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tion 3144 of the Defense Authorization Bill is flawed in many respects and has not been evaluated from a systems perspective or red-teamed for possible unintended

consequences.

My recommendation would be that the Congress task the Executive branch to work through the Nuclear Weapons Council to perform an end-to-end systems analysis of the annual assessment and certification process and to recommend one or more legislative options that can be considered next year. The Nuclear Weapons Council is the body invested by Congress with authority over stockpile policy matters, and it possesses current operational knowledge of stockpile management and stewardship. The recommendations of the Foster Panel should be important considerations in that process.

I strongly concur with the Foster Panel that it is now time to seek a better balance of the programmatic investment in stockpile stewardship to provide stronger support for the engineering design and production missions of NNSA. NNSA faces a series of system life extension programs that will challenge the engineering design and production sectors of the complex in a way that they have not been exercised in the last ten years. With prudent leadership and management, and with your strong support, I believe we can succeed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX

Highlights Of Sandia Accomplishments
Fiscal Year 2001

Major Accomplishments in Weapons Activities

• Sandia completed work to qualify the B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb as meeting all requirements, resulting in its acceptance as a standard stockpile item. We made alterations to enhance the safety and security of all B61 bombs at field locations. In recognizing the efforts of the B61-11 certification team, the Commanderin-Chief of Strategic Command cited the weapon's many advantages over the retired B53-1 bomb.

• Similarly, we concluded a three-year testing and evaluation program resulting in acceptance of the Alt. 342 W87 Life Extension Program warhead for the Air Force by the Nuclear Weapons Council as a standard stockpile item.

A significant milestone in directed stockpile work in fiscal year 2001 was our progress in redesigning the integrated arming, fuzing, and firing system (AF&F) for the W76 warhead for the Trident missile. We recently completed the redesign of a Joint Test Assembly for the W76, which will be used to periodically assess the conformance of the de-nuclearized version of the actual war-reserve warhead. • Sandia played a major role on the NNSA's B83 Systems Engineering Group, which completed development of Alt. 355 for the B83 modem strategic bomb. Alt. 355 is a near-term field retrofit kit that incorporates design modifications to certain hardware.

• We completed the Warhead Simulator Package for the Type 3E Trainer for the B61-4 bomb. The Warhead Simulator Package simulates the electrical functionality of the real war-reserve weapon. The new trainer allows military personnel to realistically practice lock/unlock and arming/safing operations without exposing a real nuclear weapon to vulnerabilities. The first production unit of the trainer has been delivered.

• Sandia has major responsibility in nuclear weapon use-control systems, which are designed to allow arming of the warhead by national command authority only. We completed a four-year, full-scale, code management system engineering project, which delivers a significant security enhancement to weapon code operations in Europe. The system enables recoding of nuclear weapons in a fully encrypted manner and greatly simplifies use and logistics.

• We have also achieved many important advances in the science and engineering campaigns that enable our successes in directed stockpile work, including radiation-hardened microelectronics, aboveground experimental physics, and advanced simulation and computation.

Accomplishments in Nuclear Nonproliferation

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials or weapons to dangerous regimes or terror groups has become a matter of great urgency. NÑSA's role in nonproliferation is acknowledged in its mission statement: "To strengthen United States secu

rity through the military application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." Sandia's recent contributions have strengthened this effort.

• As nuclear fuel reprocessing is adopted by more nations, the proliferation risk associated with fissile materials increases. To evaluate the risk, Sandia developed a proliferation analysis methodology for quantifying the proliferation resistance of nuclear power production fuel cycles. The methodology uses the tools of probabilistic risk assessment to identify proliferation pathways for various definitions of proliferators.

• NNSA's "Second Line of Defense" (SLD) program for the security of fissile materials provides consultation to customs agencies to combat trafficking of nuclear material across international borders. In 2001 we assisted twenty-six site surveys performed at Russian airports, seaports, railroad checkpoints, and border crossings to evaluate strategies for minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These site surveys included the deployment and acceptance of systems installed at eight Russian Federation State Customs Committee facilities to detect and deter illicit movements of nuclear materials out of Russia. The program has been successful and is growing to include other countries.

