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scale production facility. My estimate is that Iraq may be in actual production in two years with enough accumulated product for two to three nuclear weapons in three years. The problem however remains that we are dealing with a series of indicators but no first hand witness. This I will deal with later in this statement.

Iraq never seriously attempted to acquire nuclear fissile materials from outside sources by smuggling or other means. Though this may have changed since I left in 1994 but my belief is that this is a serious program, and is designed to turn Iraq into a nuclear power with credible nuclear force and as such systematic build-up of its capability was embarked on for over twenty years with no change of goals or purpose. This make it one of the most intensive single-minded objectives of the Iraqi regime. It dwarfs many times over both the BW and CW programs combined. By the time I left hiring was intensive especially among college graduates in engineering and science. A program declared publicly by Saddam created a series of graduate groups trained in nuclear and other weapon technologies dedicated to working in the program after graduation. This step among others turns the university system which is forced to award degrees based on classified research unseen by its faculties into an integral part of the Iraqi WMD industry. On the other hand Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE) teams were turned into civilian contracting entities that actually engage in contract work for the civilian sector. They helped rebuild Iraq's civilian infrastructure including power stations, oil refineries and telephone exchanges. This achieved two purposes. On the one hand Iraq can, and did claim that these are now civilian sector entities unrelated to the WMD program. On the other hand by working with other government establishments they can incorporate the best of these establishments into their work. There were complaints from the various sectors that AEE took away so many of their engineers that they had a hard time getting their work done. Even important sectors such as oil and power generation were not immune. One result of this is the unavailability of scientists and engineers that the Iraqi government can claim to be transferred from the military industry and as such not available to the inspectors. Also it means that Iraq has integrated its WMD into its civilian sector turning Iraq into one giant WMD factory.

I wish to point here that Dr. Spertzel's hunch about the role of Iraq's intelligence agency the Mukhabarat in the WMD program is right.

Iraq's BW program was started under an organization created by Mukhabarat called alHazen. In 1985 as an advisor to AEE I was asked to visit al-Hazen to check on their computer work and see if they need help in setting up their computer network. I was familiar with the early phase of al-Hazen and its late director Merwan al-Sateda. A Palestinian with Yasser Arafat connections he was a fellow physicist. The center started as a military research and development organization that have extensive cooperation with the U. of Arizona. It was run by the Iraqi Mukhabarat and as such was independent of any oversight by other government organs such as the Ministry of Finance. Later after being accused of pilfering 20 million dollars Merwan was jailed and later killed by Saddam and the center dissolved to be opened later with a new mission: development of Iraq's BW program.

Iraq's Mukhabarat is the creation of Saddam Hussein. It was founded on the premise that Iraq's security starts abroad. As such it had units for assassination, terror, use of poisons and biological agents against Iraqi dissidents and an extensive experimental program in all means of terror and intelligence tools. Even Atomic Energy was not immune from their power. They infiltrated AE and took under their wings many of its staff at will. As such we were aware of some of the developments going inside this terrible organization. Later I acted as a liaison with this agency regarding their acquisition of proscribed nuclear materials and presumably classified reports. I found it to be corrupt, deceitful and totally without human values.

Thus the BW program replaced the research in physics as priority for Mukhabarat because of its potential for terrorism. An angle rarely reported and I found extensive incidents regarding it when I left Iraq and worked in Libya from Iraqi expatriates was the use of humans as disease carriers. Dissidents living abroad with families in Iraq will suddenly get the news that their families are allowed to join them. Before they can obtain their passports they are usually “inoculated” against some of the standard infections. There were many incidents of whole families infected this way with HIV and other diseases. It should be noted that any Iraqi infected with HIV was transferred to a remote region in Western desert called Salman Hole presumably for treatment. However nobody ever came back and most were reported dead within a year of going there. Since HIV is rarely a cause of death this fast it was assumed that they were subject to many kinds of experiments. If smallpox is to be sent abroad from Iraq one should expect unwitting carriers being sent to the destination targets possibly not even Iraqis to achieve deniability.

When I was transferred to the military industry some of my workers were questioned about the effects of radiation and how to cause disease and death by what kind of radiation sources. Later I heard of many incidents of people with radiation burns treated in Iraqi hospitals. Work on the Iraqi dirty bomb which was tested in 1988 in Muhammediyat had an Iraqi Mukhabarat angle.

How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs.

Iraq understood that the first step in acquiring technology is the human element. Thus a large scale program of government scholarships was launched that covered all areas of WMD in addition to other needs. The program was of such a scale that though most of scholarship holders never returned those who did were of large enough number to form the nucleus of its WMD. This is critical to understand if any use is to be made of the inspectors to uncover the Iraqi WMD. Comparison with Iran may explain this point. Iran acquired calutron technology for uranium enrichment from China. Iraq developed its own much larger program for calutrons from scratch. Iran attempted acquiring heavy water technologies from many countries including Argentina. Iraq did research and development for more than twenty years to develop its own heavy water technology. Thus the scientists are Iraq's main asset not equipment nor facilities. At the same time Iraq allowed weapons inspectors to destroy many pieces of equipments and facilities it refused to give them full unmonitored access to its scientists. Inspections became a

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serious problem when inspectors in later years began to demand more access to the scientists. After several incidents some of which were described in earlier testimony Iraq began to get more and more difficult in providing access. Thus the demand for access to the scientists was the cause of the demise of the inspection process in Iraq.

