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to not voice their opinions, and you paraphrased that as "they were advised".
Mr. SNYDER. The line from the news I just read, the press report, told they were expected
Mr. HUNTER. Well, expected doesn't say somebody told them not to say anything. Does that mean that they received they didn't get the invitation to the golf game of the week or somebody didn't invite them to lunch or does it mean somebody actually said "Don't say your opposing view."
But, if you want to be informed on the opposing view, the fact that opposing views existed that were briefed to this committee, talk to me a little later.
Second, we have had—we are doing these hearings as often as we possibly can. We were the first committee to have the Secretary. We have now had two classified briefings. We are going to have another one. In fact, our goal is to have every single member of the House
Incidently, every single member of the House was invited to the last classified briefing, not just the committee. Eighty-three members appeared. Our goal is to see to it that every single member of the House has multiple opportunities to come and get a classified briefing
Now, with respect to all the personalities that are out there who have views, we want to get as many of them in as possible. We have been working to get General Clark. That was recommended by the minority side, by Mr. Skelton and by Mr. Spratt, that we get General Clark in; and I think that is an excellent recommendation. We are trying to get him.
So-but, last, to go to the relevance of this testimony, this testimony may be more important in my mind than the classified testimony we have heard or even the testimony of the Secretary yesterday, because the real question of what we do is largely juxtaposed against the issue of the effectiveness of inspections. Do inspections work? And, that was obvious from Mr. Spratt's—the thrust of Mr. Spratt's questions. How intense would the inspections have to be? What kind of duration? How could you make them work? Because inspections, obviously, are an alternative to military action.
So, Dr. Hamza-the insight of Dr. Hamza as a person who was helping to lead the nuclear weapon program of Iraq and his description of how he and his colleagues successfully evaded and avoided detection and how they continued the nuclear weapons program even while our inspections were going on and while Mr. Spratt was holding up these trophies of what they found-again, I was reminded of what we see in the San Diego papers all the time, which is the trophies of the big cocaine busts that are made on the border, and then we get inside information that shows us that, actually, for every pound that was busted and held up for the news conference there were ten pounds that went through. His explanation of how these inspections were successfully derailed, I think, goes to the heart of whether we accept inspections as a viable alternative to military action.
So, I mean, I think we all have a candid and a straightforward and a sincere interest in whether or not these things work. So, his
testimony has been right on point. I wish every Member of the House could hear it.
I would be happy to yield to my friend.
Mr. SNYDER. I think as I talk to members, Mr. Chairman and I don't want to belabor this—but in terms of the topics chosen, a lot of the testimony here today, the discussion was on the export controls, which I don't think is on people's mind. I think there are other questions out there. You are absolutely correct. Do inspections work or not, and how could they work, and will we achieve the goal of disarmament?
We had Dr. Kay and his colleague here a couple weeks ago. But, I think more common questions I am hearing from members are issues about if there was military action what would it look like, what would be the ramifications on the war on terrorism, what would be the potential cost in American lives and lives of allies, those kinds of questions that we have not addressed yet.
The other point I would make is while I, you know, watch the Senate hearings and I can read op eds, to this point we have not had anyone before this committee, I don't think, that has expressed some of the concerns as expressed by General Zinni and General Clark. I know you are doing the best you can with these very abbreviated week schedules, but I think questions can be more fully aired if we have people who have differing views.
I appreciate you. I don't mean to belabor it.
Mr. HUNTER. Understand, my friend, I am going to try to get General Clark to be here. If you would like to have General Zinni, maybe we can get them both at the same time. I like to hear different points of view. I think it is necessary for this debate.
There have been discussions in closed session about—that go to potential military operations, but I think that it was pretty wise of the secretary not to talk about proposed military operations in open session.
At any rate, we really appreciate these two gentlemen being with us. I noticed our distinguished ranking member is here, Mr. Skelton. You have as much time as you wish, sir.
Mr. SKELTON. Just a comment-two things.
Number one, in some instances it has been difficult to get a minority person to come in on the short notice that we have had. Number two, we have inquiries in today to far more than those you named to see if they will testify, and some of them have indicated willingness to do so in closed hearing.
I think in some cases it would be excellent for the American people to hear them. But, we will do our best and continue to do our best. I am not sure if the gentleman knows of the extensive efforts we have made. But, as Harry Truman says, we have done our damnedest so far to get them; and we hope we can fulfill your expectations with people thinking on all sorts of sides of this very, very important and complex issue.
Mr. SNYDER. Thank you.
Mr. HUNTER. And, Mr. Skelton, did you have any other questions that you wanted to ask the witnesses?
Mr. SKELTON. The only other question-I think that Dr. Hamza did answer it, but assume, Doctor, that the Saddam Hussein re
gime is removed. What do we do with the various scientists and engineers the day after?
Dr. H. That is a very good question, sir. Actually, Saddam already found an outiet for dem. As a cover, he had to let them in to do some crtaa work. So that when the inspector comes after them, they say. We are not worang on a weapons program. We are doing sil exgioration or we are acirg-building a refinery or we are being a power station."
