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Shax 1 are there are Members wh yon, the surmaya ag sed in advan I r. was i teme of the Co
Tame as fat we are recommendi 1. that this fuson and analysis center. Pythage Chairman, that we can begin to sha dwich why dormation together which is properly a A to come different immes, all the intelligence Vetals Manny wether in order to be able to share inform 1 There has he a lot of discussion about this, of course. A Heh, in #44iwon to that, we are recommending a separate com het, # rate, additional agency to do domestic intellige gathering with respect to terrorist and foreign activities here in Tited States, and that that be moved from the Federal Burea Investigation (B) into a new organization.
This is a very important discussion that we have had. Thisject has been lengthily discussed in our Commission this year The concern is that this work must be done and must be done. Hively, and therefore this Commission is making that reconi.
atement ht thing, 'n we put I support. mmission, wney, who ihim in the fortunately, d the call of ief of all resnt on Septemwas directing
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back when you issued
this committee was paying ne bulk of America was not, unat we would not have this
work of you and your commistelling us what we should be threat assessment mechanism prepare; and you, being the goveeded to relate down to the State all be coming from Washington. ata fusion, I don't think there is anyas I am concerned, because if you can efore it arrives here, you can deal with nan of this subcommittee which oversees spending. We can buy all the tanks and .ant, but I think a far better investment bes is to make sure that we understand that
before I yield to my colleagues for questions, ting to me was, back in 1997 when I took a deleOur colleagues to Vienna to negotiate with five Rusframework to end the Kosovo War, and I knew the e bringing a guy who was very close to Milosevic-his Dragomir Karic. So I called the Director of the Central e Agency (CIA), George Tenet, and I said, Can you give information about Karic? And he came back about two or ours later and gave me a couple of sentences saying they he was tied in with the Russian Mafia.
t telling anyone, I went to the Army's Information Dominter down in Fort Belvoir. At that time, this committee sing up funding for our Information Dominance Centers
CRISIS RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOMELAND
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, November 14, 2002.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:12 a.m., in room 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. WELDON. This subcommittee will come to order.
This morning, the Military Procurement Subcommittee meets to receive testimony from Governor James S. Gilmore on the soon-tobe-released fourth annual report to the President and Congress from the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, more commonly known as the Gilmore Commission.
Good morning, Governor. We thank you for taking your valuable time to be with us. I apologize, but we have a number of conflicts at this very moment. Both the Democratic Caucus, which started at 9:00, and the Republican Caucus, which starts at 10:00, are causing a number of our Members not to be here, especially on the Democrat side. They are having very critical elections, and we understand why Members have to be there for those elections.
You have hung in there with us for four years, working this important issue, and we greatly appreciate your service to the Nation. And I would like to remind our colleagues that it was this committee that actually created the Commission back when it wasn't the most politically correct to be talking about. So while we hear a lot of praise for Hart-Rudman and some of the other commissions, it was this committee and this particular Commission that long before September 11, was out there, assessing what needed to be done to better prepare us to deal with the kinds of attacks that we saw on September 11.
In your first report to Congress in 1999, you cite the need for a truly integrated national strategy to guide national domestic preparedness. At that time, you called for fundamental changes of the Federal Government to support State and local authorities, and you suggested a federal clearinghouse for preparedness information. You also cited a need for the intelligence community to better use information technology to obtain and share data on potential terrorist threats.
We have made some progress. We now have a national strategy. But much remains to be done on intelligence collection and sharing, as well as restructuring in the Federal Government to better address the challenge of effective homeland security.
An even greater challenge is how we overcome the bureaucratic cultural impediments to get our people to work together at the Federal level, and between the Federal and State and local government agencies. We can change the fundamental structures—as we have witnessed, we have to overcome cultural barriers to effective communication and sharing of vital information-if we are to be effective at stopping terrorist acts.
President Bush's homeland security budget request for this fiscal year concluded that, quote, "The threat of terrorism is an inescapable reality of the 21st century. It is a permanent condition to which America and the entire world must adjust," end quote.
The federal terrorism budget for the country is $38 billion for this fiscal year. That is about the same as the entire federal budget for the Russian Federation. It is estimated that our Nation as a whole spends $100 billion on homeland security. It is indeed unfortunate that for the foreseeable future terrorism is to be an enduring fact of life. All we can hope to do is to make sure that the dollars are well spent, are put to the most productive use in countering the terrorist threat.
Your appearance today is particularly timely given the confluence of many related events. The war in Afghanistan continues; the confrontation with Iraq and all that entails continues; international terrorist acts continue to be a part of our own and our friends' and allies' daily experience.
The Congress, this week, seeks to finalize authorization for the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, we did that last evening in the House, the largest reorganization in Federal Government in 50 years, and the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act is on its way to the White House for the President's signature.
Governor, many of the elements of your prepared statement warrant detailed discussion. Time is going to limit our ability to talk about them, but two of the recommendations I think are extremely important and, personally, have been at the top of my agenda for the past five years. The one deals with creating a national data fusion center, and that, contrary to what was editorialized in the national press as recently as this morning, does not mean that we have to create big brother watching on every American citizen.
As you well know and as you have pointed out continuously, what we have been talking about since 1997-in fact, we put language in two successive defense bills, in 1999 and 2000, calling for the creation of a National Data Fusion Center primarily aimed at external intelligence, intelligence collected overseas-does not violate the rights and the freedoms of people here at home in America. We want your full, candid assessment on that issue.
And the second is a recommendation that you have been calling for and which I just raised before I came here from attending a meeting with the Steering Committee of the new Congress, which I am a member of, and that is the creation and the need for a consolidation of oversight of homeland security.