the ships is such that would present any barrier to us. So I cannot really say that there is a problem that that would solve, Congress man. Mr. BIAGGI. What do you perceive as the chief hinderance to developing a U.S.-flag merchant marine capable of competing in a world trade for the carriage of bulk, mail bulk, and petroleum products? Mr. WOOLSEY. I would presume, Mr. Chairman, hindrance would have to be stated as the same hinderance that faces the Navy, and a lot of the rest of us, in trying to get jobs done, money, resources. Other than that general answer- Mr. BIAGGI. Yes. I think more than money you need a constant commitment. I remember sitting here a number of years ago, I think Mr. Gibson testified before this committee, and this committee was kind of comforted by the knowledge, or at least by the assurance from him, that we were, this Nation was embarking on a meaningful construction program that would rebuild the Nation's merchant marine, and I do not believe we have improved, if my assessment is correct, we bave gone in the other direction, and I am just curious what seems to be the trouble. Is it lack of firm resolve? If you do not have that firm resolve, you will never get the money. If you have that firm resolve you will get the money. I am curious as to where this thing broke down. Mr. WOOLSEY. Congressman, I do not know that I can answer effectively. Representing the Navy Department, I tend to have a maritime perspective on things. I tend to think that is an important national objective, both for merchant marine as well as for fighting ships. But I cannot tell you why, as a nation, we have not gone faster over the last few years than we have. I am afraid I am going to have to leave that decision to the committee and to the Congress to make. Mr. BIAGGI. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey? Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, quoting to you from section 101(b) of the Merchant Marine Act, of 1936, "It is necessary for the National Defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine," subparagraph (b), "capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency." Assuming that a national emergency developed tomorrow, is our merchant marine capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary? Mr. WOOLSEY. In some aspects, yes, Congressman. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. In what aspects is it not? What are your problems? Mr. WOOLSEY. I think the most important problem, from the Defense Department's point of view-and here I am speaking in a rather narrow military sense, in terms of national defense, rather than in a broader sense of national security, including the economic health of the maritime industry-that in a narrow military sense, the key thing we would need to be able to do quickly in transport large amounts of such material as mored personnel carriers, artillery, what have the fighting was taking place. The most that purpose are RO/RO LASH and LASH rom our point of view, in insufficient supply arne. why do you propose to subsidize three LASH ships? essman, the overall scope of construction ram is primarily determined by private nistration, and we derstand it Mr. Secretary, that is the s. to meet the law, are supposed to however, the Navy apparently plays at ships shall be subsidized. mony, you are conceding that you play s that you would need for military cat correct? this way, Congressman. From the ty, the matter of owning your own escre, bulk carriers, as well as other to the Navy, but in this specificay, I do not mind you putting it in e an answer to my question. of ships was made for Maritime cart in selecting the mix of ships were supposed to serve as an auxil saying in my own words is close to what you are saying, we may be saying the same thing. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. If I understand you correctly, and I will ask Mr. Blackwell this when he testifies, is the 1936 act, which mandates by law that the merchant marine be capable of serving as an auxiliary in time of war, deficient because the decision of what kind of ships should be subsidized to do that is left to the Maritime Administration, and the Navy does not participate? Am I accurate? Mr. WOOLSEY. Let me ask Mr. Kinkead. [Short pause.] Mr. WOOLSEY. I suppose what I would have to say, Congressman, is that as long as a ship is needed, even if other types would be needed more, the Navy has not taken a position that a CDS should be denied, and since the overall state of our merchant marine is in such a low condition in terms of numbers, the operational effect of that has been that the Navy has certainly not insisted that CDS be denied to ships that are otherwise useful, but that the Maritime Administration and the industry have agreed upon. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Secretary, again I hear your answer, but I am not certain from it whether the Navy plays any part at all in the selection of the ships to be constructed. Does it or does it not? [Short pause.] Mr. MCCLOSKEY. May the record show these long silences before the answer? Mr. WOOLSEY. We concur before the subsidy is granted, Congressman, but that concurrence has been quite regular, as long as the overall numbers in the merchant marine are as low as they are. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, excuse me if I exceed my 5 minutes. The CHAIRMAN. I have not charged the long pauses against the gentleman. Mr. SNYDER. MR. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to yield my 5 minutes to Mr. McCloskey. The CHAIRMAN. All right. So we have continuity with the questioning. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. On page 1 of your testimony you state, "Tankers, bulk carriers, and special purpose ships are also vital to our national security, as is the vitality of the shipyards which construct and repair both naval and merchant vessels." For some years you had underway a study to determine how many shipyards we need, are vital, to protect the naval and the merchant marine capacity under the 1936 act. Has the Defense Department reached a conclusion as to how many healthy shipyards are needed for our national security? Mr. WOOLSEY. Well, I do not know that that question can be answered with a specific number of shipyards. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Secretary, the study to which I referred, what was its specific goal? If the Secretary is not familiar with it, Í would be glad to defer it the question. To my understanding, it is still classified secret. Mr. WOOLSEY. Are you referring to primary construction yards only, or also overhaul yards, to do overhaul work? Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Both. You have before you a major issue, as I understand it, as to whether a carrier is to be overhauled, in Philadelphia or Norfolk, and I understand, that the number of shipyards necessary to the national security of the United States is the precise subject of the study that was undertaken some 4 years ago, which has been withheld from publication, at least to the public. Mr. WOOLSEY. I believe the study is still going on. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I can just tell you, Mr. Secretary, that 2 years ago your predecessor sat in that chair and advised us that the study would be before us within a matter of 2 or 3 months, I am interested in finding out why the Navy, in 4 years, has not been able to tell us how many shipyards are vital to the national security? Is it for political reasons, or is it national security reasons? Mr. WOOLSEY. Well, Congressman, I was not seeking, in the testimony, to communicate to you obviously, a specific number of shipyards. I do not know the answer to your question. I will do the best I can to answer it. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Do you know whether it is for political or for security reasons that the results of the study have not been given to this Congress? Mr. WOOLSEY. I am sure, Congressman, it is either because the study is ongoing, or some reason of that kind, and I would just have to look into it. I am not familiar with the details of the study, and I will have to look into it, and give you an answer for the record. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Very good. [The following was received for the record.] NEED OF SHIPYARDS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY DOD criteria for maintaining required naval shipyard ship support is as follows: 1. For strategic reasons, to assure that vital drydocking service will not be denied to the fleet by either natural or man-made disasters, two naval shipyards on each coast for carrier overhaul/drydocking, geographically dispersed; i.e., East CoastNorfolk, Philadelphia; West Coast-Puget Sound, Long Beach. 2. Two naval shipyards on each coast for nuclear surface ship overhaul, currently, one of the East Coast shipyards is a private shipyard (Newport News). Navy recognizes that it may need a second East Coast naval shipyard for nuclear cruiser overhauls. Charleston has been chosen as the second naval shipyard and now has an emergency repair capability for these ships; i.e., West Coast-Puget Sound, Mare Island; East Coast-Newport News (a private yard), Norfolk Naval Shipyard. 3. Three naval shipyards on each coast for nuclear submarine overhaul and refueling augmented by three private yards. This total capacity is required to support programmed submarine work; i.e., East Coast-Portsmouth, Norfolk, Charleston; West Coast-Mare Island, Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor; Augmented by: Electric Boat, Newport News and Litton. 4. Three naval shipyards on each coast for overhaul of complex missile ships, to do the volume of specialized work necessary on these complex ships. These hardcore requirements, provide the essential depot level support for our primary combatant ships. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I yield back, at this point, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DONNELLY. If in fact the Department of Defense position is an increased merchant marine fleet, do you not feel that more involvement by DOD, in terms of the makeup of these ships, and more involvement in terms of the specific defense related features of the ship by DOD, in the subsidy program, is necessary? Mr. WOOLSEY. Yes, I think it is necessary. Mr. DONNELLY. Ought it to be done statutorily? Mr. WOOLSEY. What we are trying to do, Mr. Congressman, through our own consultations with MA right now, is improve and update our work on the national defense features themselves, of whatever ships are built. We are quite interested in seeing whether or not, for example, improved communications gear for ships that are being constructed, might become more a part of the NDF requirement than they are now. We would like to look into such matters as perhaps rails for containerships, even ships which could carry-have cranes attached to them, in the event of a mobilization; perhaps even having some equipment purchased as part of the NDF features that was not installed on the ship at the time, and stockpiled. We already, of course, under the consultations on NDF, try to work hard to see that speed, nuclear biological chemical washdown capabilities, adequate electrical generating capability, and a number of capabilities of that kind are included to the degree we would like to have them on the ships which are constructed. I personally think we could do more in the NDF area than has been done in the past. NDF features are well under 1 percent of ship construction costs, and I think there is room for considerable improvement in that area. Mr. DONNELLY. But do you not have statutory responsibility in this area? Mr. WOOLSEY. I am not certain of the question, Congressman. I believe we have primary authority for commenting now. Mr. DONNELLY. You have no primary responsibility, as I understand? Mr. WOOLSEY. We do have to certify that the NDF will be useful. Perhaps it is the word primary that is giving me trouble. In what sense, could I ask, do you mean, primary? Mr. DONNELLY. At this point you have no primary responsibility in terms of mandating the specific needs and goals on these vessels? Mr. WOOLSEY. It is worked out in cooperation with MA. It is true, Congressman, we do not mandate the NDF. Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder? Mr. SNYDER. I will yield my time to Mr. McCloskey. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Evans? Mr. MELVIN EVANS. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Mikulski? Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloskey? Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Secretary, going back to this question of the vitality of the shipyards which construct and repair both naval and merchant marine vessels. Since they are vital to our merchant marine and to our national security, can you state what steps or programs the Navy is considering to revitalize American shipyards? Mr. WOOLSEY. I think Secretary Claytor's first priority when he came into office, Congressman, was to get a handle on the very large shipbuilding claims that had built up in the three largest shipbuilders for the Navy: Newport News, Electric Boat, and Litton Ingalls. Those claims, and the contract disputes surrounding them |