• Also with Russia, after four years of negotiation and collaboration with the All Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), we kicked off a joint facility-to-facility remote monitoring project in June 2001. The project will evaluate advanced fissile material monitoring and communications technologies in a bilateral verification regime.

• Sandia is responsible for satellite-based sensors for detecting nuclear detonations in the atmosphere. We developed a new space-to-ground communication path for monitoring Nuclear Detection System sensors onboard the Department of Defense Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. The launch of a GPS satellite equipped with the Nuclear Detonation Detection System Analysis Package in January 2001 significantly enhanced the nation's ability to detect nuclear detonations occurring anywhere in the earth's atmosphere.

Contributions to Homeland Security

and the War Against Terrorism

Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories responded to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound resolve on both a personal and professional level. As a result of our own strategic planning and the foresight of many sponsors to invest resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to immediately address some urgent needs. A few examples follow:

• By September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented the K-9 rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs to enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video and audio to their handlers. This relatively low-tech but timely adaptation was possible because of previous work we had done for the National Institute of Justice on instrumenting K-9 units for SWAT situations.

• A decontamination formulation developed by Sandia chemists was one of the processes used to help eliminate anthrax in the Hart, Dirksen, and Ford buildings on Capitol Hill, and at contaminated sites in New York and in the Postal Service. Sandia developed the non-toxic formulation as both a foam and a decontamination solution, and we licensed it to two firms for industrial produc

tion.

• Sandia engineers worked around-the-clock to modify the "Steel Eagle,” airdropped, unattended ground sensor for deployment in Afghanistan. Originally designed under sponsorship of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the 1990s to identify mobile missile launchers, we modified the system to detect light trucks and armored vehicles. The sensors can be deployed from F-15E, F-16, and Predator unmanned aircraft.

• The Predator unmanned aerial vehicle gained recognition in Afghanistan for its ability to capture and transmit in real time high-quality radar images of terrain, structures, and moving vehicles through clouds and in day or night conditions. The advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability on the Predator was substantially developed by Sandia National Laboratories. We began working on miniature radars based on synthetic aperture concepts in 1983 in the nuclear weapons program. In 1985 we became involved in a special-access program for the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a one-foot-resolution, real-time SAR suitable for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first real-time, onefoot-resolution, SAR prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by DoD con

tinued to improve the system, and a partnership with an industrial firm, which
shared program costs, transitioned the technology into the field-deployable sys-
tems used in Afghanistan.

• An array of devices invented by explosives experts at Sandia have proved to be
effective for safely disarming several types of terrorist bombs. For the past sev-
eral years, Sandia experts in conventional explosive devices have conducted
training for police bomb squads around the country in the techniques for using
these devices for safe bomb disablement. The shoe bombs that Richard Reid al-
legedly tried to detonate onboard a trans-Atlantic flight from Paris to Miami
were surgically disabled with one of these advanced bomb-squad tools originally
developed at Sandia. That device, which we licensed to industry, has become
the primary tool used by bomb squads nationwide to remotely disable hand-
made terrorist bombs while preserving them for forensic analysis.
• Detecting explosives in vehícles is a major concern at airports, military bases,
government facilities, and border crossings. We have developed and successfully
tested a prototype vehicle portal that detects minute amounts of common explo-
sives. The system uses a Sandia-patented sample collection and preconcentrator
technology that had previously been licensed to industry for use in screening
airline passengers for trace amounts of explosives. The Technical Support Work-
ing Group and DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security funded this research.
Sandia is a partner with Argonne National Laboratory in the PROTECT pro-
gram (Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemi-
cal/Biological Terrorism), jointly funded by DOE and the Department of Justice.
PROTECT's goal is to demonstrate systems to protect against chemical attacks
in public facilities, such as subways and airports. For more than a year, a
Sandia-designed chemical detector test bed has been operating in the Washing-
ton D.C. Metro. The system can rapidly detect the presence of a chemical agent
and transmit readings to an emergency management information system. We
successfully completed a demonstration of the PROTECT system at a single sta-
tion on the Washington Metro. The program has since been funded to accelerate
deployment in multiple metro stations. DOE has also been requested to imple-
ment a PROTECT system for the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority.
• Another major worry for homeland security is the potential for acts of sabotage
against municipal water supplies. In cooperation with the American Water
Works Association Research Foundation and the Environmental Protection
Agency, Sandia developed a security risk assessment methodology for city water
utilities. This tool has been employed to evaluate security and mitigate risks
at several large water utilities. We have used similar methodologies to evaluate
risks for other critical infrastructures such as nuclear power-generation plants
and chemical storage sites.

