signers peer-review the work of the designers in New Mexico, and vice versa. I assure you, it is not a collegial interaction. It is a formal process that is often quite contentious. Within the past few weeks, I have received peer review reports from groups in California and New Mexico that confirm again to me that Sandia's peer review process is vigorous and robust. Comments on Section 3144 Regarding Red Teams and Peer Review The Defense Authorization Bill at Section 3144 would mandate laboratory "red teams" to challenge internal laboratory assessments and to perform inter-laboratory peer reviews. Actually, red teaming and peer reviews have been standard practices between the nuclear weapon laboratories since at least 1956, when the concept of two competing laboratory clusters was fully implemented. However, the current language of Section 3144 is faulty in many respects. For example, it would require Sandia to peer-review the assessments of the nuclear design laboratories and vice versa. This fails the first requirement of "peer review”—that the participants indeed be peers! Sandia is not competent to peer-review the nuclear explosive systems of Livermore and Los Alamos; and conversely, Livermore and Los Alamos do not have the competence to peer-review the technologies nor the complexities of Sandia's nonnuclear components. But the longstanding arrangement whereby the California design cluster and the New Mexico design cluster peer-review each other avoids that problem, and has proved to be an effective practice. I am also troubled by the provision requiring that the President and Congress receive each certification letter and report from each laboratory director and the commander of Strategic Command, including the findings and recommendations of all their red teams. Currently, the laboratories' Annual Assessment Reports and directors' letters are included as background information in the package accompanying the joint certification memorandum from the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. But I do not believe that it would be appropriate, as a routine practice, to forward all red-team findings to the President and Congress. Red-team issues are usually very arcane and highly technical. In the vast majority of cases they can-and shouldbe resolved at the level of the laboratory director. However, I have always maintained that a minority report from a laboratory director regarding the certification of any warhead should be communicated to Congress and the President as part of any safeguards process associated with a nuclear test ban or moratorium. The Nuclear Weapons Council (a very senior council of Defense and Energy that was created by Congress to oversee nuclear stockpile issues) requires that the laboratories' Annual Assessment Reports be "forwarded unaltered to the Secretaries," so I do not see this as a worrisome issue. The Secretaries of Energy and Defense have a responsibility to integrate the laboratory directors' findings and provide the President with the "bottom line," and I believe that any president would require that of them. Currently, the Nuclear Weapons Council is tasked to perform that integration function and prepares the Nuclear Stockpile Certification Memorandum (to the President) for signature by the two secretaries. It is surprising that Section 3144 makes no mention of any role for the Nuclear Weapons Council. Under current law 6 the Nuclear Weapons Council has broad responsibility for oversight of stockpile programs. Some of the requirements that Section 3144 would place on the laboratory directors (i.e., in their reports accompanying certification) are already assigned to the Nuclear Weapons Council by statute. would be uncomfortable, for example, evaluating the relative merits of various nuclear weapons for a particular military mission, as would be required of me in my annual certification report as currently outlined in Section 3144. However, this (and other responsibilities) are adequately and appropriately discharged by the Nuclear Weapons Council. I credit the Foster Panel for focusing attention on the importance of the annual certification process, which was originally established by President Clinton in 1995 by directive. The process was also spelled out in the Resolution of Ratification that accompanied the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty to the Senate. However, because that resolution failed in the Senate vote, that document today has no formal status. I might add that with the failure of the CTBT ratification, there also is no procedural certainty by which the need for a nuclear test would be communicated within either the Executive or the Legislative branches of the U.S. government. Thus, it may perhaps be time to establish annual certification as a statutory requirement with responsibilities carefully defined in law. However, by moving too quickly with the proposed Section 3144 at this time, we may create, at best, a partial fix that will introduce some unintended consequences. My recommendation would be that the Congress task the Executive branch to work through the Nuclear Weapons Council to perform an end-to-end systems analysis of the annual assessment and certification process and to recommend one or more legislative options. The Nuclear Weapons Council is the cognizant body invested by Congress with authority over stockpile policy matters, and it forms the junction between the NNSA and the Department of Defense. It also possesses current operational knowledge of stockpile management and stewardship. Certainly the Foster Report's recommendations should be important considerations in their delib erations. INFRASTRUCTURE I have expressed my concern before this committee (and its