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ture improvements are still needed to ensure an acceptable manufacturing mission of the Kansas City Plant.
ignment of the Kansas City Plant with the changing needs analysis has been conducted on a regular basis. The most period FY2002 to FY2010 was completed in June 2002 and as City Plant can support the future life extension program was based on future manufacturing capacities following the project in FY2005.
ysis indicates that workload requirements for 25 of 29 major managed with current capacity, the addition of an extra shift, ent from commercial industry.
remaining product lines, the workload is highly dependent on associated with the upcoming LEPs. The data used in this foreg-range (FY2006-FY2010) assumptions for material and labor e relatively uncertain at this time and may be artificially high. ints for these two areas will continue to be monitored as prothe LEP programs develop.
product lines, facility expansions are required. One of these prodill require a line-item funded project to expand the capacity to ted workload. This line-item project is currently funded and ingrated Construction Program Plan for NNSA. Activities are curle for completion in FY2006, in time to support the projected workr products. The remaining product line, Firesets, will require only on of its existing manufacturing facility to provide the needed inty. Contingency space to accommodate this need has already been through the SMÁRI project. This expansion is not required until FY De accomplished with minimal funding. As a result, the capacity needs il continue to be monitored on a regular basis but efforts to begin the not occur until approximately FY2006.
ur recent capacity analysis, we are confident the Kansas City Plant necessary manufacturing capacity to support the needs of the NWC. analysis will continue to be updated to ensure that changes in workhnology are appropriately incorporated into our site planning process. . The Savannah River Site has defined two line item projects, Replaceion Tester (RFT) and Cleaning and Loading Modifications (CALM), that d to provide the production capability to support the current weapons reat plans and directives. These two projects are approved by the DepartEnergy and are included in the out-year budget plan for the Savannah ». Conceptual design is completed for both projects. The RFT is scheduled p in FY09 and CALM is scheduled for startup in late FY07 or early FY08. se projects augmenting existing SRS production facilities, the desired nuapons posture will be maintained.
WELDON. What is your best estimate of the time required to support an unund nuclear test, if such a test were to be directed by the President? TARANTINO. Since 1996, the NTS contractor has used structured processes to the ability to return to underground nuclear testing. The National Weapons ratories have developed several weapon physics test scenarios that are used for purpose of planning and readiness assessment. Schedule estimates for the NTS ractor to support execution of the first test in a series of underground nuclear s for physics reasons are approximately 3 years.
At the request of the Department of Defense Office of Program Analysis & Evaltion, a simple demonstration test was considered in 1999. At that time, the schede estimate to conduct this type of simple demonstration test was approximately
Mr. WELDON. What steps could be taken, specifically at the Nevada Test Site, to enhance test readiness?
Dr. TARANTINO. The NNSA, in conjunction with the National Weapons Laboratories and the NTS contractor, has recently completed a study of the cost and schedule of activities to enhance test readiness to 18 months. Significant activities identified for the NTS to maintain and enhance test readiness were organized into two groups: (1) Authorization Basis and (2) Personnel, Facilities and Equipment.
Authorization Basis consists of preparing nuclear explosive safety studies, technical and operational procedures, and other certifications and permits required for compliance with current federal and state laws and regulations. This activity is primarily a NNSA responsibility, but will require significant National Weapons Laboratories and NTS contractor support.
NTS Personnel, Facilities, and Equipment consists of many NTS Infrastructure items that have deteriorated in the 10 years since cessation of underground nuclear
testing. Examples include reconstitution of big hole caliper logging, reconstitute wit rope pull test facility and test/certify wire rope (used in device emplacement grade Las Vegas Valley seismic monitoring; reconstitute slant hole drilling and crduct drill-back nuclear chemistry exercise; conduct nuclear diagnostics training, and update design and fabrication plans for device racks/canisters.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIRK
Mr. KIRK. In your prepared statement, you mention that our allies face similar problems of stockpile reliabilities, performance and security. Yet, you do not specify detailed problems that these nations encounter, specifically Britain and France Would you please provide a summary of how these two nations are addressing these issues?
General GORDON. Our allies, specifically the United Kingdom and France, are faced with stockpile issues like those in the United States. They also must confirm the reliability, performance and safety of their nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. Thus, they have research and experimental programs that are similar ours. They are doing extensive research and experimental programs that are similar to ours. They are doing extensive research and experiments to improve their understanding of aging materials, building and using advanced radiographic and laser erperimental facilities to study weapon hydrodynamics and high-energy-density phys ics, and developing weapons simulation capabilities on advanced computers. In the high-energy-density physics area, the French already have an eight-beam laser facility in operation and are planning a major laser facility (Laser Megajoule or LMJ which will be comparable to our National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Mr. KIRK. When we look at the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), and what the capability it can provide. In 1986 we went after Libya's Rabta facility. A great many of STRATCOM's personnel are familiar with it as being Libya's high command for chemical and biological weapons. After the strike there, the Libyan significantly hardened the site. Would there be a way for you to report to the committee in classified form whether conventional munitions could take out Rabta at this point? Can you provide a classified list of other nations that have hard targets similar to this?
Admiral BYRD. [The information referred to is classified.]
Mr. KIRK. Can you provide a list of hard targets that you are aware of, specifically in areas related to the axis-of-evil? Also, can you specify the munitions that are be lieved to be held in these targets?
Admiral BYRD. [The information referred to is classified.]