WITNESS DISCLOSURE INFORMATION

Witness name: C. Paul Robinson

Capacity in which appearing: Representative of a non-government entity
Name of entity being represented: Sandia National Laboratories (GOCÓ)
Position held: President and Laboratories Director

Parent organization (managing contractor): Lockheed Martin Corporation
Federal contract: Management and operating contract between Sandia Corpora-
tion and U.S. Department of Energy, DE-AC04-94AL85000.
FY2000 cost: $1,540,019,000; negotiated fee: $16,110,000.
FY2001 cost: $1,580,187,000; negotiated fee: $16,300,000.
FY2002 cost: $1,684,552,000; negotiated fee: $17,270,000.

Curriculum Vitae:

Dr. C. Paul Robinson is President of Sandia Corporation and Director of Sandia National Laboratories, with principal sites in Albuquerque, New Mexico and Livermore, California.

Joining Sandia in 1990, Robinson was Director and Vice President before becoming President in 1995.

Ambassador Robinson served as Chief Arms Control Negotiator from 1988-90 and headed the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva. He was appointed by President Ronald Reagan, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and reappointed by President George Bush. These negotiations produced protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which were ratified unanimously by the Senate.

From 1985-88, Robinson was Senior Vice President, Principal Scientist, and Board Member of Ebasco Services, Inc., a major engineering and construction firm.

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He spent most of his early career (1967-85) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he led the laboratory's defense programs. He is a longstanding member of the Strategic Advisory Group for the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command Robinson has served on DoD's Threat Reduction Advisory Committee since 1998. He was Chair of the Presidential Technical Advisory Group on Verification of Warhead Dismantlement and Special Nuclear Materials Controls. He previously served on the Scientific Advisory Group on Effects for the Defense Nuclear Agency, on Defense Science Board studies, and has advised other government agencies.

Dr. Robinson received the Outstanding Public Service Medal from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was elected to the National Academy of Engineering. He currently serves on several community and educational boards, including the Great Southwest Council of the Boy Scouts of America, the Explora Science Museum, and the Florida State University Research Foundation's Board of Trustees. He is also a trustee of the Kazakhstan Nonproliferation Institute. Robinson holds a B.S. in Physics from Christian Brothers College, a Ph.D. in Physics from Florida State University, and an honorary doctorate from Christian Brothers University.

REFERENCES

1 John S. Foster, Jr., Chairman, Expectations for the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program, FY 2001 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, March 15, 2002.

2 Foster, p. 14.

3 Foster, p. 14.

4 Foster, p. 15.
5 Foster, pp. 15–16.

610 U.S.C. Sec. 179.

7 Foster, p. 4.

8 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study; Complex 21; Defense Programs Phase I and II Maintenance Studies; Energy Federal Contractor Organization Group Study; Office of Secretary of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation Review; Stockpile Stewardship Program Thirty-Day Review; DOE Inspector General's Defense Programs Production Facilities Assessment; FY 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile (Foster Report).

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. BROWNE, DIRECTOR
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
SUBMITTED TO:

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT

JUNE 12, 2002

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, for the opportunity to submit this report on the status of our science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

In 1995 the U.S. Government initiated the stockpile stewardship program to ensure the safety, reliability and performance of the nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This program, which constitutes the core mission of our Laboratory, presents one of the most difficult technical challenges this nation has ever faced. In this testimony I will present the status of the program, accomplishments to date, and challenges for the future.