counterpart in the Senate) in hearings going back to 1997 over the matter of balance in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The essential question has always been how to balance the resources needed to support and maintain the deployed stockpile, while also creating new laboratory facilities to partially substitute for the loss of nuclear testing. I believe the Foster Panel is correct with its assessment that: The weapons program must be transformed from a decade focused on the scientific building blocks of stockpile stewardship to a focus on meeting DoD's stockpile requirements and restoring the infrastructure necessary to sustain and refurbish the stockpile.7 Several studies 8 have concluded that the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex has eroded significantly and needs refurbishment. After a decade of aggressive investment in large scientific facilities for science-based stockpile stewardship, it has now become urgent to assess that part of the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex that directly supports the stockpile maintenance mission and to make appropriate changes and investments. Specifically, the engineering design and production capabilities of the complex need to be addressed with a prudent plan for realignment and refurbishment. The life extension programs for the W76, W80, and B61 depend on this. At Sandia, the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) complex is crucial to our ability to design, develop, and, if necessary, produce microelectronics and integrated microsystems to support a certifiable stockpile for the future. We are being very careful to phase the development of that facility in a way that it can provide the needed support for various stockpile refurbishments in a timely manner, so that from the start its capabilities will be supportive of the stockpile lifeextension schedule. Like other sites across the NNSA complex, Sandia has a number of aging facilities in need of refurbishment that fall below the level of line-item construction and have been insufficiently supported by general plant projects (GPP) or other infrastructure funding programs. Infrastructure problems at this level are chronically understated and deferred, and they accumulate with the passage of years. Ultimately, this can lead to capability limitations that impair the mission. NNSA addressed this problem through a Facilities and Infrastructure Initiative that inventoried infrastructure repair and improvement projects across the complex. Congress approved an appropriation request of $200 million in fiscal year 2002 to help bridge the gap for essential infrastructure repairs that were unfunded. However, the effort to restore the NNSA weapons complex will take many years and the total costs are not yet well defined. It will be important to assign highest priority to those facilities that are essential for the scheduled stockpile refurbishments over the next decades. At Sandia, we identified approximately $300 million in infrastructure revitalization projects that would be carried out during the course of the next few years. The top priority items on our inventory are sufficiently urgent that failure to fund them would impact weapon program deliverables. A specific example is Sandia's Electromagnetic Test Facility. Its twenty-year-old diagnostic equipment has limited capability to support data acquisition for the development and validation of simulation codes. This modernization project will improve our capability to perform electromagnetic tests to qualify the W76 and W80 in accordance with their life extension plans. NNSA's Facilities and Infrastructure Initiative will perform a very important service to the Defense Programs mission if it succeeds in restoring the appropriate balance in funding for infrastructure improvements that are critical to sustaining mission capabilities. As currently planned, the initiative will help the nuclear weapons complex deal with longstanding infrastructure challenges. NNSA also needs a more viable decontamination and demolition program to dispose of obsolete facilities. The program must also make a long-term commitment to major renovations STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM PLANNING The Fuser Report manzes NONSA + img-range planting and budgeting perform ante bas i becere that szica progress has been actered The Defense Prox giza zotein trysm tave worked cosy Fit the ANSA jeadershi the last several months to trece a plan to prorate and grace pro gezza teda with a defensible appropriate ride. The fog leves f ine manger eliza in vs Toure-Tears Nantrial Secunay Pen reden SIMLEN ELze é resource requirements mder the guidance provided by Presdental tretive. D6D requirements and the Natear Fosure Renew The plan a argiza mise auch as NNSA has for the first some achieved a 10year planning tatt agreement with the Aman who care management we beleve that NNSAs may deliteratues can be completed within the F Yeare National Security Plan schedule and budget proce The afficity of ong-range planning and budgeting is compounded by ancenatio ties that are not under the control of NNSA The recent Natear Posture Review NPR and the Treaty of Moscow will reduce operationally deployed maclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2.200 warheads over the next decade. However, the precise force structure in terms of warnead types and their readiness states that wè must work toward under the NPR has not yet been defined in deta It has been stated that many of the warheads to be removed from the operationally deployed stockpile will be maintained as a responsive force in case of a majo change in the global threat environment. The intent is to maintain the warbeads of the