now?

So, the whole thing depends on the will of the government. If the government is not willing to give this up, and it is not, for obvious reasons, throughout all the time and all the problem going everybody is going through, it lost hundreds of billions—well, I don't know, 100, 120 billion in oil revenues to keep the system.

So, what guarantee is there, with a government that accepted such a huge loss, not to allow the system to be dismantled, it will in the future somehow forget about it and drop this option and let everything go? What kind of guarantee anybody has? Would anybody be really ready to guarantee this?

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask you another question. It has been mentioned that Saddam Hussein is—has, and you mentioned that he basically got his scientists together and said we must move out on a program and have a nuclear weapons program. Did he did you regularly get communications from Saddam Hussein or from his offices to the nuclear weapons community, to the scientists community?

Ďr. HAMZA. I have just to make a point that Saddam founded all the WMD programs and the missile. He took over atomic energy personally, as chairman in 1973.

Mr. HUNTER. He took it over personally?

Dr. HAMZA. Personally. He ran all the WMD programs personally. He chose the administrators, he chose the staff, most of the senior staff. He also took away the financing of the WMD from the general government budget and made it into the revolutionary council budget, which is separate. So, he personally, because he runs the revolutionary council even when he was Vice President. The President never attended the meetings of the revolutionary council, so automatically as vice president, he became the chairman. So, the whole budget was appropriated by him. The actual personnel chosen was by him. The approval of the programs were by him from day one.

I mean, I went as a head of the Iraqi delegation to France in 1974 to purchase a reactor through his orders. He was my chairman then. And, we—when we suggested negotiating a nuclear cooperation treaty with the France, India, he went personally and signed them, in France and in India. So, you—this is his own creation. The whole WMD program, in all its phases is his personal creation. And, he nurtured it personally and followed it personally. There is nothing in the world that would make him give it up.

Mr. HUNTER. Did you have any conversations with him?
Dr. HAMZA. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Tell me about the nuclear reactor that the Israelis destroyed in—was it 1982?

Dr. HAMZA. In 1981, June 1981.
Mr. HUNTER. Was that reactor devoted to the weapons program?

Dr. HAMZA. That reactor was actually internationally supervised facility. We were-Dr. Jaffer and I, the head of the nuclear program now there. We were actually planning on using it in some kind of arrangement to irradiate some extra uranium, which we have, and extract the plutonium out of that in a facility provided to us by the Italians. So, it was a slow, long-range process because the French were there. Inspectors will come every six months to inspect this facility. When the Israelis bombed out that reactor, true, it delayed our program for some time. But, it was a relief to Saddam. He just did not want everybody looking over our shoulder what we are doing and we are cheating with the extra time we can find.

He wanted a totally secret program, totally at our control. So when the Saudis offered to buy us another reactor, he refused. He took the money and diverted it into the enrichment program. He asked what alternative can we have to build our own system, and we told him it is enrichment. He jumped the staff from 400 working in the French reactor to 7,000 in 5 years. The budget raised from 400 million to 10 billion by the onset of the Gulf War.

Mr. HINTER. To ten billion?

Dr. HAMZA. To ten billion, the cost of the program at the onset of the Gulf War. So, actually what we had, what we started with, which was a nuclear program to basicaily ongoing to make two or three nuclear weapons or four max, turned into a large entity, which is meant to produce a larger amount of nuclear weapons and turn Iraq into a serious nuclear power in the region.

Mr. HUNTER. And, in your estimation, we have heard a lot of estimates from W.X-the UX, analyses as to how close Iraq was to having a nuclear weapon at the time of the Gulf War. How far away were you at that time?

Dr. HANZA. Actually, Ambassador Butler gave a very accurate estimate, which is six months.

Mr. HUNTER. You were about six months away?
Dr. HUUZA Yeah, six months away.

Mr. HUXTER. And yet, the Western analyses before we had the war, the projections were that you were three to five years away.

Dr. HAVA Yeah, exactly. And, that is

Mr. HUNTER. To what do you attribute that, because we have a lot of people we send to college and end to inteligence schools and are supposed to be great analysis of interagence information, and Ver they were totally est, obvious y, with that estimate.

10 what do you attribute that huge disparity between what we shuht Saddam had and what you, as a member of his nuclear Mens program, say you really did have, which was a six month See table I mean, that ended up making a lot of congressmen

She tools because the congressmen, sme very prestigious consiten, would get up on the Senate and House floor, and would mahut how we had three to five years and how we should have x 2013 against Iraq and slowly they would come around. And yet . We got there, we had this six month timetable we were deal

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