They bct Iraq's power station. not the generators themselves, but the control rooms and such. They built telephone exchanges. Now. if you call Iraq in two rings you get anybody you want in Iraq. Of course, this is to get Iraq ready. the communications system, in case of war so an order can go fast between towns and to the required persoccel.
You have a very professiocal and very proven groups now which can be realy used to rebuid Iraq. They already rebuilt Iraq after the Gulf War. We had no communications system, no telephones, no power, no gas; and they get all that back in line. Get them back to do that. They couid
The Iraq system is really right now run down. Iraq need huge effort to rebuild and reconstruct, and these people can do that. So, I think these scientists and engineers are already, because of the cover required for their work, are already in the civilian sector. They just can be made to do that full time instead of part time just for show and just to cover themselves against inspectors or against whoever comes looking for them.
Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Milhollin, is there any other—having looked—you have looked at the Export Administration Act, the proposal that was put forth by the House Armed Services Committee and also by the International Relations—did you look at the International Relations Committee's product?
Dr. MILHOLLIN. Yes, I did, but that has been some time ago.
Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Are there any-is there any advice that you would like to give us on those pieces of legislation?
I mean, we are moving into this it is interesting we are moving into this at a time when we are contemplating the passage of an Export Administration Act. At the same time, we are poised to have to spend a lot of American resources and risk American lives, perhaps, to eliminate the product of Western technology, some of it American technology, that passed under a previous regime. So my question is, having learned this difficult lesson, is there any advice that you would recommend with respect to this act? It can be general or specific.
Dr. MILHOLLIN. Well, first, general. I think my question—my answer earlier was that this really is historically obsolete, the law we are looking at. It was framed-it was negotiated, framed, debated, drafted before September 11th. We need to go back and start over. It doesn't fit the new period of history we are living in.
I think that if people of good faith and goodwill put their heads Together in the next session of Congress, we can come up with an puport control law that would be specifically designed to combat terrorism and that a majority of Congress could support.
Second specific comment would be that the legislation got stronger as it progressed through Congress, and the strongest version, the version that most adapted to protect our national security, is the version that finally came out of this committee. So, if Congress is going to pass anything, it should pass the version of the bill this committee put together.
The next--the most desirable outcome would be to pass nothing. The second would be to pass the version of the bill that this committee put out. The third would be to pass the version of the bill that the House International Relations Committee put out. And, I think, the unacceptable alternative would be to pass the Senate bill as it was enacted.
So, that is my advice.
We are joined by Congressman Simmons who is I consider him to be a national asset because he has a member of the committee who has a great background in intelligence, and I know he is got some questions. So, Mr. Simmons, you are recognized.
Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I apologize for being detained.
Listening to the testimony this morning and then reading the testimony reminded me of Casey Stengel's comment, “Deja vu all over again”.
I had the opportunity to serve my country abroad about 30 years ago in a location in the Far East where a weaponization program appeared to be taking place. I was assigned to the embassy there, and one of my duties was to be the Export Transactions Officer, tó review exports from the standpoint of whether they contributed to nuclear proliferation.
During my three-year tour there, I encountered many of the things that have been raised here today with regard to Iraq. I encountered that one of the greatest suppliers of technology and resources was the United States of America. I also encountered that European countries—the Netherlands, France, Germany and others—were also suppliers; and that while we were trying to implement a nuclear proliferation or nonproliferation pre-regime, our own country and our allies were contributing to the problem that we faced. When inspectors came into the country to look for evidence of the program and the weaponization, they would end up going to sanitized sites.
I think the doctor very pointedly testified that when these activities occur in a country, they will do everything in their power to keep them from the eyes of a curious world.
In my experience, very strong diplomatic pressures were brought to bear which effectively curtailed this program, at least at the time I was involved; and the difference then and now is that we have a country where perhaps diplomatic pressures from the United States alone are not enough. So, my question to you is, are there diplomatic or export opportunities that we can exploit, either ourselves or through the United Nations, through the IAEA or other organizations, that we can take advantage of now over the short-term that would be steps short of surgical strikes or in fact introducing forces into the country? Are there opportunities like that that we should be focusing on?
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tee of Arrenca. I mean, curate as Americans, we commit our moet precious resource to the dease of our Nation, and it is not noterý, and it is not techno.cg. It is our sons and daughters.
Dor MILHOLLIS, I have spoken to companies about this over the year's What they fear most is being linked to the spilling of Amercan blood in the media. They don't really fear our government or our government's investigators, our government as prosecutors as much as they fear public exposure. So, I think that is one of the great weapons we have that we should be willing to use more often. Mr SIMMONS. I thank you for those responses.
I would also like to publicly thank Dr. Hamza for the courage that he has shown in speaking out on these issues. I know from my own experience that that kind of courage can be risky, dangerous, in fact. I am sure that grows out of a deep conviction in him own heart and in his own mind, and I thank him for those convictions and for that courage.