responsive force in a condition that would permit them to be redeployed in a matter of weeks or months but not within days or hours. Consequently, the stewardship requirements for the responsive force are not yet fully defined, although I expect that the warheads will require a level of maintenance and surveillance by the NNSA that is not substantially different from what is required for the active. deployed stockpile. It is certainly appropriate, as required by Section 1014 of the Defense Authorization Bill, that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy through the Nuclear Weapons Council, define a Strategic Force Structure Plan that will specify the makeup of the enduring stockpile under the NPR and the Treaty of Moscow, as well as the stewardship expectations of the responsive force. As part of that plan, it will be important to validate the NNSA life extension program schedule against future DoD mission requirements and delivery systems. Under almost any scenario for the NPR implementation, the NNSA laboratories will have a substantial workload of life extension programs for systems that require refurbishment or complete redesign of electronic subsystems and other components. NNSA needs reliable strategic guidance to adequately plan its life extension program schedule and resources. The Defense Programs laboratories will work closely with NNSA to adjust the Future-Years National Security Plan as necessary to prioritize and integrate programmatic needs within a defensible budget. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION With respect to Sandia's stockpile responsibilities, it is my judgment that sciencebased stockpile stewardship has met expectations during the last decade. The program has succeeded in stimulating the development of powerful new tools and simulation capabilities that are extending our ability to maintain and certify the stockpile. These tools will undoubtedly continue to improve in the years ahead as sciencebased stockpile stewardship campaigns mature. I fully expect that we will be able to meet our stewardship responsibilities with the tools that we have developed and are improving under science-based stockpile stewardship as we proceed with our system life-extension responsibilities. More definitive evidence of the efficacy of science-based stockpile stewardship should be available when we complete our first full-scale life extension program for a major warhead system. I commend the Foster Panel for focusing attention on the importance of the annual certification process. It may be appropriate to establish annual certification as a statutory requirement with responsibilities carefully defined in law. However, Sec tion 3144 of the Defense Authorization Bill is flawed in many respects and has not been evaluated from a systems perspective or red-teamed for possible unintended consequences. My recommendation would be that the Congress task the Executive branch to work through the Nuclear Weapons Council to perform an end-to-end systems analysis of the annual assessment and certification process and to recommend one or more legislative options that can be considered next year. The Nuclear Weapons Council is the body invested by Congress with authority over stockpile policy matters, and it possesses current operational knowledge of stockpile management and stewardship. The recommendations of the Foster Panel should be important considerations in that process. I strongly concur with the Foster Panel that it is now time to seek a better balance of the programmatic investment in stockpile stewardship to provide stronger support for the engineering design and production missions of NNSA. NNSA faces a series of system life extension programs that will challenge the engineering design and production sectors of the complex in a way that they have not been exercised in the last ten years. With prudent leadership and management, and with your strong support, I believe we can succeed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. APPENDIX Highlights Of Sandia Accomplishments Major Accomplishments in Weapons Activities • Sandia completed work to qualify the B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb as meeting all requirements, resulting in its acceptance as a standard stockpile item. We made alterations to enhance the safety and security of all B61 bombs at field locations. In recognizing the efforts of the B61-11 certification team, the Commanderin-Chief of Strategic Command cited the weapon's many advantages over the retired B53-1 bomb. • Similarly, we concluded a three-year testing and evaluation program resulting in acceptance of the Alt. 342 W87 Life Extension Program warhead for the Air Force by the Nuclear Weapons Council as a standard stockpile item. • A significant milestone in directed stockpile work in fiscal year 2001 was our progress in redesigning the integrated arming, fuzing, and firing system (AF&F) for the W76 warhead for the Trident missile. We recently completed the redesign of a Joint Test Assembly for the W76, which will be used to periodically assess the conformance of the de-nuclearized version of the actual war-reserve warhead. Sandia played a major role on the NNSA's B83 Systems Engineering Group, which completed development of Alt. 355 for the B83 modem strategic bomb. Ast. 355 is a near-term field retrofit kit that incorporates design modifications to certain hardware. • We completed the Warhead Simulator Package for the Type 3E Trainer for the B61-4 bomb. The Warhead Simulator Package simulates the electrical functionality of the real war-reserve weapon. The new trainer allows military personnel to realistically practice lock/unlock and arming/safing operations without exposing a real