arge memes and stability of White were essential elements contribut42 seres of calculations.

more than fully subscribed, and new capabilities are soon to be de Aamos and Sandia. Livermore is earmarked to take delivery of its computer in FY 2004, a machine that will be capable of 60 to 100 wil move us much closer to ASCT's goal of full-scale simulation of weap es mance using advanced physics models with data derived from extensive.

nies physics simulations. The groundbreaking ceremony for construction Terascale Simulation Facility (TSF) to house this computer was held April

National Ignition Facility (NIF). The High Energy Density Physics tos do effort is a critical element of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is the རསྶ བྷཱཝཱ, ཙ, ཙཱནྡྷོཏི ཝེཏྟཏྭཱ of experimental data to support ongoing LEPs and data to support the ingenterm effort to provide predictive capability and quantitative measures for warhead certification into the future. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the contra experimental facility in the HEDP Program. Housing a 192-beam laser and gccaciated experimental capabilities, NIF will be the world's largest laser, delivering 60 times more energy density than the Omega laser at the University of Rochester cane, the previous Nova laser at Livermore), currently the largest in the HEDP pro

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Ni s the only stewardship facility that will provide experimental conditions relevani te fuiisaan burn, a critical process in the operation of a nuclear weapon. NIF will be egpable of addressing underlying physics issues associated with our stockpile waggons and the ability to conduct integrated experiments at weapons-relevant Kampo siures and pressures. These integrated NIF experiments will allow us to exAs imanesið valdate our computational capabilities, under conditions more closely matchaë të those encountered in actual underground tests. In addition, NIF will be so important toði for evaluating the judgment of the stewards, based on the ability to pvdbot, or not the outcome of complex weapons-relevant experiments.

Cape motion is continuing on NIF. Overall the NIF project is more than 60% comalate in Sopiomber 2001 the NIF conventional facilities construction, a $270 million easyr was completed on schedule and on budget. In May 2002, the Project comakorde insiadation of one-half of NIF's beampath infrastructure. Now in place are de poveston cleaned enclosures for the components of 96 laser beams. In addition, we dierizare to make outstanding technical progress on NIF's optical systems. Great chy has been made on the development of new optics polishing techniques that voce the damage potential of NIF optics much more than our requirements. We se cumpally implementing these new techniques at our vendors to provide the Joy 2 PO N.P's final focusing systems.

638

basoline plan and schedule for NIF was included in General Gordon's certifiverson of the Nid project, provided to Congress on April 6, 2001. The schedule provika dar pagod completion at the end of FY 2008, and the NIF team's goal in the

a trg is to achieve "first light" by delivering four laser beams to the target „hamber Mxperimental plans have been developed to utilize the NIF as it is brought Those early experiments have been designed to provide data to support LEP and to begin to provide some of the data required to improve our ability Aereomide margins against credible failure modes. As commissioning of laser A... gonimuos, &F will quickly become the workhorse experimental facility in de reb OP program

PROGRAM CHALLENGES

Vagy major milestones have been achieved in the Stockpile Stewardship ProCa but datheult challenges he ahead as weapons continue to age and the possibilnew requirements for stockpiled weapons arise. A full spectrum of capabilities ve &pule stewardship is required for long-term success.

11.04 to recognize and evaluate aging issues (and other defects) in weapons and Kromeches before they become problems, we must understand in detail the cacy and technology that govern all aspects of nuclear weapons. We are making ava vas here, but we need even better investigative tools. Enhanced surveillance psites and a better understanding of aging effects in weapon components will eð avoid surprise and provide a longer lead to time for refurbishment actions. A. auclear weapons production complex must be flexible and able to remanufacmy parts and refurbish weapons as needed. There will be requirements for new gest sumponents Investments in production facilities are required to support urneeded refurbishment actions in current LEPS and to begin to deal with cad obsolescence in the production complex. The plants need efficient and means for manufacturing weapon components. In addition, we need to pro

ceed expeditiously with studies of plutonium aging and the W88 Pit Manufacturing and Certification Integrated Project. These efforts will provide an informed basis for future decisions about a plutonium pit production capability.