Let me begin by saying that I am more encouraged today by our ability to address and resolve stockpile issues than I have been in the past. Based on our progress and accomplishments to date, if we continue on the present path I believe we can reverse a perceived decline in confidence. We have had notable successes in the recent past in manufacturing pits, in developing the experimental and simulation tools and methodologies that help us better understand weapons performance, and in developing a certification methodology. This progress gives me renewed hope in

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our ability to meet present and future challenges to our stockpile. The attached appendix summarizes highlights of our recent accomplishments. The following are a few examples:

Pit Manufacturing and Certification: We have made great strides in recapturing this capability for the nation. We are on schedule to deliver a certifiable W88 pit in April 2003, and we have fabricated a total of 13 pits, 6 more than our planned baseline schedule of 7.

Life Extension Programs: Projects to extend the life of the W76 and B61-7 and -11 are proceeding on schedule. We have completed the W80 Baseline program and continue to support knowledge transfer for the life extension of this system to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Advanced Simulation and Computing: During this past year, we completed the first three-dimensional simulation of a full nuclear weapon system explosion using the LLNL 12 Teraops White computer that was directly relevant to the W76 Life Extension Program (LEP). We are installing the first phase of 10 Teraops of the 30 Teraops computer in our new Nicholas C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation that was completed ahead of schedule and $13M under its $106M budget.

Hydrodynamic Experiments: Completing the first axis of the Dual Axis-Radiographic Hydro-Test (DARHT) facility enabled us to perform hydrodynamic tests of nuclear weapon primary systems with outstanding spatial resolution. Since mid-FY01, we have performed seven major hydro-tests, four at DARHT, directly related to stockpile systems and in support of certification activities. The second axis of DARHT will be completed this calendar year and will be fully operational in 2004. Proton radiography is a new technology being developed at our LANSCE facility that is helping us make decisions about the stockpile and portending great promise for a future Advanced Hydrodynamic Facility (AHF). Certification Metholodgy: In the past year, Los Alamos and Livermore reached agreement on an approach to certification and quantifying margin and uncertainty (QMU) that will allow a better understanding of the confidence for any given nuclear weapon. We have begun to apply this methodology to this year's certification process.

The ability of the NNSA defense complex infrastructure to maintain the stockpile will depend, in part, on the viability of today's production capacity and capabilities to meet current and future needs, e.g., to find and address problems through enhanced surveillance, to extend weapon system lifetimes, and to produce weapons modifications required to meet new Department of Defense (DoD) requirements. The nuclear facilities and infrastructure at Los Alamos-buildings, roads, sewer systems, and the electrical power grid-are approaching fifty years old and are deteriorating at an alarming rate. The dedicated revitalization effort being planned by NNSĂ is crucial for the long-term viability of Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as for other facilities in the nuclear weapons complex.

But the effectiveness of the defense infrastructure to maintain the stockpile depends on more than our capacity for production. A production capability depends on our ability to understand the performance of weapons. We cannot, for example, produce and certify nuclear pits without a better, scientific understanding of weapons performance. This science-based approach to stockpile stewardship allows us to make critical decisions about the stockpile, including whether or not nuclear testing is required to resolve a technical issue. This also includes resolving Significant Finding Investigations (SFI's), performing life extensions, and assessing the health of the stockpile annually. I am concerned that we are cutting too deeply into an investment in the predictive science that will prevent us from making wrong or untimely decisions. This investment must not be deferred. Failure, even temporarily, to maintain appropriate levels of investment in experimental and diagnostic facilities and equipment risks creating vulnerabilities from which we might not be able to recover as quickly as might be necessary.

Additionally, we must find ways to assure the Congress of appropriate accountability and transparency in our programs without resorting to Congressional language that would force us to ask permission before beginning even preliminary investigation of advanced concepts. The flexibility to pursue advanced concepts in a manner consistent with established processes of scientific inquiry is important to assuring that we can address new requirements for the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and avoid technological surprise with new or unanticipated developments. Flexibility is equally important in allowing us to exercise the scientific and technical expertise of weapons designers, especially those who do not have nuclear test experience.

Finally, we support the steps that NNSA is taking to streamline operational oversight, encourage and support cooperation among its contractors, and to focus its ef

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