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A SAMPLING OF THE PURCHASES
Types of technologies and equipment bought by Iraq from the five countries with the greatest
share of responsibility
WEST
SWITZER ITALY

FRANCE

BRAZIL GERMANY LAND

Missile develop Missile develop Scud improve Equipment to in- Missile develop ment

ment crease Scud range ment

Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons Missile developScud launchers Nuclear weapons development, no development, no ment Nuclear weapons development tably plutonium tably Osirak re

Nuclear weapons extraction lab actor development Supergun

development oratories Missile develop

Supergun ment Warhead develop ment Supergun

BEEPING UP THE SCUD VASSILE: VHO HELPED The Soviet Union supcije: Inseto Send sissies at had a range of 180 miles. They were used to bombard sei icas si a muiters bese in Seta Arabia where 28 American sol diers were des ster Satan Enssein andere range to 380 miles. These corepanies and government agencies hat sies AUSTRIA

FEST GERMANY AVL Designed neis one or missie Asingen Bau Contor Suppied laboratory complex

egment Consultes Designed missie empies

Aviatest Bult vind tunnels, suppted eng And Fenneleng Manage score of reers for missile comples missile fuel comples

Besajean Developed and suppbed test BRAZIL

stands for missile propulsion HQ Five Bedrser, Orbita Disinet Inspis BP. Cad Zeisss Degussa, Tesa Supplied in reket technologs sugged assistance

sining missile electronics, wind turnels, BRITAIN International Computer Systems Supplied Pris Teme Subcontractor and supplier for computers at miste site

missile samples International Military Services designed Gildemeister Contractor for missile comand supervised vestrægue of a missile - pies bineprints, sachine tools, furnaces, test ing complex

standis control facilities Nacris Cauredil Supplied scores of sen

B& E Metalform Supplied rocketry equip sative nadine teis MED internasieel Frent company for

ment, glindrical presses, testing plant for

missile comples misle prvurement Technolog Development Group Front

Favert Industrie Supplied material, equip company for misie preurement

ment, fast-refreitag pressure units TMG Engineering Preet wmpany for mis Heingieł Mrelier Suppäed precision lathes sale meremeet

I ako Intermediary for delivery of compo SAUDI ARABIA

sents to install groscopes Sandi Pimp Factory Helped supply test Leiteid Supplied cylindrical presses, rocket stand for todo premes SOVIET UNION

Messerseite-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB)
Sovies Government Seeplied st least 379 Subcontractor for missile comples
Seeds

MBB and Gildemeister Transferred Amer SWITZSRLAND

iesn-made wmputers, electronic test equip Condor Projekt Segerrised waste of

ment missile feel productive site

GBB and Transteehnica Helped build UNITED STATES

ar tracking statioc, rocket test stand for

missile complex Electronics Associates Supplied computer

Nickel Supplied imate control technology system for missile wind tunnel

for fisel steres et missile fuel production site International Imaging Systems Suppžied imaging echanging equipment espadle a mis

Saner Informatie Supplied computer plant sile targeting

for missile comples

Sebzedtelmaier Supplied electronic measLitton Industries Finaseed West German firm Gildemeister, wie bei Iraq's missile

wresent and testing instruments for missile

fsel prodation complex Seientifie Atlanta Supplied antenna testers

Semens Supphed switching devices, trans

femers, electrical systems to watzol missile (through West German firms) for miskile w

fuel production equipped radio room at misplex

sule complex Tektronix Suppbied measuring equipment

Thyser Contract for 305 turbopumps (sup(through West German firme MBB) bo missile

pied 35) site Wutron Suppliec network analyzers used to

Carl Zeiss Seppied cseputerized mapping

equipment develop missile guidance

[graphic]

WHO ARMED IRAQ? ANSWERS THE WEST DIDNT WANT TO HEAR

BY DOUGLAS JEHL

WASHINGTON—The terms of the punishment forced on Iraq since the Persian Gulf War may be most valuable for what they have taught. Rarely has a country defeated in battle been so laid bare to outside scrutiny. To the victors, the answer to how Iraq gained its power is now dispiritingly clear: it was us the West, and German companies in particular.

