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poration has done the
», emergency services so to this day.
at work. Our first regn. *
ne National Guard, and At that time we
people from the commutack by a weapii O MES B
| fact that becomes necmission's deageer
of course with specialty could not take i file
ng in the regular military agenda for sasa
e believe that this is the On the one han
id feeling of the American tional attack.
ind not to overreact by too the explosio & ports
of the military. land. This was the
1 health and medical issues, very much as die idee
ior a bioterrorism attack. We In the secunt : 2
utical stockpile usage, we are We recommend te z
e focused our attention on the that a Federa se
es to be prepared for bioterrorstrategy regurs D. coordinated in onze i
are a lot of concerns about this sponse. We 2
Congress on December 15th, parcial commer
al reimbursement for any types of in order to ik :
es, localities, private sector, for imtion for alt telligence size
there needs to be constant interoperso that we SE.
particularly telecommunications. I pared to es health ani meru
that are before the Federal Communica3
ght now and before the Committees of cyber secut I Mr. Charts
iectrum and the ability to distribute that body of wii
as to enhance inter operability_Federal, the concert te
at, we are focusing a great deal of attention
i of the critical infrastructure is in private we are se efects we are fer
rical companies, water companies—critical, foe if there is a major attack—will need to be y communicate as well.
rns that we are bringing forward, including i the need to be prepared to maintain the food ne case of a major attack. 1, the second issue that I would bring forward today the Committee has asked us to specifically address, equipment needed, and policies and procedures and ity of entities and common training requirements. It
essential issue that we still have to answer, Mr. Chairour Car
nation, and that is, what is readiness? Until we define
is and we understand the level of risk that inevitably we n, only then can we begin to focus our attention on what sary to reduce that risk to a minimum while maintaining vil liberties. That is the principal policy goal that the Conand the administration will need to reach towards. uw do we best set our priorities? Mr. Chairman, it is not pos· to buy everything that people want to sell to the government. hody is coming forward with systems; some work and some
ut most do work and most do enhance security, but it will ssible to do everything. So we have to define what the pri
this issue 2000, focuse
With the that we are work in the will focus goverTIME strates the the met protect
Wanneer ons as me Has we ze recommendine We plaatsing a sing first and mass center, Why We war Chairman, so that we can begin to sha! helt ut with the seanction together wice is properly an bawang AS, Ind, nama different lines, all the intelligence or What
do you know, wrtha in order to be able to share informas oth twak bua van a lot of discussion about this, of course. And Witch, W www that, we are recommending a separate comp Hal # warnte, additional agency to do domestic intelligen When we with respect to terrorist and foreign activities here in the Yimita law, and that that be moved from the Federal Bureau e Inventanton (FBI) into a new organization. The # # very important discussion that we have had. This sut
han heen lengthily discussed in our Commission this year. Bu the concern is that this work must be done and must be done et Hively, and therefore this Commission is making that recommend Hinna
We will have additional recommendations of course within report we are also focusing a great deal of attention om med Ry the Congress to establish a separate authorizing comedan ** and related appropriations subcommittee with jurisdicta der Prama and authority for combating terrorism Andy The Commission, over the years, continues med about the proliferation of the large numb Hularly in appropriations, that the new D fodde and there is concern that there
w and this will retard the abilit Homeland ey to get off the gm
We recommended continuous Mittee of the S
.. work of you and your commistelling us what we should be threat assessment mechanism prepare; and you, being the govJeded to relate down to the State will be coming from Washington. ata fusion, I don't think there is anyis I am concerned, because if you can efore it arrives here, you can deal with nan of this subcommittee which oversees
spending. We can buy all the tanks and ,ant, but I think a far better investment beis to make sure that we understand that
before I yield to my colleagues for questions, iting to me was, back in 1997 when I took a deleur colleagues to Vienna to negotiate with five Rusframework to end the Kosovo War, and I knew the e bringing a guy who was very close to Milosevic-his Dragomir Karic. So I called the Director of the Central Agency (CIA), George Tenet, and I said, Can you give information about Karic? And he came back about two or urs later and gave me a couple of sentences saying they he was tied in with the Russian Mafia.
telling anyone, I went to the Army's Information Dominter down in Fort Belvoir. At that time, this committee ing up funding for our Information Dominance Centers
CRISIS RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOMELAND
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 14, 2002. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:12 a.m., in room 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENT
ATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PRO-
This morning, the Military Procurement Subcommittee meets to receive testimony from Governor James S. Gilmore on the soon-tobe-released fourth annual report to the President and Congress from the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, more commonly known as the Gilmore Commission.
Good morning, Governor. We thank you for taking your valuable time to be with us. I apologize, but we have a number of conflicts at this very moment. Both the Democratic Caucus, which started at 9:00, and the Republican Caucus, which starts at 10:00, are causing a number of our Members not to be here, especially on the Democrat side. They are having very critical elections, and we understand why Members have to be there for those elections.
You have hung in there with us for four years, working this important issue, and we greatly appreciate your service to the Nation. And I would like to remind our colleagues that it was this committee that actually created the Commission back when it wasn't the most politically correct to be talking about. So while we hear a lot of praise for Hart-Rudman and some of the other commissions, it was this committee and this particular Commission that long before September 11, was out there, assessing what needed to be done to better prepare us to deal with the kinds of attacks that we saw on September 11.
In your first report to Congress in 1999, you cite the need for a truly integrated national strategy to guide national domestic preparedness. At that time, you called for fundamental changes of the Federal Government to support State and local authorities, and you suggested a federal clearinghouse for preparedness information. You also cited a need for the intelligence community to better use information technology to obtain and share data on potential terrorist threats.