We also must be responsive to new requirements and prepared to deal with surprises. DoD requires that NNSA retain the capability to design, develop, and produce new-design nuclear warheads. By engaging in studies and exploratory research and development for advanced weapon concepts, we can exercise weapon development capabilities, help to avoid surprise and understand threats, and become better positioned to respond to new weapon requirements should they emerge. In addition, these activities will serve to train new designers and engineers, and they will reinforce ties to DoD and its contractors. Interactions with the plants about manufacturing issues will also be beneficial.

Since the future is uncertain and surprises do occur, we need nuclear-test readiness. In conjunction with the other laboratories and the Nevada Test Site, Livermore is participating in NNSA's examination of measures that can be taken to shorten the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the event. Together, we need to determine the longest lead-time items and costs to shorten them in order to make reasonable trade-off decisions to cost-consciously improve readi

ness.

The nation must be confident in the results of Annual Certification and our assessments of the performance of aging and refurbished warheads as well as any new weapons that are developed. Expert judgment is required, backed by experimental data, the results of validated simulation models, and application of a rigorous, quantitative certification methodology. We need to press ahead to further refine and fully implement the QMU certification methodology together with acquisition of advanced computation and experimental facilities: more powerful ASCI computers, modern laboratory experimental facilities, NIF and DARHT, and then an advanced hydrotest facility. These capabilities are essential elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program's Campaigns and efforts to improve our fundamental understanding of nuclear weapons, which are essential for assessments and certification.

Finally, acquisition of this spectrum of capabilities is time urgent to meet existing requirements for weapon refurbishment and to deal with other weapon performance issues as they arise. At the same time, the LEP workload is substantial, and the program needs to become more flexible and agile so that it will be able to deal with surprises, which are sure to come. There are currently many competing demands on the Stockpile Stewardship Program that must be balanced in order to succeed. Program balance depends on having strong, sustained support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and we are benefiting from this committee's continuing support. Program balance also depends on having quality leadership by the NNSA management team, effective systems and tools for comprehensive program planning, and efficient program execution. We are pleased with General Gordon's actions to provide NNSA clear direction, make necessary organizational changes, improve longterm planning and budgeting, and make NNSA a more effective and efficient organization. We are already seeing some benefits from these actions and expect to see more in coming years.

CLOSING REMARKS

The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to make excellent technical progress in many areas, some of which I have highlighted here: notably, the W87 ICBM warhead life extension, completion of the Contained Firing Facility, progress on construction of the National Ignition Facility, use of the ASCI White supercomputer and future ASCI plans at Livermore, and selected scientific and technical achievements that are improving our understanding of the aging of nuclear weapons and weapon performance. However, many difficult challenges lie ahead. There are many competing demands on the program that must be balanced in order to succeed. Stockpile stewardship continues to be an ambitious, extremely demanding program from both technical and managerial perspectives. Nevertheless, I believe that a strong, sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program will succeed in maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear deterrent over the long term. Achieving that goal depends on your strong, sustained support for the program, effective and efficient management of it by NNSA, flexible and agile production capabilities, and continuing scientific and technical excellence in pursuit of stockpile stewardship at the NNŠA laboratories.

Finally, as you are aware, I will be leaving my position as laboratory director soon. I appreciate the support that this committee has provided to Lawrence Livermore and to me during my tenure. I also appreciate having had the opportunity to

serve our nation in this manner. I look forward to the very positive future that! believe Lawrence Livermore will have with your continued support.

STATEMENT OF DENNIS R. RUDDY

PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, BWXT PANTEX
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 12, 2002

Mr. Chairman, my name is Dennis Ruddy. I am President and General Manager of BWXT Pantex, which manages the National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA) Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas.

Since BWXT Pantex assumed operations of the plant a little more than a year ago, we have made significant progress in fulfilling the site's important national security missions:

• Evaluate, retrofit and repair weapons in support of both life extension programs and certification of weapon safety and reliability,

• Dismantle weapons that are surplus to the strategic stockpile;

• Sanitize components from dismantled weapons;

• Develop, test and fabricate chemical and explosive components; and

• Provide interim storage and surveillance of plutonium components.