nuclear weapon to vulnerabilities. The first production unit of the trainer has been delivered. • Sandia has major responsibility in nuclear weapon use-control systems, which are designed to allow arming of the warhead by national command authority only. We completed a four-year, full-scale, code management system engineering project, which delivers a significant security enhancement to weapon code operations in Europe. The system enables recoding of nuclear weapons in a fully encrypted manner and greatly simplifies use and logistics. • We have also achieved many important advances in the science and engineering campaigns that enable our successes in directed stockpile work, including radiation-hardened microelectronics, aboveground experimental physics, and advanced simulation and computation. Accomplishments in Nuclear Nonproliferation Preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials or weapons to dangerous regimes or terror groups has become a matter of great urgency. NÑSA's role in nonproliferation is acknowledged in its mission statement: "To strengthen United States secu rity through the military application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." Sandia's recent contributions have strengthened this effort. • As nuclear fuel reprocessing is adopted by more nations, the proliferation risk associated with fissile materials increases. To evaluate the risk, Sandia developed a proliferation analysis methodology for quantifying the proliferation resistance of nuclear power production fuel cycles. The methodology uses the tools of probabilistic risk assessment to identify proliferation pathways for various definitions of proliferators. • NNSA's "Second Line of Defense" (SLD) program for the security of fissile materials provides consultation to customs agencies to combat trafficking of nuclear material across international borders. In 2001 we assisted twenty-six site surveys performed at Russian airports, seaports, railroad checkpoints, and border crossings to evaluate strategies for minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These site surveys included the deployment and acceptance of systems installed at eight Russian Federation State Customs Committee facilities to detect and deter illicit movements of nuclear materials out of Russia. The program has been successful and is growing to include other countries. • Also with Russia, after four years of negotiation and collaboration with the All Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), we kicked off a joint facility-to-facility remote monitoring project in June 2001. The project will evaluate advanced fissile material monitoring and communications technologies in a bilateral verification regime. • Sandia is responsible for satellite-based sensors for detecting nuclear detonations in the atmosphere. We developed a new space-to-ground communication path for monitoring Nuclear Detection System sensors onboard the Department of Defense Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. The launch of a GPS satellite equipped with the Nuclear Detonation Detection System Analysis Package in January 2001 significantly enhanced the nation's ability to detect nuclear detonations occurring anywhere in the earth's atmosphere. Contributions to Homeland Security and the War Against Terrorism Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories responded to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound resolve on both a personal and professional level. As a result of our own strategic planning and the foresight of many sponsors to invest resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to immediately address some urgent needs. A few examples follow: • By September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented the K-9 rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs to enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video and audio to their handlers. This relatively low-tech but timely adaptation was possible because of previous work we had done for the National Institute of Justice on instrumenting K-9 units for SWAT situations. • A decontamination formulation developed by Sandia chemists was one of the processes used to help eliminate anthrax in the Hart, Dirksen, and Ford buildings on Capitol Hill, and at contaminated sites in New York and in the Postal Service. Sandia developed the non-toxic formulation as both a foam and a decontamination solution, and we licensed it to two firms for industrial produc tion. • Sandia engineers worked around-the-clock to modify the "Steel Eagle," airdropped, unattended ground sensor for deployment in Afghanistan. Originally designed under sponsorship of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s to identify mobile missile launchers, we modified the system to detect light trucks and armored vehicles. The sensors can be deployed from F-15E, F-16, and Predator unmanned aircraft. • The Predator unmanned aerial vehicle gained recognition in Afghanistan for its ability to capture and transmit in real time high-quality radar images of terrain, structures, and moving vehicles through clouds and in day or night conditions. The advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability on the Predator was substantially developed by Sandia National Laboratories. We began working on miniature radars based on synthetic aperture concepts in 1983 in the nuclear weapons program. In 1985 we became involved in a special-access program for the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a one-foot-resolution, real-time SAR suitable for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first real-time, onefoot-resolution, SAR prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by DoD con |