That conclusion is documented in stark detail in a new study by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Based in part on the work of United Nations inspectors, it identifies the Western companies who supplied the crucial parts in what was emerging as an extraordinary Iraqi arsenal. German firms were by far the worst offenders, but others in Switzerland, Britain, France, Italy and the United States were also instrumental. Without Western help, the report's author, Gary Milhollin, shows, Iraq could never have come so close to producing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

The pattern is in some ways familiar. Countries aspiring to power have long turned to foreign merchants for muskets and machine guns. What has changed has to do with what has changed about war. Rather than in vast shipments, even the smallest of acquisitions may prove decisive in an era in which nuclear, biological and chemical weapons can hold populations hostage. And the goods sought for military value may just as well be produced by a supercomputer manufacturer or biotechnology company as by a munitions maker.

A Western bolt found in an Iraqi missile is not necessarily a sign of complicity. A bolt has many peaceful uses, too. But the picture provided by the Wisconsin Project suggests just how instrumental such dual-use trade can be. Italian technology allowed Iraq to extract plutonium, and high-performance Swiss presses gave it the ability to make nuclear weapons parts. Most of what Iraq needed to extend the range of its Scud missiles came from Germany. American computers were used in virtually all Iraqi missile and nuclear sites.

Of course, Iraq's most crucial acquisitions had even clearer military purposes. The Soviet Union openly sold Baghdad hundreds of Scud missiles; Brazil helped secretly in an effort to build an atomic bomb. But it was the wider Western flood, aided by lax laws and porous borders, that helped Iraq to refine those tools, outfit secret factories, and thereby to reach the verge of even more destructive force.

'Dairy Planť Parts Just one example of that flow was first found in crates marked as dairy plant parts bound from Frankfurt for Baghdad. In fact the intercepted metal parts were a supplement to the 27,436 Scud missile parts worth $28.2 million that the German company, H & H Metalform, had already delivered to Iraq. A separate compression device was to have helped Iraq test a new intermediate range missile. There was little mystery to its purpose, German intelligence found: the company had sold the same kind of rocket-testing device to Brazil.

With the most dangerous of the projects dismantled, the tension between Iraq and the West is mostly about the future. In refusing again last week to permit U.N. inspectors to install cameras at a missile-test site, Iraq made clear its aversion to the next step of U.N. oversight, which under Security Council Resolution 715 calls upon the West to keep long-term watch as Iraq begins to build new weapons.

An apparent agreement on a separate U.N. plan calling for Iraq to sell oil to meet humanitarian needs suggested that Baghdad might still be open to a last-minute compromise. But even a fence-mending visit by Rolf Ekeus, the chief U.N. weapons inspector, left unclear by Friday whether Iraq would back down or brave a Western threat of a retaliatory strike.

The new U.N. focus on monitoring—with its fixation on products-nevertheless carries a danger of being too narrow. There are signs that Western equipment remains a key ingredient in secret weapons programs, not only in Iraq but elsewhere.

A report to Congress last month concluded that illegal shipments by Western companies had helped Iraq repair or rebuild nearly all of the military production capacity it lost during the war. American intelligence reports have similarly warned of newly aggressive efforts by Iran to acquire the technology needed to produce chemi. cal and biological weapons.

getes

izan has also aanged furthe spielt pressing both Pussie and Chine for muclear Tractors that spuit baie ste time reebet I produce a nuclear weapon. North Korea Des devoted in recent shopping to sense coming within minutes last fall of hurmg a contingent of Russist nuclear scienaste to Pyongyang. Libya has tried to buy Toose fue from a Frussian concern India and Pakistan have been similarly ener

in the American-let efters tout such commerce, the recriminations of the golf war stil echo. Tinder press from westlington, Germany in particular has taken Steps to tagter is one-farcit empr. mok. Brain has begun an inquiry to reView what let is companies to assis. She krag buildup, including the manufacturze by Soefheit Fogmasters 2 six-meter-inng berrels for Iraq's never-completed supergue Wt she has less es model Congress lası fall voted to subject. Izan to export restrictions as igitus Sanse that are in effect on Baghdad.

