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transfers and in any lessons for the United States that you think we should learn from this?

Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, first I would like to say that I believe the reason for the difference in the estimates is that the intelligence community, giving the estimates of three to five years, assumed that the French fuel and some Russian fuel also in Iraq would not be diverted from international safeguards because they were being inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Mr. HUNTER. But, how often were they being inspected?
Dr. MILHOLLIN. Not often enough, obviously.
Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Hamza, how often?

Dr. HAMZA. Presumably every six months, but that is when it started. After the six months, we immediately got the order to

Mr. HUNTER. So, I mean, what do you have? You have Saddam Hussein's promise that he really, truly is not going to use it for a weapon.

Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, one of the problems was the IAEA's rules. They had rules for what they called material balance areas. And, if you didn't have enough for a bomb in a particular area, then you didn't have to inspect it as often.

So, we had these inspections every six months because the agency took the position that you shouldn't add all the amounts up in the country. We learned after the war began that, in fact, Iraq had enough material for one bomb, but it was spread out at different locations. But, because of the IAEA rules, they weren't inspecting it every three weeks as they would have to do if it were all in one place.

So, we had a problem with the IAEA's own rules, that was only discovered after the war began. But again, I think the difference for the estimates, the difference in the estimates is the assumption that it would not be the—the material would not be diverted. I think if you asked the CIA how long it would take if the material was subverted, they would have had a different answer.

Dr. HAMZA. I have some comment on this. Actually, it is worse than this. The International Atomic Energy Agency, despite reports in Der Spiegel and other journals about the Germans providing us with the technology for uranium enrichment, declared Iraq to be clean in the area of nuclear weapons. So, the whole structure that was built around a destroyed reactor basically, the French reactor was destroyed and atomic energy kept growing. And, inspectors were there.

Nobody asked “What are these buildings doing here? There is no reactor. What are you working on?” So what was going on is a huge infrastructure built up to make nuclear weapons, and at the same time, the IAEA vouching for Iraq that Iraq is not working on nuclear weapons despite all kinds of reports being in the media about Iraq purchases and Iraq acquisition of nuclear technology, which is meant for nuclear weapons.

Mr. HUNTER. Is there a chance that there is right now an operating centrifuge facility in Iraq that we simply don't know about?

Dr. HAMZA. I believe, yes. I believe Iraq is now in the pilot plant stage for centrifuge production. I mean, it has some several units of centrifuge together. Of course, you need thousands to be in the production stage. But, I believe Iraq has several centrifuges right

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now in working order. The order for the aluminum tubes indicate that this is past.

Mr. HUNTER. That this is what now?

Dr. HAMZA. That this is done. This is past. What is coming on is a production system, and for the production system, you need a huge number of tubes. But, Iraq is already over the pilot plant stage.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, when you say they are already over the pilot plant stage, you think there is a chance that they may have enough material now to make a bomb?

Dr. HAMZA. No. In the pilot plant stage, you don't get enough material to make a bomb. You get probably few kilograms at most over several years. Pilot plant stage would be something like 50 units operating 20, 30, 40, 50 units. What you need for a bomb is 1,000 and over. Then you can have probably enough for a bomb in a couple of years. Several thousand you will have enough in one year for a bomb.

Mr. HUNTER. Is there any-now you have seen, Dr. Hamza, the discussion about these tubes, and speculation about them. Is there any doubt in your mind but that these tubes were to be used for the nuclear weapons program.

Dr. HAMZA. No. Not with the specifications that we have been hearing about. They are high technology quality, not usually used or intended for use in ordinary, mundane everyday things. These are technologically viable tubes for a nuclear weapon program.

Mr. HUNTER. Did you ever order these tubes yourself?

Dr. HAMZA. No, I am not part of the enrichment until later part. I stayed with the enrichment untill 1985, and then left it and became Advisor to Atomic Energy, and later on worked in the nuclear weapon. Enrichment is another group. But, I was aware of what was going on because I used the output as the head of the nuclear weapon program for a while.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Mr. Milhollin, tell us a little bit about, from your perspective, what is the state of security with respect to technology transfers going to countries like Iraq pre-'91 and post '91 Did we really improve things with respect to the flow of militarily useful technology out of the West?

Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, during the mid and late 1980s, we had a policy of building up Saddam Hussein as a counter to Iran. That policy resulted in sharing intelligence information. It also resulted in directions in effect from the White House to the Commerce Department to facilitate dual-use exports to Iraq. This policy resulted in-I guess, I have to be fair-it resulted in a bending of the rules. Things were being held up because our government knew that they were sensitive, they were going to places that we knew were making missiles, we knew were making nuclear weapons or at least we suspected were making nuclear weapons.

But, political pressure from the White House caused the government to lower the barriers, and this technology went out. That happened in the late 1980s. It is a sad story, but it is, nevertheless, undeniable.

Did we learn anything from this? We did. There was an effort after the Gulf War to increase export controls. We—there was an effort to adopt what is called a catch-all clause, meaning if you

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Washington, DC, Thursday, September 19, 2002. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter presiding.


REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. HUNTER. Folks, today the Committee on Armed Services continues its review of the Iraqi threat and United States policy toward Iraq with a specific focus on how the U.S. and the international community should act in concert to restrain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. This morning's hearing marks the third of a number of planned public sessions designed to inform the committee and the American people on the various issues surrounding Iraq's continued violation of numerous United Nation's resolutions, its illicit development of weapons of mass destruction and the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and the international community.

In the past two weeks, the committee received classified briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and I might add we had yesterday's briefing that we opened up to the full membership, some 83 members of the House beyond the Armed Services Committee membership, and we heard testimony from former senior United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors about Iraq's illicit weapons programs: -- we have also received the administration's position on Iraq

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These national security export controls are critical to ensuring that our adversaries and potential enemies don't acquire the high technologies that will threaten the United States national security or reduce the qualitative advantages of our armed forces.

The irony that rather than strengthening these systems of control, the legislation that is being pushed through Congress dramatically liberalizes these key protections making it easier for Saddam Hussein and his ilk to continue their weapons of mass destruction programs.

This morning our witnesses, who we hope will connect the dots between export controls technology transfers, and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program are, the gentleman who has been with us many times, and I think one of our most valuable citizens, Dr. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Dr. Milhollin has been watching and documenting Iraq's WMD programs for years and is also an expert in national security export controls.

And, I might point out to the members and to the American people, The New York Times op-ed written Friday, April 24th, 1992, by Dr. Milhollin entitled Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip, in which he traced back all of the contributors, including many Western corporations, of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

We are also pleased to have Dr.-Doctor, if I butcher your name here, you please correct me-Dr. Khidhir Hamza, is that close enough for government work?

Dr. HAMZA. That is close.

Mr. HUNTER. Who was a trained nuclear engineer who worked in various parts of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, both before and after the 1990, 1991 Gulf War. Dr. Hamza will tell us how Saddam Hussein acquired the technologies necessary for its weapons of mass destruction program, even while under the watchful eyes of the United Nations (U.N.) inspectors and the restriction of U.N. sanctions.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you both for agreeing to appear before the committee today, and before we begin, I want to invite the very distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the committee to offer any comments that he might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 219.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE


Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I thank you for your leadership in quickly scheduling a range of hearings on the issues related to Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction program. We here in Congress, as well as the American people, need to understand clearly the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein so that we can carefully consider what action the United States must take.

The hearings we have had so far with former United Nations weapons inspectors and with Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, have presented valuable information about Iraq's weapons pro

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