BWXT Pantex is preparing to accomplish future work that will provide a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile for many years to come. That preparation involves improving our infrastructure and technology within a new security environment to ensure our ability to meet Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP) objec

tives.

I believe we all recognize the challenge of providing for the security of our facilities and our personnel in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. Immediately after the tragic events of that day, we implemented a contingency plan to ensure the security of the site and our personnel. Since that time, we have enhanced security in a wide variety of areas. We increased security patrols around the site, tightened our requirements to access the facility, improved our physical security systems and replaced equipment that was beginning to show its age. While our workforce, and particularly our security force, has responded admirably, these enhancements have not come without costs. This fiscal year, more than $16 million in supplemental funding has been given to Pantex to cover these expenses. This amount is over and above the $68 million originally earmarked for Pantex security.

Much of this funding has been used to cover overtime for our security force. Before September 11, our security guards normally worked 12 hours a day, on four consecutive days. Then, they had four days off. Since September 11, they have worked six consecutive 12-hour days, then been given two days off. In order to meet the NNSA's new security requirements, reduce our overtime, and put our guards back on a more reasonable work schedule, we established a target to hire 140 additional security officers by the end of this fiscal year. Through operational efficiencies and other security enhancements, we are seeking to reduce this new staffing to 109 additional officers. Either number will be a significant increase in security personnel compared to our staffing before the terrorist attacks. In addition to personnel additions, we are currently considering other security enhancements and their associated costs. In order to develop these security improvements and retain our new personnel, permanent increases in security funding with have to be made a priority. Despite the increased attention that we have given to security, our mission to support Stockpile Stewardship remains our primary focus. The Nation still depends on a reliable nuclear deterrent to protect our country and our allies, and BWXT Pantex is committed to safely providing weapons of the highest quality to our customer. As we look ahead, we see that the majority of our authorized weapons dismantlement workload is scheduled to be complete by 2008. It should be noted that the recent arms reduction agreement between the United States and Russia has not been factored into this schedule. Our weapons evaluation workload remains steady for the future. Beginning in 2005, we are planning for a surge in work to support ŚLEP effort. The additional SLEP workload will involve modifications to weapon systems and will bringith it additional evaluation requirements.

We are now working with the NNSA to ensure that this work is properly funded. There are currently budget shortfalls in FY2003 and FY2004 that cause concern in the areas of Campaigns and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF). Reductions in Campaigns and RTBF funding in FY2003 and FY2004 could delay technological and facility improvements needed to implement the SLEP schedule on time. NNSA is well aware of these issues, and we are working together to assure that we can meet the military's future requirements for the stockpile.

As I have testified to this group before, we have significant infrastructure needs at Pantex. I am happy to report that thanks to the increased funding that we have received, we have made progress in improving our infrastructure. The FY2001 plusup and supplemental funding of approximately $15 million allowed us to make roof repairs to prevent leaks in weapons production facilities and replace some aging equipment necessary for our work. In FY2002, we are receiving $22 million in Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) funds and a plus-up of at least $20 million. These monies will be carefully used to make additional roof repairs, replace obsolete fire alarm systems and carry out much-needed maintenance in a wide variety of areas.

Still, there is much to be done. We had a $218 million backlog in infrastructure needs in FY2000. That number increased to $262 million in FY2001. The FIRP funds mentioned earlier will allow the FY2002 infrastructure backlog to decrease to approximately $248 million. (See Figure 1.) As this chart shows, we have turned the corner and are beginning to decrease the deferred maintenance backlog. While we are spending our infrastructure funds on the highest-priority items, the fact remains that more than 50 percent of the plant's square footage is over 25 years old, and many building elements are at the end of their service life and require restoration.