Not even Irar has proven arwhez megEs branem es Irag, however, making its

In the absense of a recognizable ilsis like Saddam Hussein, a private company can finishe temptatim fig business a nd difficult to resist "One major foreign order is enongo inpensive for some of these firms to turn a blind eye to the law, said Anthony Cordesman a Made Easappet who has advocated even more rigid restrictions

That problem is compounded when governments send mized messages, as a lawFer for en Aflauta banger argued les week Te dhent, the local representative of Ene Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, is accused of granting nearly $5 billion in unauthorised loans to finance krag's military online and former President Bush was served with a subpoena afer the lawyer said his testimony was needed to demanstrate that the chest was just carrying out stated United States pabcy.

Even the Clinton Administratie, hering vowed to subject Iren and Irag to a new doel coctainment has yet to reject an eppes by Boeing and General Electric for special permission to set $750 wee of commercial aircraft and engines to Iran Bieing has warned that a White Foase refusal to approve the sale would effectively surreader shoesands of jobs to szupe's Aidas Industries

SADDAM HUSSEN COLLECTED NUTS AND BOLTS AND LETHALITY

FOR HIS SCUDS FROM THE NATIONS THAT DEPLORED HIM

Vague Pledges and New Pleading Sul more powerful pressures affect Germany and Japan who rely far more heavily on the Iranian market. So it was no surprise that President Clinton was able to win little more than a vague pledge from other leaders at the economic summit in Tokyo to hold Iran and other rogue countries accountable for their actions. As M. Mihollin warns, Most of the companies that sold to Iraq are still in business, and are still looking for sales in the Middle East

And for governments increasingly preoccupied with job creation, it may be difEcult to reject new pleadings from those who insist that their chemical or computer can do no harm.

Any sale looks less sinister when considered individually, but the lesson of Iraq might counter such complacency. As chronicled now, it shows millions of dollars in British and German machine tools used to make centrifuges, sleek new Swiss presses designed to forge nuclear weapons parts, Mercedes-Benz tractors and flat-bed trailers fitted as mobile missile launching pads. Its message is that economic security, for all its importance, remains a subset of something more fundamental

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On March 11, 1991, the Commerce Department released a list of those licenses. The list showed the equipment approved, the date, the value, the buyer in Iraq and the claimed Iraqi end use. This report is an analysis of the list. It shows, beyond any doubt, that U.S. export controls suffered a massive breakdown in the period preceding the Gulf War. When U.S. planes were sent to destroy Iraq's strategic sites, much of the equipment they bombed was made in the United States. The report finds that:

• The Commerce Department knew that millions of dollars' worth

of sensitive American equipment would wind up in Iraq's
missile and other military programs, but approved the licenses
anyway.

• The Commerce Department failed to refer missile technology

export cases to the State Department and muclear technology
cases to the Energy Department, in violation of its own
procedures.

• Front companies for every known nuclear, chemical and missile

site in Iraq bought American computers, with total American
computer exports exceeding $96 million.

• American machine tools may have helped build the SCUD

missiles that hit Tel Aviv and killed U.S. troops in Saudi
Arabia.

• American radar components may have helped shoot down U.S.

aircraft and develop long-range missiles.

Based on these findings, the study recommends that Congress take dual-use licensing away from the Commerce Department, appoint a Congressional committee to oversee the licensing process, and open dual-use licensing to public view.

http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/1991/icensemd.html

11/19/2002

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