This points out a critical factor for inspections to be of any meaning. With little or no human intelligence about Iraq's WMD inspectors have little to direct them to the whereabouts of the Iraqi programs. However if a condition is made that the scientists are to be made available outside Iraq together with their families the story could see an immediate turnaround. All Iraq's pretexts of no WMD will collapse. Iraq will expose its hand immediately through flat refusal to cooperate. The names of all the relevant scientists are known to the US authorities. Unmovic already possesses huge financial resources from its share of Iraq's oil revenues at its disposal to take care of all the important Iraqi scientists and engineers permanently. Iraq's scientists if they chose to and my guess is that they will can go under the equivalent of the US witness protection program paid for by income already under Unmovic disposal if they agree to cooperate. This is the test. If Iraq has really no illegal WMD program it should agree. My bet would be that it will not. This is the smoking gun everybody is looking for.

Iraq was reorganizing its concealment mechanism even before the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam's son in law. The resulting system took effect in 1995 by the creation of the Concealment Organization headed by Saddam's younger son Qussey within the Special Security Organization (SSO). The NY Times interview of the Iraqi civil engineer charged with building backup sites tell only part of the story. The defector who brought with him official Iraqi contracts reports duplicate sites built mostly underground with specifications that included lead impregnated concrete resin covers that mean radioactive work. A back-up system of support do the rest. Any inspection process is monitored carefully as to its intentions. Once a possible target is identified a special team with its transport vehicles and technicians will descend on the target of inspection, dismantle all equipment and any possible incriminating evidence and carry it to the backup site. This is the more sophisticated version of what inspectors already experienced through denial of access and standoffs. Good luck for any future inspection team that wants to beat this system.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

Prepared Testimony of U.S. Senator Jon Kyl
House Armed Services Committee Hearing
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program and Technology Exports
September 19, 2002

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing.

I appreciate your providing a forum to bring us up to date on issues relevant to the consideration of the Export Administration Act. As you know, the Senate passed its version of the bill, S. 149, on September 6, 2001. At the time, along with the ranking members of the Senate Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Governmental Affairs Committees, I raised serious concerns about the bill's potential negative effects on U.S. security. Unfortunately, despite our efforts to negotiate meaningful changes to the bill, it passed with only a few slight alterations.

Since then, there have been many developments that should cause us to be even more cautious in regulating the export of dual-use technologies, and should give us pause before passing a bill like S. 149.

Five days after the Senate acted, thousands of innocent people were killed in the most horrific act of terrorism in our nation's history. We now fully recognize the stark reality of the world in which we live today - one in which people who hate freedom and democracy are willing to use all means possible to achieve mass casualties among civilian populations. And, as official government statements and press reports have wamed over the past year, these terrorists would like nothing more than to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to achieve that end.

Also, since the Senate passed S. 149, the U.S. government has released several reports that document not only the danger of the proliferation of these weapons, but also, unfortunately, deficiencies in the U.S. export control system that only exacerbate the problem. In fact, the bipartisan U.S.-China Security Review Commission - created by the legislation that granted permanent normal trade status to China in 2000 - agreed with the conclusion of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission that,

"The U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through] foreign student training in the U.S., by wide dissemination of technical information, by the illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment, and by the relaxation of U.S. export control policies."

The General Accounting Office has also released three reports that should be a cause for serious concern. The first, released in April, addressed China's success in closing the gap with the U.S. in semiconductor technology. The GAO stated that, in the past five years, U.S. officials in China responsible for monitoring the end-use of semiconductors have not conducted any of

these checks.

The second, released in August, addressed the administration's January 2002 decision to raise the control threshold for high performance computers exported to tier-3 countries, such as China. The GAO concluded that the President's report justifying that change neglected to address several of the statutory requirements, including the potential military uses of the computers and the impact of those uses on U.S. national security.

And it turns out that the one requirement that was addressed in the President's justification - the domestic and foreign availability of the computers - was based on false industry data. The GAO stated that, while the administration justified its decision based on the projected domestic and foreign availability of the computers by early 2002, only one of 10 companies cited now produces computers with that capability. The administration relied upon data from the very industry that wanted to relax the high performance computer controls for its own commercial benefit, rather than doing its own independent analyses.

As Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and one of the distinguished witnesses at today's hearing, noted with regard to the administration's most recent relaxation of computer controls in a recent op-ed in the Los Angeles Times,

“... it sabotages our fight against terrorism. We can't ask our allies to keep dangerous equipment away from terrorists and the countries that support them if we don't control our own sales.

"... As for Unisys (the only company cited that now produces computers with the new capability), it can't be expected to use restraint. Before the Gulf War, it sold Iraq's interior ministry an $8-million computer system specifically capable of tracking the Iraqi population, which could still be helping Saddam Hussein stay in power."

The third GAO report dealt with the Commerce Departments controls over deemed exports – transfers of technology within the United States to foreign nationals. The GAO found a number of weaknesses in the current system to control deemed exports, and concluded that those vulnerabilities could help countries of concern to improve their military capabilities. The GAO also noted that more than 90 percent of the deemed export licenses that are approved by Commerce involved China and other countries of concern, yet there is no monitoring system in place to ensure compliance with the conditions of the licenses.

The information contained in these reports is a clear indicator of the deficiencies in our current export control system and should prompt us to tighten controls over the export of dualuse technology, rather than to relax those controls. As this hearing takes place today, there is a very real possibility that this country will soon take military action against Iraq because of the threat posed by Saddam's Hussein's possession and continued development of weapons of mass destruction.

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