Figure 1: Deferred Maintenance Baseline

Another key factor in our ability to support Stockpile Stewardship in the long term is the recruiting and retention of employees with critical skills. BWXT Pantex has taken a proactive approach to recruiting, retaining and developing the critical skills necessary to accomplish future weapons work. We have identified the critical skills in engineering, science and other areas necessary for us to maintain and grow our technical basis for weapons work. Of the 1,174 positions we consider to be critical, we have only 84 vacancies. This is an improvement over the 200 critical skill vacancies we had one year ago. We have also eliminated 33 exempt critical skills positions through the streamlining and reorganization of our Manufacturing Division. In addition to outside hiring, we have initiated two new programs to develop our employees from within. Late last year, BWXT Pantex announced the development of an Engineering Graduate Studies Program in conjunction with Texas Tech University, West Texas A&M University and the Amarillo Economic Development Corporation. This program is allowing our employees and other workers in the community to earn advanced engineering degrees locally. We also worked with West Texas A&M to develop an Employee MBA program to allow our workers to receive advanced instruction in business. Both of these programs have been very well received by our employees and will provide us with a higher quality workforce in the

years to come. As long as ur budgets remain stable, we will be able to offer a wariing environment hat leips attract and retain people with the key skills that we

need

As our workload a Pantex ncreases, so ines the amount of oversight at our plant and xher stes round ne mplex. Wale we recognize and agree with the seed ir ndependent evaration if ur resus. he growing oversight into our processes and achines tetracts from he attention we are able to give to the day-to-day wors that me VSA qures I is in ms iscal year one, we have already had 2 nts fom he inspector General. ICE NNSA. General Accounting Office and the Defense Nuclear Ficlines Satery Board. This rend is sharply up from FY2000 and FARL

Cooking to re fiture, we believe that positive gains will be realized as the reorga nization if ne VNSA continues. A streamlined path of communication will improve nir pusiness and make is more age in responding to requests. The ability f MCA a use is resources to better support ne sites wil ncrease efficiency. Move ment if more tecision-making responsicity o ne ieid offices will also lead to more #ncent iperations. We fully support nese manges and look forward to the recrganization being implemented is scon is possicie.

A said it ne jutset. 3WX Pantex saying the groundwork for important Stoexple Stewarismp work extend ne ire rur nuclear weapons stockpile Laprovements in canology and mirastructure will prepare the site to meet NNSA SLP mais in ne nterm, we will work with NNSA and Congress to address the malenges "nat ve murrently face.

Mr. Chairman, hank you for ne opportunity to present these views to you today Look forward to conanuing a work with you and the members of this committee ʼn ensure the safety and rentability of ne stockpile in the future. I will be happy answer any questions the Committee may have.

Biography of Dennis R. Denny' Ruddy,
President and Generai Manager, BWXT Pantex

Denny Ruddy has 30 years of experience managing complex nuclear and non-nuclear manufacturing operations. In 15 years at DCE's Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, he neid staff level positions in Quality Assurance and Manufacturing. As Manager of Quality Assurance, he had wversight of tesign, testing, manufacturing, and prototype reactor operations. As Manager of Core Manufacturing, he was responsible for the production of nuclear reactor cores. fieis, components and test hardware, special nuclear material contri. 3 & 3, and jesign production interface. With Tennech, he was responsible for the total Quality Program for the international packaging operations. In his ast assignment as head of global manufacturing for Tenneco Automotive, he managed 70 plants in 23 countries, a workforce of 20,000, and an operations budget or 33.28. In both the DOE and commercial arenas, he has a proven record of guiding change and improving performance and safety.

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF DR. FREDERICK A. TARANTINO
PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, BECHTEL NEVADA

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PROCUREMENT

JUNE 12, 2002

Mr. Chairman and Committee Members:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Safety, Security, Reliability, and Performance of the United States Nuclear Stockpile. My name is Fred Tarantino and I am the president and general manager of Bechtel Nevada, the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) management and operations contractor for the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

In accordance with Rule XI. Clause 2g of the Rules of the House of Representative, Contract DEAC08–96-NV-11718 with the US Department of Energy, was awarded to Bechtel Nevada with an effective start date of January 1. 1996 for a five-year term at an estimated value of $1.5 billion. The option to extend the contract was exercised for a term of four years and nine months, extending the contract to September 30, 2005, at an estimated value of $1.425 billion.